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 Civil wars have long been characterized in the comparative politics literature as 
having profoundly negative economic effects for both individual households and 
countries on a larger scale.  However, variation in postwar economic outcomes indicates 
that conflict may indeed have some curative effects.  I argue political settlements in the 
aftermath of civil wars can shape postwar economic outcomes by transforming 
institutions critical to agricultural productivity.  The structure of the state postwar can 
shape land tenure security, local government participation, and the management of 
preexisting social divisions.  I employ a case study method controlling for differences on 
the independent variable in order to better study agricultural productivity postwar.  Using 
archival data, I examine the state of the agricultural sector in three sub-Saharan African 
country cases. 
 I contribute to the existing scholarship on civil wars, postwar economic recovery, 
and institutional development in several ways.  I discuss how civil wars can precipitate 
institutional changes that have a measurable effect on postwar economies.  I establish that 
postwar settlements are important not only in terms of forestalling a return to violence 
and providing security guarantees to warring parties, but these agreements can establish a 
foundation for economic growth (or economic stagnation).  Finally, while I acknowledge 
the importance of having a good institutional foundation for economic growth, I 
emphasize the interaction between the local political context and institutional 
arrangements aimed at bringing about greater productivity.   
 My research has broader implications for our understanding of the effectiveness 
of aid disbursements and loan programs to the developing world.  Foreign aid and loan 
programs often do not take into account local conditions that may assist or hamper 
economic growth.  Promoting property rights, as multilateral development agencies such 
as the IMF and the World Bank are wont to do, may be wrongheaded in cases with 
lingering social divisions or a lack of participatory mechanisms.  In fact, pushing 
formalized property rights in countries with considerable class or ethnic strife could lead 
to conflict recurrence.  Additionally, and contrary to the insistence of international aid 
agencies, I find that countries can emerge from civil war with a strong foundation for 
economic growth, provided the postwar political settlement addresses some of the 
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Chapter 1: The Economic Consequences Of Civil War 
Introduction 
 Civil wars have profound economic effects that have been traditionally 
characterized as solely detrimental.  Civil wars devastate otherwise productive industries, 
divert social welfare spending to security, and imperil individuals and households 
through property destruction, the spread of disease, diminishing access to food and water, 
and the increased chances of physical harm.  However, there exists variation in postwar 
economic outcomes that indicate conflict may indeed have some curative effects.  Some 
countries stagnate economically for years in the aftermath of an intrastate conflict, while 
others recover and grow at impressive rates in the postwar period.  My central research 
question is what accounts for this variation in postwar economic outcomes?  In contrast 
to other scholars who characterize civil wars as wholly negative for the economy, in my 
dissertation I found that postwar political settlements had the ability to generate positive 
economic outcomes through the institutions that arise in the aftermath of conflict.  I 
studied variation in agricultural productivity to examine the impact of political 
settlements on postwar economies. 
 Variation in postwar outcomes can be explained by political changes that occur as 
a result of civil war; political settlements can help generate positive change in postwar 
economies through the transformation of institutions.  Two questions are crucial in the 
aftermath of a civil war: who should rule and what is the structure of the state?  There is a 
wide universe of cases where there is variation on who controls the state and the structure 
of the state postwar.  I selected three cases with said variation on the control of the state 
and the structure of the state in the postwar period.  Using databases compiling household 
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surveys and land records, I examined the state of the agricultural sector in three sub-
Saharan African country cases (Burundi, Sierra Leone, and Uganda).  Who rules and the 
structure of the state can shape land tenure security, local government participation, and 
the management of preexisting social divisions, all of which are crucial in shaping 
agricultural productivity postwar.  I found the aforementioned institutions to be the 
primary causal explanations of postwar agricultural productivity. 
 The chapter proceeds as follows.  First, a definition of the phenomenon of civil 
wars will be provided.  Second, the economic consequences of civil wars related 
specifically to development will be discussed.  The deleterious effects of economic 
growth lost as a result of intrastate conflict becomes especially clear when comparisons 
are made between countries that have and have not experienced civil war.  The 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) will be used as a baseline measure of the aims 
of development that intrastate conflict impedes.  Third, the rationale for studying postwar 
agricultural productivity will be provided and the challenges facing farming communities 
in sub-Saharan Africa will be discussed.  In developing countries, the majority of the 
population is dependent on agriculture and the raising of livestock for their economic 
livelihood.  As most civil wars take place in developing countries, the ways in which the 
agricultural sector is diminished during wars can have a significant impact on the wealth 
of households for generations (Holsti 1996).  Fourth, civil wars have clear implications 
for the economy of a war-torn state on the macro level and the micro level.  Macro-level 
economic effects center on the changes in Gross Domestic Product (GDP)/Gross National 
Product (GNP), shifts in exports and imports, and changes to the tax base that occur as a 
result of conflict.  Micro-level economic effects highlight the changes war brings to 
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individuals and families caught in the fighting.  Fifth, the processes of aided and 
autonomous recovery after the end of a civil war will be compared and contrasted.  
Central to the autonomous recovery argument is the conceit that war can generate 
institutions that serve as foundation for postwar economic growth.  Sixth, some of the 
specific ways in which civil war can facilitate institutional change beneficial to the 
economy will be examined.  An outline of the argument tying institutional change during 
civil wars and postwar economic consequences for the agricultural sector will then be 
presented.   
 
Definition of civil war  
 Definitional questions regarding what constitutes a civil war are ongoing given 
the nuances of the category and the inherent ambiguities of what constitutes an intrastate 
conflict.  However, for the purposes of this dissertation, the minimal definition of civil 
war put forward by Stathis Kalyvas will be employed.  Civil war is defined as “armed 
combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to 
a common authority at the outset of hostilities (Kalyvas 2006: 17).” This definition has 
several key components.1 First, the violence that takes place in an intrastate conflict is of 
an organized nature.  This element of the definition of civil wars excludes the kind of 
violence seen in an urban riot or low-level banditry, which lacks the scale and 
sophistication of combat carried out by government or insurgent forces.  Civil wars are 
																																																								
1 The Kalyvas definition leaves out several commonly mentioned aspects of the phenomenon.  The 
definition skips over larger conceptual debates regarding the root causes of civil wars, the goals of 
intrastate conflict, and the motivations of the actors involved.  At the same time however, the Kalyvas 
definition illustrates the wide-ranging nature of the category of intrastate wars. Proxy wars, revolutions, 
separatist conflicts, among many other forms of conflict, are able to be included under the Kalyvas 
guidelines.  This definition then has clear benefits in terms of the breadth of case selection (Kalyvas 2006). 	
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thus generally more destructive than similar acts of mass violence.  Second, there must be 
an element of contested sovereignty in the civil war; this is also characterized as divided 
or dual sovereignty (Tilly 1978: 191; Trotsky 1965: 224).  The allegiances of all of the 
actors involved in a civil war need to have been committed to a single sovereign state 
before the outbreak of hostilities (Kalyvas 2006: 18). This element of the civil war 
definition highlights the devastating effects conflict can have on the existing social order 
as civilians who previously lived under a singular regime begin committing acts of 
violence upon each other.2  The ensuing breakdown of normal societal relations, as well 
as the struggle to rebuild interpersonal trust shattered in the conflict, has profound effects 
for postwar economic recovery.  Third, government must be a party to the organized 
violence of the intrastate conflict.  This definition assumes there are at least two parties to 
a conflict and the state authority must be a part of the contestation.  Diminished state 
capacity and shifting governmental priorities as a result of the intrastate conflict also have 
considerable implications for postwar economic recovery.   
 
The development gap 
 Core social, political, and economic institutions needed for the functioning of a 
society are seriously harmed during internal conflict.  Most importantly, those countries 
that have experienced civil war have a profound development gap compared to those 
countries that have not undergone such conflict, where there are strong negative 
outcomes in the economic performance of the former.  For example, the countries of 
																																																								
2 David W.P. Elliott, in his historical account of the Vietnam War, transcribes the words of a local peasant 
regarding the nature of the conflict: “There cannot be two suns and there cannot be two kings for one 
country.” Although contemporary civil wars differ greatly from the conflict in Vietnam, especially 
considering the end of the Cold War superpower standoff in which the Vietnam War took place, contested 
sovereignty is a crucial component of any internal conflict (Elliott 2007).		
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Burundi and Burkina Faso shared a similar economic growth trajectory in the Cold War 
era up until the 1990s.  However, the assassination of the first Hutu President of Burundi 
by Tutsi soldiers triggered an ethnic civil war that resulted in the deaths of over 300,000 
people.3 By 2008, the national income of Burkina Faso was double that of Burundi, as a 
result of the lost decades of economic development for the latter country.   
 The presence of internal conflict creates a variety of deleterious social and 
economic conditions that linger postwar.  Roughly 38 million of the 230 million primary 
school age children in nineteen conflict countries are not enrolled in school when they 
normally would be under peacetime circumstances.  Almost one quarter of the population 
of the globe live in countries that are either currently experiencing conflict or are in a 
phase of post-conflict reconstruction.  On a worldwide scale, these countries account for 
24% of the malnourished population, 29% of those living in poverty, 56% of the 
populace lacking a primary school education, and 35% of all births given minus the 
presence of medical personnel (Gates, et al. 2010).  According to Scott Gates, Håvard 
																																																								
3 According to a timeline established by the BBC, regional leaders from Tanzania, Uganda, and South 
Africa oversaw a mediation effort of the civil war in Burundi from 1993 to 2006, after a formal request by 
the United Nations.  Hardline Hutu and Tutsi rebels continued to engage in hostilities and played spoiler to 
the proceedings but were not able to forestall a referendum on a new constitution for the country or national 
elections for the legislature and presidency in 2005.  From 2006 to 2008, Burundi experienced a surge of 
violence from the FLN (Forces for National Liberation), the last remaining extremist Hutu militia.  The 
national courts, special tribunals, and truth and reconciliation commissions have not addressed many of the 
war crimes that occurred during the Burundian civil war.  In the midst of mediation efforts and ongoing 
violence, hundreds of thousands of individuals fled the country and the gradual return of the refugees post-
2008 has only triggered further smaller scale property conflicts.  Government forces and the National 
Liberation Forces (FNL) rebels signed a ceasefire in 2008 but the increasingly authoritarian tendencies of 
President Pierre Nkrunziza dashed hopes for a sustained peace.  In June of 2010, Nkrunziza won a 
fraudulent election for a second term and FNL leader Agathon Rwasa went into hiding while his 
insurgency rearmed themselves and launched attacks against government facilities.  In May of 2015, 
Nkrunziza won a third term in another highly dubious election. Mass protests ensued after a failed army 
officers coup during the same time period and Nkrunziza attempted to quell any dissent with force from his 
security forces.  Hundreds have been killed and more than 260,000 have fled the country as a result of the 
escalating violence that took place in the year following the presidential election.  The effects of the 
internal conflict in Burundi are still keenly felt to this day and can be seen in the poor performance of the 
country on nearly every social and economic indicator. 
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Hegre, Håvard Mokleiv Nygård, and Håvard Strand a medium-sized conflict is expected 
to reduce life expectancy by 1 year, yield a 10% increase in infant mortality, increase 
malnourishment by 3.3%, and deprive 1.8 % of the population from access to drinkable 
water.4  There are clear economic growth implications given the presence of conflict 
(Gates, et al. 2012: 1713-1714).  
 An analysis of progress toward the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 
countries that have experienced internal conflict versus countries that have not 
experienced internal conflict serves to further illustrate the far-reaching implications of 
the development gap.  I use MDGs to highlight the degradation of a number of health and 
social indicators as a result of civil war.  The MDGs represent benchmarks of 
achievement toward a number of social and economic indicators for developing 
countries. The eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, the achievement of universal 
primary education, the promotion of gender equality and female empowerment, the 
reduction of child mortality, the improvement of maternal health, the elimination of 
HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases, the promotion of environmental sustainability, 
and the development of international agreement regarding the value of democracy are the 
seven core goals of the MDGs.5 The General Assembly of the United Nations agreed 
upon the contours of the MDGs at the Millennium Summit in 2000.  Progress toward the 
																																																								
4 A medium sized conflict is defined as having 2500 battle deaths according to the UPPSALA Conflict 
Data Program (UCDP). 
5 William Easterly highlights number of salient criticisms of the MDGs.  Some of the seven core objectives 
of the MDGs are quite difficult to measure, such as environmental sustainability and a growing consensus 
regarding democracy, and thus tracking progress on these indicators may be out of reach.  There has been 
little transparency regarding why the seven objectives of the MDGs were chosen for particular attention on 
the part of the international aid community and what the explicit connection is between the aforementioned 
indicators to economic development.  While MDGs have been successful in increasing the amount of aid 
developed countries are willing to pledge to developing countries, much of the increased aid has gone to 




MDGs has combined the efforts of the United Nations, the World Bank, and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in reshaping aid to the developing world (Easterly 
2009: 26). However, examining the countries that have encountered difficulty in reaching 
the targets prescribed by the MDGs is instructive in our understanding of the effects of 
internal conflict on development. 
 There are clear divides in progress toward the MDGs among countries that have 
experienced conflict and countries that have not experienced conflict.  The IMF and 
World Bank have castigated several sub-Saharan African countries for failing to make 
significant progress toward the MDGs in comparison with other regions of the globe 
(Easterly 2009: 2).  A number of sub-Saharan African states have missed every one of the 
MDGs as of 2015.  Statistical data on the percentage of people living on less than $1 a 
day, the total completion rate of primary school, the ratio of boys to girls in secondary 
education, the number of deaths per 1,000 of children under the age of 5, a ratio of 
maternal mortality per 100,000 live births, the percentage of the population aged 15-49 
afflicted by HIV, and the percentage of the population lacking access to purified water 
sources seem to back up the belief that many hold in the international aid community of 
an African continent lagging behind the rest of the world in terms of development.6  
																																																								
6 William Easterly argues that the agenda of the Millennium Development Goals is heavily biased against 
African nations because of the indicators used to measure development progress.  African nations struggle 
in achieving the levels of poverty reduction, universal primary school enrollment, and child mortality 
proscribed by the MDGs because these states start with lower per capita income, lower primary school 
enrollment, and higher child mortality than comparable regions of the globe.  Furthermore, although sub-
Sarahan Africa is criticized for failing to reduce maternal mortality and eliminate the prevalence of HIV 
according to the standards set by the MDGs, there is no reliable data available for trends in either category 
to base such a reproach on the part of the international aid community.  Overall, Easterly asserts the major 
flaw in the MDGs is an overemphasis on absolute changes in the seven core indicators of the program 
versus the percentage changes, where the latter offers a far more positive outlook for sub-Saharan Africa 
than the former.  According to Easterly, such faulty assessments reinforce the commonly held narrative of 
Africa being a place of sustained societal and economic failure to the transnational actors that should have a 
stake in the development of the continent (Easterly 2009). 
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Although some scholars argue such a blanket characterization of the performance of sub-
Saharan African societies is unjust, the presence of internal conflict is a statistically 
significant factor in progress towards the MDGs (Easterly 2009: 32). 
 There are a number of causal explanations for why conflict specifically impedes 
achievement of the MDGs and generally hampers economic development.  The 
differences in achievement of the MDGs in countries that have faced or are currently 
facing intrastate warfare versus countries that have not undergone the same turmoil can 
be attributed to the effects of conflict on the larger macroeconomic state of the country 
and the health of the population caught in the midst of the fighting.  Civil wars have been 
characterized as “development in reverse,” where national income declines by 
approximately 15% after an internal conflict lasting at least seven years, when compared 
to a country where such fighting is absent (Collier 2003: 17). The destruction of 
resources, the disruption of the social order, the diversion of public expenditures to the 
war effort, and the shifting of assets out of the country, and the phenomenon of dis-
saving all contribute to the damage an economy sustains as a result of internal conflict.7 
These are five causal mechanisms that aid in explaining how changes in the 
macroeconomic situation of conflict countries lead to considerable difficulty in fostering 
economic development or meeting the MDGs (Collier 1999: 168-183).8  
																																																								
7 Dis-saving, also known as negative saving, is defined as any situation where spending is greater than 
income.  Economists have noted that patterns of household dis-saving generally increase as people age and 
move into retirement.  Adult children moving away from the home and becoming financially independent 
trigger patterns of dis-saving among elderly populations worldwide.  Severe economic stressors, such as 
The Great Depression in the United States, also lead to patterns of systematic dis-saving.  Intrastate and 
interstate war are the kinds of economic stressors that prompt widespread negative saving in civilian 
populations caught in the midst of the fighting (Collier 1999). 
8 Christopher Cramer critiques presenting conflict as entirely destructive and ultimately wasteful.  He notes 
violence has the potential to bring about institutional changes and unleash considerable a wave of social 
creativity in its wake.  Using the case study of Angola in the twentieth century for his analysis, he examines 
how war finance aided the institutional development of the country and its integration into global markets.  
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 The public health consequences of civil war on civilian populations cannot be 
overlooked in our understanding of the development gap and the core targets of the 
MDGs.  The poor health of locals caught in the midst of intrastate conflict can be 
attributed to the degree to which populations are exposed to conditions which facilitate 
increased risk of disease and death, the availability of financial and human resources 
needed to take on public heath needs of people within a conflict zone, the private and 
public sector allocation of resources devoted to mitigating public health crises, and the 
extent to which resources apportioned to the public health needs of the civilian 
populations are effectively administered (Ghobarah, et al. 2003: 191-192).  
 If civilians are directly exposed to fighting in intrastate conflict, especially in 
scenarios where battle deaths are high, their chances of death or disability are greatly 
increased.  However, the greatest effects on the public health of civilians in civil war 
come as a result of the indirect consequences of warfare.  Displacement of populations 
facilitates the spread of infectious disease through elevated levels of stress that weaken 
immune systems, crowded conditions, lack of access to potable water, substandard 
sanitation measures, and poor nutrition (Ghobarah, et al. 2003: 193).  Disease has 
consistently killed more civilians than direct fighting for much of the history of war; 
roughly 4/5 of the casualties in Darfur did not occur in pitched battles or raids for 
example.  The spread of disease, and the component increases in infant mortality as a 
result of the transmission of infectious pathogens, accounted for the majority of the 
																																																																																																																																																																					
In fact, Cramer points out how central periods of conflict were in the development of the advanced 
economies of the Western world and still is in the contemporary period.  He highlights how the transitions 
to capitalism in the industrialized economies of the present have been fraught with violence as previous 
economic, political, and social organizations are upended.  Thus, he criticizes what he calls the “historical 




deaths in Darfur (Degomme & Guha-Sapir 2010: 297). Furthermore, states are often 
unwilling or incapable of providing the means of stopping the spread of infectious 
disease to displaced populations in wartime, thus letting the conditions of refugee camps 
worsen and cause further outbreaks.  Conflict disrupts public health measures on a 
national level as a result of wartime destruction of transportation infrastructure, 
effectively cutting off needy populations from medical facilities.  Wartime destruction or 
disruption of communication and transportation infrastructure also greatly hampers the 
effective distribution of food, potable water, medical supplies and other relief supplies to 
refugee populations and civilians living in their prewar places of settlement.  Medical 
personnel, who generally have some means to escape conflict, often leave war-torn 
countries and thereby leave the most vulnerable elements of the civilian population 
behind to experience the full brunt of the consequences of internal strife (Gates, et al. 
2012: 1715).  Internal conflict causes a significant regress on the MDG indicators of a 
reduction infant mortality, an improvement in maternal health, the elimination of the 
spread of infectious diseases, and the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger.   
 
Postwar Agricultural Recovery 
 Agriculture is a valuable bell weather for the state of most African economies 
given the high percentage of the population working in the farming sector.  The 
development gap literature also applies to agricultural productivity (or the lack thereof) in 
civil war scenarios.  The growth of the agricultural sector in sub-Saharan Africa at the 
end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first has been quite 
impressive.  From 1984 to 2003, the total output growth of agriculture averaged 3.2% 
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annually.  Only China posted better agricultural output growth over the same time period.  
In contrast, from 1972 to 1983, total output growth was less than 1% annually (Nin-Pratt 
and Yu 2009).  The primary reason for a more productive agricultural sector in Africa has 
been the gradual decrease of civil war outbreak on the continent.   
 In most rural households, livestock and other farm assets serve as the primary 
source of family wealth.  However, this wealth is greatly depleted during civil wars.  The 
farmers of Mozambique are estimated to have lost 80% of their cattle during the intrastate 
conflict that ran from 1977 to 1992 (Tilman Bruck 1996).  In the 1980s, many of those 
living in northern Uganda during the civil war lost almost all of their cattle and farm 
assets (Annan, et al. 2006; Gersony 1997).  The agricultural sector as a whole is 
diminished significantly during intrastate conflict as rural citizens are forced to flee their 
farms. 
 One of the assumptions I make in this dissertation is that the key to agricultural 
recovery postwar depends upon the successful balancing of both food production and the 
return of the export market.  The return of food production is critical in reducing the 
unemployment and rising poverty levels associated with intrastate conflict.  The return of 
the export market is crucial to external solvency (as paying the service costs on 
considerable debt has been a major impediment in economic growth in many developing 
countries).  However, the recovery of either one of the aforementioned indicators without 
the other can be problematic for the postwar economic environment.  Mozambique 
experienced the return of food production after the end of the conflict but the export 
market struggled and service costs of the national debt rose sharply.  While this state of 
affairs was elemental to alleviating poverty, the country struggled with insolvency in the 
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postwar period.  Nicaragua witnessed a return of the export market but limited recovery 
of food production and as a result poverty persisted after the civil war (Bruck, et al. 
2000).  The postwar challenge then for either external interveners or local governments is 
to achieve this balance of food production and exports.  The project will seek to measure 
both food and export production in the selected country cases.     
 Increased agricultural productivity in Africa has been instrumental in the driving 
industrial policy throughout the continent.  However, government manipulation of 
agricultural commodity prices and predation toward rural farming communities has 
occurred quite frequently.  Postcolonial governments in sub-Saharan Africa sought to 
shift resources from agriculture to industry and manufacturing.  Through this transfer of 
resources, agricultural production has been subject to substantial manipulation by the 
rent-seeking behavior of government officials via state marketing boards.9 State 
marketing boards would buy cash crops, sell the goods at world market prices, and then 
use the surplus to finance cheap loans to industry.  These surpluses would also find their 
way into the hands of government officials on the state marketing boards, in addition to 
any further rents gleaned from urban elites from the industrial sector.  Agricultural inputs 
such as fertilizer and tractors were often brought in tax-free and farmers who made use of 
these resources received access to subsidized credit in return.  These subsidies only 
applied to wealthy farmers, as poor farmers generally did not utilize enough of the 
aforementioned agricultural inputs to qualify.  The need for governments in sub-Saharan 
Africa to court the political support of industrial workers and elite farmers drove the 
																																																								
9 State agricultural marketing boards in sub-Saharan Africa had their roots in the colonial period.  Imperial 
authorities sought to create a monopsony (where there was only one buyer for agricultural products), and 
tasked state marketing boards with buying all the cash crops in a colony and then exporting them abroad. 
Imperial powers used state marketing boards to stabilize crop prices and this institution persisted even after 
the end of direct colonial rule. (Bates 1981) 
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policies regarding the prerogatives of state marketing boards and agricultural inputs 
respectively.  Additionally, in order to meet the demands of industrial workers for higher 
wages, governments in sub-Saharan Africa have chosen to use inflationary measures and 
repression of rural labor to keep food prices low.  Thus, real wages for industrial workers 
rise due to cheap food while governments avoid increasing wages (which often scares 
away potential investors).  State marketing boards were the mechanism by which 
resources could be transferred from the agricultural sector in the countryside to 
burgeoning industrial initiatives in urban areas.  Postcolonial governments in sub-Saharan 
Africa have repeatedly favored the development of industrial capacity over the interests 
of rural producers (Bates 1981).  Market manipulation and rent-seeking behavior on the 
part of government officials is crucial in understanding the agricultural sector and the 
struggles of farmers in rural communities throughout sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Macro level effects 
 Civil wars have a wide variety of consequences at all strata of economic 
organization.  There are particular developments, however, in the macro economy that 
causes significant nationwide changes as a result of the conflict.  Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP)/ Gross National Product (GNP) declines during periods of internal strife as 
casualties mount, populations are displaced, markets experience disruption, and 
infrastructure is damaged or destroyed.  These declines vary in their significance for the 
long-term performance of the postwar economy.  Long-and short-duration intrastate wars 
have varying effects on GDP growth postwar.  Paul Collier notes a continued decline in 
GDP growth rates for civil wars of a short duration after the conclusion of hostilities, as a 
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result of the postwar environment being less advantageous to capital projects and foreign 
direct investment than the antebellum period (Collier 1999: 175-176).   
 However, there exists a Phoenix effect of rapid recovery and GDP growth for 
internal conflicts of a long duration (of at least 15-20 years).10  While a state will 
experience an economic decline shortly after the end of a civil war, the Phoenix effect 
describes how prewar growth trajectories are generally more instructive in predicting 
postwar recovery than the nature of the conflict itself (Organski & Kugler 1977: 1364-
1366).  Siyan Chen, Norman V. Loayza, and Marta Reynal-Querol also find significant 
levels of GDP per capita decline postwar as a result of the destruction that takes place 
during the conflict.  The authors find above average economic growth takes place during 
postwar recovery, with the greatest gains occurring in the fourth or fifth year after the 
conclusion of hostilities.  Akin to the Phoenix effect, the scholars find economic recovery 
postwar takes the shape of an inverted U (Chen et al. 2008: 72-79).  Postwar growth 
trajectories in internal conflicts have wide-ranging effects for the entire country 
recovering from the worst effects of the fighting.  
 Additionally, there are macro-level developments in the realm of exports during 
civil wars.  Exports often fall during internal conflicts, as there is a shift to local 
																																																								
10 The Phoenix effect describes a pattern of economic recovery originally observed in studies of the effects 
of interstate wars on the power differentials between actors in the international system.  Brandon Prins and 
Suveyda Karakaya apply the findings of Abramo FK Organski and Jacek Kugler regarding the Phoenix 
effect to studies of economic recovery after intrastate war.  Brandon Prins and Suveyda Karakaya find that 
the Phoenix effect does apply to civil wars with some caveats.  GDP per capita and life expectancy do 
recover quickly after the conclusion of hostilities, however, within a decade after the intrastate conflict, 
health indicators in a war-torn country still lag behind their prewar levels.  The public health situation 
postwar is clearly inferior to the prewar situation of the country.  Furthermore, Brandon Prins and Suveyda 
Karakaya have found that recovery trends are highly dependent upon the duration of the conflict, the 
intensity of the fighting, regime type of the state undergoing internal strife, and prewar poverty levels.  
Economic recovery in intrastate conflicts is greatly hampered by the presence of multiple conflicts, a low 
GDP per capita, and the presence of a non-democratic regime (Organski & Kugler 1977; Prins & Karakaya 
2011).   
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production, a disruption in international markets, and general declines in output as a 
result of the hostilities.  Imports either remained stable or increased during times of 
intrastate war via government access to external aid and private credit.  As a result, 
foreign debt often rises sharply during civil wars.  Furthermore, foreign exchange during 
intrastate conflict is often redirected toward military expenditures or consumer goods 
deemed essential, thereby diverting resources for a whole host of other economic inputs, 
needed for the functioning of a healthy economy (Stewart 2003: 330-333).   
 Lastly, civil wars shape national expenditures by altering the sources of tax 
revenue for governments during internal strife.  During civil wars, many individuals and 
larger communities often shift to subsistence farming and the informal economy in order 
to secure a livelihood amidst the chaos of fighting, as opportunities to generate income 
that would normally be available in peacetime are no longer present.11  Production of 
illegal commodities (narcotics) and the proliferation of illegal trading networks 
(smuggling) will increase given the diminished attention of the state on problems of 
domestic criminality and a lack of resources to combat these particular problems.  The 
tax revenue that the government can collect will decrease in wartime as a result of these 
altered and generally less profitable economic arrangements.  In country cases where 
																																																								
11 The growing percentage of the population engaged in subsistence farming is not only a consequence of 
civil war, but also a possible motivation behind the initial hostilities.  Kishor Sharma, in her study of the 
root causes of the Maoist insurgency of Nepal, notes the increasing prominence of subsistence farming in 
the former constitutional monarchy.  In an attempt to develop Nepal through import-substitution 
industrialization (ISI), development funds were transferred from agricultural initiatives to the 55 public 
enterprises created by the state and located in urban areas within the country.  Although agriculture 
employed the overwhelming majority of the Nepali population, only 26% of development spending was 
allocated to this particular sector of the economy.  The rising lack of basic amenities in the countryside, 
such as potable water, transportation infrastructure, and healthcare services, due to a lack of government 
spending in rural areas, caused a significant migration to urban centers within Nepal.  A decline in the 
incentives surrounding commercial farming combined with a lack of basic amenities increased landlessness, 
unemployment, and overall disaffection with the direction of the government.  The perilous economic 
situation in the Nepali countryside was a significant root cause in the Maoist insurgency within the small 
constitutional monarchy (Sharma 2006). 
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there is an outright collapse of state revenue-gathering mechanisms, social services 
provision also fails entirely.  Furthermore, during an intrastate conflict, governments will 
allocate available funds toward military expenditures, to the detriment of needed social 
and economic spending.  During wartime, as a result of an erosion of the tax base, greater 
domestic and international borrowing, increases in the money supply, and soaring 
military expenditures, national budget deficits grow considerably (Imai and Weinstein 
2000).   
 
Micro level effects 
 Micro-level economic effects of civil war hinge upon the entitlements the local 
population is accustomed to being available.  As Amartya Sen asserts, entitlements entail 
the command individuals or households have over needed resources.  If the level of 
entitlements enjoyed by an individual or family falls below a certain point, abject human 
misery will be the result.  This is described by Amartya Sen as an “entitlement failure.” 
All of the numerous categories of entitlements are affected by intrastate conflict, some 
more than others.  Public entitlements are those goods, services, and subsidies supplied 
by the national government.  Market entitlements involve the purchasing power 
individuals have access to as a result of their wages.  Direct entitlements are those 
benefits given to business and commercial interests by the government in order to spur 
economic growth and productivity.  Civic entitlements are those goods, services, and 
subsidies provided by communities or non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  Extra-
legal entitlements are those goods, services, and subsidies that do not fall under either of 
the previously mentioned categories as a result of their origins in illicit activity or 
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criminal networks (Sen 1981: 750-757).  Thus, micro-level economic effects of civil war 
deal with the entitlements, or control individuals have over resources, and their access to 
critical needs such as food, potable water, and health services.  The changing natures of 
these entitlements and the need to secure basic necessities inform a great deal of 
individual behavior and decision-making during internal strife.   
 As a central feature of the micro level economic effects of civil wars, individual 
entitlements transform in profound ways as a result of conflict.  Of all the aforementioned 
categories, public entitlements experienced the most severe declines in availability.  
These declines were especially prominent in countries where the revenue sources for the 
government collapsed as a result of the internal strife.  Social spending per person 
declined sharply during the majority of intrastate conflicts.  Market entitlements also 
decreased significantly as a result of a fall in formal production and a move towards 
informal economic arrangements.  Furthermore, as previously mentioned, rising levels of 
inflation coupled with widening budget deficits during intrastate conflict undercut the 
value of worker wages.  The level of direct entitlements doled out during wartime varies 
considerably depending upon the intensity of the fighting.  Direct entitlements rose in 
particular regions of a country undergoing civil war, but not in areas where fighting was 
so heavy as to render any type of productive activity impossible, such as Mozambique in 
the 1970s or Afghanistan in the 1990s (Stewart 2003: 335).  Public, market, and direct 
entitlements generally experience declines during intrastate conflict, and especially in 
areas where the fighting was most intense.   
 Unlike the other categories, civic and extra-legal entitlements tend to rise quite 
consistently during civil wars.  Civic entitlements generally increased during internal 
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conflict to make up for the declines in other resources over which individuals regularly 
exert a measure of control.  Local villages, domestic and international NGOs, and 
insurgencies often deliver needed services during internal strife, given the absence or 
reduction of government assistance.  Much like direct entitlements, the dissemination of 
civic entitlements is dependent upon conflict intensity; areas of heavy fighting often 
preclude communities, NGOs, and rebel government structures from responding to severe 
crises.  Extra-legal entitlements also tend to increase during civil wars.  Novel economic 
arrangements of profit and trade arise during internal strife, both legal and illegal in 
nature.  The return of opium poppy cultivation to Afghanistan after the ouster of the 
Taliban leadership by American forces is an example of the transformation of economies 
as a result of civil war  (Goodhand 2000: 87-90).  However, there are elements of the 
local population that stand to gain by extra-legal entitlements while other sectors of 
society may lose their livelihoods in addition to recurring opportunities for physical 
harm.  The rise of the informal economy in the former Yugoslavia is representative of the 
rise of illicit economic activities due to intrastate warfare (Schlichte 2003: 30). 
Entitlements fall generally, across a wide variety of civil war cases, and the resulting 
insecurity on the part of the populace will often garner international attention.   
 
Aided Versus Autonomous Recovery 
 Given the aforementioned macro and micro level consequences of civil wars, it is 
no surprise then that external actors seek to improve upon the precarious postwar 
environment.  Since the end of the Cold War stalemate in the United Nations Security 
Council, post settlement peacebuilding operations have been considerably more frequent.  
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Likewise, post-conflict reconstruction is now an increasingly prominent issue on the 
foreign policy agenda across numerous national capitals (Eizenstat, et al. 2005).  
Furthermore, scholars have proposed models such as neo-trusteeship (where states with 
significant economic or military interests in a country experiencing conflict take charge 
of a transitional administration and focus on building up taxation capacity) and shared 
sovereignty contracts (where international actors assume control over specific issue areas 
in a war-torn state in order to strengthen domestic institutions ravaged by conflict) 
(Fearon & Laitin 2004; Krasner 2004).  External actors seek to initiate a process of aided 
recovery in war-torn states.  Aided recovery is defined as “…the process by which 
international actors play a vital role in ending a conflict, maintaining or guaranteeing a 
negotiated settlement, and assisting in the recovery process (Weinstein 2005: 9).”  
 The economic consequences of civil wars, insofar as they generate weakened 
institutions that lead to diminished state capacity, are of particular concern to the 
international community.  The expansion of terrorist networks, the smuggling of 
weapons, the sale of illegal narcotics, the spread of disease, and the movement of 
refugees across borders have become major security concerns for those states in the 
immediate vicinity of a civil war as well as developed countries.  A state that is unable to 
provide for the security of its populace is seen as a product of institutional weakness 
(Weinstein 2005).  Intervention is seen as a way to prevent the worst effects of conflict 
spillover and regional destabilization. 
 External actors that have intervened in a conflict scenario primarily focus on the 
development and maintenance of institutions that promote peace and stability. There is 
some evidence that the presence of international actors in a conflict situation can aid with 
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the conditions required for a durable peace settlement.  Barbara Walter discusses how the 
peacekeepers can facilitate disarmament and demobilization in a civil war by the 
provision of crucial security guarantees to warring parties.  Virginia Page Fortna argues 
peacekeepers are critical in building durable peace post-conflict by altering the incentives 
of warring parties.  This altering of incentives by peacekeepers is accomplished by 
mitigating fears of each other, encouraging political inclusion, and policing the behavior 
of hard-line factions (Fortna 2008).  International peacekeepers were particularly critical 
in the mitigation of the risk of future conflict occurrence in countries like Sierra Leone 
and Liberia (Collier 2007).  Several scholars have noted a link between aid disbursements 
and reduced civil war reoccurrence as a result of increased economic growth.  Faster 
economic growth is posited as enough of an inducement for previously warring parties to 
cease fighting (Collier & Hoeffler 2002; De Ree & Nillesen 2009).12  In order to facilitate 
a speedier postwar recovery, assistance from interveners helps to restore damaged or 
destroyed infrastructure or replace stolen, lost, or ruined household assets.    
Interveners during post-conflict reconstruction also focus on strengthening 
institutions that promote economic growth.  However, there is still no clear consensus as 
to what institutional arrangements would foster more positive economic outcomes.  The 
role of property rights, social cohesion among people experiencing conflict, the 
effectiveness of bureaucracies, the self-enforcing constitution, and a host of other 
explanations have been posited as the necessary link between institutions and the 
economic growth of an entire society (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Knack & 
																																																								
12 The findings of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler regarding a link between promises of faster economic 
growth through aid disbursements and incentives for warring parties in civil wars to stop fighting is highly 
disputed.  Their research has a rather small sample size of fourteen cases, disputed end dates of conflict 
(critical in a study on the cessation of hostilities), and numerous coding issues with how civil wars are 
defined, among other methodological problems (Suhrke, et al. 2005).   
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Keefer 1997; North & Weingast 1989).  A number of scholars are sharply divided on the 
particular institutions needed for economic growth and how these same institutions are 
impacted by intrastate conflict.  Additionally, there is little evidence on the rate at which 
institutions evolve during conflict and under what specific circumstances such change 
takes place in a civil war scenario.  Given these many unknowns and an overall lack of 
evidence, it is a significant challenge for interveners to build sustainable institutions in 
the hope of facilitating a better postwar economic environment. This project seeks to 
address some of these questions regarding the link between institutional change in 
wartime and economic growth. 
 Some countries that have undergone a civil war do in fact recover without 
external assistance calling into question some of the assumptions of the aided recovery 
model.  The first questionable assumption in the aided recovery paradigm is the idea that 
states beset by internal strife will not emerge from the conflict on their own.  The second 
questionable assumption is that intervention in the form of mediation, peacemaking, and 
peacekeeping is a necessary element in establishing postwar economic development and 
political stability.  In sharp contrast to aided recovery, autonomous recovery is defined as 
“…the ways in which countries that have recently experienced a conflict experience a 
lasting peace, a reduction in violence, and economic and political development in the 
absence of international intervention” (Weinstein 2005: 9). 
 Jeremy Weinstein points to the cases of Uganda and Eritrea as evidence for his 
autonomous recovery model.   In both cases, intrastate war (and the subsequent 
reconstruction) was carried out largely in the absence of external support.  The National 
Resistance Movement (NRM) in Uganda and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front 
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(EPLF) broadened their initial appeal as insurgent movements to include a number of 
different ethnic groups in their respective counties.  After both rebel groups achieved 
their objectives, they launched participatory constitution writing campaigns and instituted 
competitive elections in the decision making process at the village level.13  In this way, 
conflict helped to ease longstanding ethnic tensions that proved a stumbling block to 
political and economic reform in the agricultural sector throughout the twentieth 
century.14  Uganda and Eritrea had strong economic growth postwar, with declines in 
inflation and poverty as well as improvements in social service delivery (Weinstein 
2005).15 The nature of violence in a particular conflict setting is instructive for the 
development of institutions postwar.  War generates institutions that aid in the 
prosecution of the conflict but serve a purpose postwar. 
  
Institutional Change & Civil War 
 Ana Arjona identifies two critical parts of the process of institutional change 
during civil war in particular.  First, the collapse of formal state institutions creates 
openings for new arrangements to emerge.  For instance, in illegal markets where there is 
																																																								
13 Both the NRM and EPLF leadership banned ethnic parties and limited party competition for several years 
after achieving victory in their respective civil wars.  By “competitive,” I mean village councils or 
chieftains that had been previously been established by heredity/tradition were now made up by individuals 
running for and winning local office (Weinstein 2005). 
14 While both Uganda and Eritrea did undergo significant postwar political reforms, in recent years both 
countries have regressed in terms of political inclusion and democratic decision-making.  Eritrea is 
currently a one-party state where elections have been repeatedly postponed and the powers of President 
Isaias Afwerki have grown tremendously since he took office in 1993.  Since 2005, President Yoweri 
Museveni of Uganda has greatly restricted party competition and expanded his executive authority.  He has 
drawn a great deal of condemnation from domestic sources and international observers for seeking and 
winning a third term in 2015.  
15 Weinstein is vague about two crucial elements in his discussion of the concept of autonomous recovery:  
how institutions are generated by warfare and the connection between these institutions and economic 
growth.   
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an absence of formal legal mechanisms, parallel institutions arise to enforce contracts and 
uphold property rights (Gambetta 1996; Volkov 2000; Varese 2001).  Second, actors 
during civil wars have an incentive to create institutions to fill in the gaps left by the state 
authority.  Warring sides seek to accomplish their military and political objectives.  To do 
this, they seek to create an environment for citizens to engage in productive activities for 
the purposes of resource extraction.  Institutional arrangements that protect citizens and 
set up systems of taxation during civil war are central to this environment (Olson 1993).  
On a related note, insurgent groups that seek to maintain control in pockets of territory as 
a challenge to the state authority do so using both violence and crafting methods to rule 
civilian populations (Kalyvas 2006; Arjona 2010).  The resulting institutions aid 
recruitment and provide rebels access to preexisting local political networks (Arjona 
2010; Mampilly 2011; Arjona, et al. 2015).  The particular order created by insurgents 
helps to ensure voluntary compliance on the part of the citizenry, which is needed to 
maintain control and is far less costly than the use of force (Mao 1978; Guevara and 
Davies 1985; Kalyvas 2006).   
 The rise of institutional arrangements parallel to those of the state can be 
characterized as a new wartime social order. As a general term, social order refers to the 
shared norms that regulate behavior among members of a community.  Therefore, the 
wartime social order is defined as the existence or lack thereof of predictability in 
interactions between civilians and combatants.  Additionally, the corresponding norms 
crucial in regulating such behavior are another critical aspect of wartime social orders 
(Arjona 2014).  A wartime social order denotes a form of social contract between 
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civilians and armed groups.   Civilians provide armed groups needed information and 
resources while armed groups set up institutions for the purpose of stability. 
 Armed actors often seek to ensure cooperation and predictability among civilians 
and combatants through the maintenance of public order16.  To this end, armed actors will 
aim to carry out punishment for severe crimes such as rape, theft, and murder.  Armed 
groups would also seek the resolution of interpersonal conflicts such as disputes over 
land and the maintenance of social norms.  Based upon her research in Colombia, Ana 
Arjona found that guerrillas and paramilitary groups would regulate movement patterns, 
free speech, and clothing standards for civilians.  The maintenance of some semblance of 
public order is a necessary prerequisite for the resource extraction upon which armed 
groups in a civil war rely (Arjona 2014). 
 Regarding economic activities, beyond tax collection from the civilian populace, 
armed groups often regulate various productive enterprises.  Both legal and illegal 
activities would be monitored and guerrillas/paramilitary groups would in some cases 
control the receipt of state subsidies.  For example, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front 
(EPLF) created a system of taxation and implemented redistributive land reform aimed at 
the rural poor.  The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka set up 
																																																								
16 Armed actors during civil war vary in their level of commitment to administering civilian populations 
and the maintenance of the public order.  Jeremy Weinstein and Zachariah Mampilly have divergent 
accounts explaining the circumstances under which insurgent groups devote themselves to administering 
local populations.  Weinstein argues insurgencies in a resource poor context are less likely to abuse 
civilians than those rebel groups operating in a resource rich environment.  In the former scenario, 
insurgencies are reliant upon civilians for information and material support, leading to rebel groups 
committing their resources to ruling local populations.  Additionally, insurgencies in resource poor context 
are more likely to attract members committed to the goals of the rebellion given the relative absence of 
opportunities for material gain.  Mampilly argues pressures from civilians, internal factions in the 
insurgency, and increasingly ubiquitous transnational actors in conflict zones factor into how rebel groups 
govern local populations.  All three groups can jeopardize the control insurgent groups have over territory 
during civil wars.  Thus, rebel groups respond to the aforementioned pressures in order to maintain their 
authority in areas under their control (Mampilly 2011; Weinstein 2006). 
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community banks in the areas in which they ruled while Maoist rebels in Nepal 
established institutions for the purpose of food and land distribution (Arjona 2014: 30-31).  
The existence of predictability in interpersonal relations and the emergence of 
cooperative efforts among civilians are crucial for creating the kind of postwar 
environment conducive to economic growth.  
 
Statement of the Argument 
 Expanding upon the concepts of autonomous recovery and wartime social orders, 
war can shape institutions critical to postwar economic growth.  My contribution centers 
on the link between the nature of the postwar political settlements and institutions that 
promote recovery in the agricultural sector in particular.  Scholars have shown that war 
and the resulting political settlements generate institutions that can promote long-lasting 
peace and political stability.  However, I argue the same is true for economic recovery.  I 
argue that the nature of the postwar settlement, both in terms of who controls the state 
and the structure of the state, connects civil war with variation in postwar agricultural 
outcomes.  The postwar political settlement can shape the institutions that I find to be 
critical to agricultural productivity: land tenure security, local government structures that 
promote participation, and the management of preexisting social divisions.  
 Security of land tenure can promote agricultural productivity through increased 
access to credit and resulting land improvements.  Local government structures that 
promote participation on the part of peasants can legitimize changes in land policy from 
either the national government or via international assistance.  Management of 
preexisting social divisions is critical for the resolution of land disputes that have served 
as a barrier to agricultural investment.  However, the effectiveness of these 
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aforementioned institutions for agricultural productivity is dependent upon the nature of 
postwar political changes.  Changes in both the structure of the state and who rules will 
lead to positive economic outcomes.  No change in the structure of the state but a shift in 
who rules will lead to negative economic outcomes.  No change in either aspect of the 
postwar political settlement will lead to mixed results.  The causal reasoning for each 
hypothesis will be further elaborated in the following chapter. 
  
Conclusion 
 Civil wars have devastating effects for all levels of the economy, but the conflict 
itself can be a catalyst for institutional change. The ways in which political settlement can 
generates institutions with some import for economic growth will be examined by 
looking at the postwar agricultural sector in three civil war cases: Burundi, Sierra Leone, 
and Uganda.  All of the cases show variation in the independent variable of study (the 
structure of the state and who controls the state postwar) and thus serve as an appropriate 
test of my argument.  The focus of the dissertation will be variance in agricultural 
productivity as a result of institutional development across regions within war-torn states 
in the postwar recovery period.   
 The project is outlined as follows.  Chapter two will focus on the nature of 
institutional development during wartime.  Institutions will be defined and the debates 
over the effect of institutions on economic growth will be presented.  Additionally, the 
second chapter introduces the literature on the processes of institutional change and 
discussed why land tenure security, local government participation, and the management 
of preexisting social divisions are good predictors of postwar agricultural productivity.  
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My third chapter details how the structure of the state in postwar Burundi did not change, 
but power changed hands from Tutsi-dominated political parties to a Hutu-dominated 
political party.  Unfortunately, with little change in the institutional arrangements critical 
for agricultural productivity, the same predatory practices of government employees 
toward farming communities in prewar Burundi continued postwar, to the detriment of 
the agricultural sector of the country as a whole.  My fourth chapter examines how 
neither the structure of the state nor control of the state changed in postwar Sierra Leone, 
with mixed results for agricultural productivity.  Paramount chiefs in Sierra Leone 
historically hampered agricultural investments through restrictive land access policies, 
and the continued influence of these local leaders has remained an impediment to the 
development of farming communities.  My fifth chapter discusses how both the structure 
of the state and control of the state shifted in postwar Uganda.  Local councils of villagers 
supported sweeping changes in land tenure in Uganda, greatly aiding postwar agricultural 
productivity, through increased investment in land improvements and credit access.  The 
sixth chapter concludes my dissertation by summarizing my contributions to the 
discipline and providing an outline for future research projects. 
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Chapter 2: Institutional Development in Wartime 
Introduction 
  The myriad economic consequences in the aftermath civil war are closely tied to 
institutional development during the conflict.  The following chapter aims to unpack the 
ways in which the institutions of land tenure, local government participation, and 
management of social divisions, all shaped by the nature of the postwar political 
settlement, can serve to either bolster or depress agricultural productivity in the aftermath 
of a civil war. 
 Before a discussion of institutional change can take place, the conceptual 
foundation for the role of institutions in economic growth need to be established.  First, a 
definition of institutions will be provided, with a special emphasis on the economic 
implications of institutional arrangements.  Second, a brief overview of the origins of 
institutions will be provided.  While tracing the beginnings of institutions is an immense 
endeavor, there will be a particular focus on the role of institutions in facilitating more 
productive economies and the fierce debates over the accuracy of the historical narrative.  
Third, a discussion of how institutions change will be presented alongside some possible 
reasons for why institutional reforms have failed in the least developed countries (LDCs).  
(This is particularly relevant to the project given that the cases selected are all LDCs).  
Fourth, the institutions that I highlight as critical to the success of the agricultural sector 
will be examined.  In terms of a definition of land tenure, a distinction will be made 
between various categories of rights to land and access to title.   The literature on the 
connection between security of tenure and agricultural productivity will then be explored.  
Fifth, the rationale for why local government changes that promote greater citizen 
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participation should improve agricultural productivity will be presented.  Sixth, a 
definition of social divisions will be offered.  Additionally, the relationship between the 
successful/unsuccessful management of social divisions and agricultural outcomes will 
be further elaborated.  The reasoning behind my selection of land tenure, local 
government mechanisms that promote peasant participation, and the management of 
social divisions will be offered in this section.  The chapter concludes with an overview 
of the case selection and the research design for the project.  The rationale for how the 
cases serve to illustrate institutional development after civil wars and the resulting 
economic consequences will be given.  Additionally, the ways in which agricultural 
productivity will be measured will be presented in the research design section. 
 
Definition of Institutions 
 Working from a clear definition of institutions is critical before any examination 
of the economic implications of institutional transformations can proceed.  There are 
several variations of the definition of institutions, but they all share some common 
elements.  Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, 
economic, and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, 
taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct) and formal rules (constitutions, laws, 
property rights).  Institutions are not simply physical buildings or 
government/intergovernmental offices, but instead recurring patterns of behavior that 
govern the actions of individuals belonging to a specific community.  Additionally, these 
patterns of behavior are not simply repetitive but self-enforcing to a large extent.17  These 
																																																								
17 Members of the community in which institutional arrangements are observed view such constraints as 
legitimate and necessary in their everyday lives.  The process of legitimation of institutions can take 
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recurring and self-enforcing patterns of behavior are clearly highly valued by those who 
act within these constraints, otherwise this collection of formal and informal rules would 
not be observed over the passage of time (North 1991).18 Institutions serve to solve 
problems of coordination and cooperation among actors in any form of exchange.  
 The literature on institutions describes situations in which actors involved in an 
economic exchange willingly accept limits on their potential pool of possible interactions.  
In an ideal scenario, rational individuals (those who seek to maximize their own personal 
profits), will accept the costs of cooperating with others in an exchange when they retain 
full information about the past performances of those they are dealing with, when such 
interactions are repeatable, and when there are only a manageable few actors involved in 
the transaction.  Conversely, constraints on human behavior are necessary when 
individuals lack information about each other, a great many people are involved in a 
particular exchange with any single person, and the transaction itself may not be 
repeatable (North 1991: 97-99).  Transactions between individuals are far more likely to 
resemble the latter situation rather than the former.  Thus, institutions are those 
																																																																																																																																																																					
multiple forms.  Certain constraints and patterns of behavior become widely accepted and even thought of 
as ultimately necessary for the functioning of a society after the passage of time.  This applies to 
arrangements that were deemed highly controversial at the time they were first conceived.  For example, as 
social welfare reforms gradually expanded in continental Europe in myriad areas of public life, the 
increasing role of government within society was debated in entirely different manner by both the public 
and political elites.  It was no longer a matter of whether government should intervene in societal outcomes, 
but how and to what degree should such an involvement manifest (North 1991). 
18 There is often some conceptual confusion between norms and institutions.  Norms are standards of 
behavior that may or may not be institutionalized within a given community.  For example, while 
individuals may recognize cruel and excessive punishments meted out by law enforcement as unjust, not all 
states have formal codes regulating such actions or bodies of local and federal government meant to punish 
such extremes of conduct.  Domestic laws and international conventions defining and thus prohibiting the 
use of torture as a means of information gathering or a weapon of war indicate the norm has been 
institutionalized.  Intergovernmental bodies aimed at punishing those who transgress against formal legal 
codes regarding mistreatment of individuals is more evidence that the norm against cruel or excessive 
punishment has been institutionalized.  While some norms have yet to or may never reach the level of 
institutionalization, (the responsibility to protect in the international community is one such example), all 
institutions share some degree of normative acceptance (North 1991). 
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arrangements that seek to reduce the costs and uncertainties inherent in the process of 
exchange and transaction among individuals.19  Effective institutions are able to 
successfully reduce transaction costs and the expenses inherent in cooperating.20 
Economic growth and institutional change occurs concurrently; neither phenomenon can 
be isolated from the other.  
  
Institutional Origins 
 Scholars that study economic development and economic history continue to 
debate institutional origins.  While there is widespread agreement on the importance of 
institutions in shaping the direction of economic growth, how these institutions came to 
be and persist is still disputed.  Douglass North and Ha-Joon Chang offer divergent 
narratives of institutional development with considerable implications for how the 
country cases in the project will be analyzed. 
																																																								
19 Self-enforcing cooperation and cooperation requiring outside help from institutions is an important 
distinction.  When simple exchange was conducted among individuals with some familiarity with each 
other in close proximity, the self-enforcing ties of family and kin were often enough to ensure cooperation.  
As exchange grew more complex and was conducted across greater distances among individuals that did 
not know each other, self-enforcing cooperation yielded to outside institutions able to more effectively 
manage transactions (North 1990).	
20 A distinction needs to be made between memes and institutions.  Both concepts deal with the self-
perpetuating effects of certain patterns of behavior within a set community.  Memes denote ideas, behaviors, 
and styles that are transmitted from person to person within a particular culture.  The literature on memes 
originates in biology, as a means to explain how selective processes can favor certain patterns of behaviors 
and beliefs while minimizing or outright eliminating others.  Memes are largely analogous to genes in that 
they replicate, transform over time, and are subject to selective pressure.  Memes that are beneficial to 
group cohesion and individual fitness tend to be reproduced and transmitted throughout successive 
generations.  Although institutions tend to replicate and are subject to some selective pressure, as described 
by Ian Lustick, with inefficient patterns of behavior being unable to effectively reduce transaction costs and 
thus being discarded in favor of better performing constraints, these arrangements are transmitted at a scale 
much larger than person-to-person contacts.  Furthermore, some institutions have spread through the use of 
force, as observed in the separate waves of European colonialism in the New World and Eurasia/Africa.  
Colonial powers often brought institutional legacies wholesale from the European continent to the areas 
being colonized.  The way in which memes and institutions are spread throughout societies is a clear area 
of distinction between the two concepts (Lustick 2011). 
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 As economies increased in scale, institutions evolved to solve problems of 
organization, facilitate cooperation among many actors, and mitigate the problems that 
arise from a lack of information in exchange (Williamson 1985).  According to Douglass 
North, human beings have devised institutions to create order and reduce uncertainty in 
exchange, as well as capture gains from trade throughout history.  The earliest economies 
centered on relationships between hunter-gatherers or largely self-contained exchanges 
within a village setting (North 1991: 97).  These cooperative exchanges were among kin 
and necessarily limited and autarkic.21  Transaction costs are quite low in these settings as 
a result of the presence of a dense network of social connections between individuals who 
know each other quite intimately and are bound by well-known yet unwritten codes of 
conduct (North 1990: 355-367).  However, the hunter-gatherer and local farming 
economies started to expand greatly in terms of distance via the expansion of regional 
trade.22 Eventually, the rise of overland caravan paths and shipping routes across bodies 
of water allowed these regional networks to have more of a global reach.  Given the 
increasing scope of trade, there arose new coercive and voluntary institutional 
mechanisms to enforce contracts. 
																																																								
21 Autarky, in the aforementioned context, describes a state of self-reliance for individuals living within a 
particular society or country.  Autarkic economic organizations aim to limit exchanges with outsiders and 
focus on producing everything needed for the functioning of a society on their own.  Autarky is a defining 
feature of transactions in hunter-gatherer groups and local farming villages.  Furthermore, autarky on a 
national level was attempted in the postwar era as a means of rejecting trade with the Western powers for 
the Soviet bloc and cutting ties with former colonial powers in the developing world (North 1991).   
22 Avner Grief notes that the use of settled communities in many different trading centers all over the world 
critical in solving agency problems as trade expanded beyond local networks.  Group cohesion among 
Jewish communities settled all over the Mediterranean would enable effective punishment against members 
who violated their commercial codes.  Additionally, the sharing of information between members of this 
trading community greatly lowered transactional costs.  The Greek colonization of the Mediterranean in the 
classical period also shares many of the same hallmarks of the importance of familial/personal connection 




 Additionally, as trade expanded internationally, there simultaneously arose 
increasing economic specialization for both individuals and regions of the world alike.  
Economies of scale led to urbanization, as workers settled down in a single location for 
the production process.  The development of property rights grew out of this increasing 
specialization in personal expertise and local trading centers that would grow into cities.23 
Early manufacturing required secure property rights that are reliant on credible 
commitment on the part of a ruler to forbear seizing or modifying the value of assets.24  
Additionally, capital markets require flexible laws to allow for a host of organizational 
structures and courts to mediate property disputes.   Lastly, as early manufacturing 
continued to grow in scale, governance structures need to be put in place in order to solve 
agency problems (Chandler 1977; North 1981; Stiglitz 1989).  The growth of property 
rights is central to the North narrative regarding institutional development. 
 Also in this narrative, the state was a major player in the process of contract 
enforcement and the resulting institutional growth.  The analysis of North centers on the 
European continent in the early modern period (1500-1800 CE).  The fierce competition 
among territorial entities in Europe necessitated institutional evolution.  Ever more 
destructive military technology spread among the warring polities on the continent and 
																																																								
23 According to John Sheehan and Garrick Small, property usually evokes images of land or buildings.  
However, property rights denote an ability to receive income or generate revenue, alienate or sell, and 
powers of management for any interest, including ideas i.e. intellectual property.  For the purposes of this 
study, I will use property rights primarily in the context of agricultural land (Sheehan & Small 2002).  
24 The Glorious Revolution of 1688 is often hailed as a watershed moment in the history of checks on the 
arbitrary power of sovereigns/credible commitment.  However, there are competing explanations of how 
such arrangements developed over time.  While scholars like Douglass North and Barry Weignast 
emphasize a peaceful process of concessions rulers made to their subordinates in the interest of winning 
wars, Steven Pincus takes a different approach.  He argues the changing balance of power in continental 
Europe and the pressure King James II exerted to build a bureaucratic state powerful enough to stymie the 
designs of the French for the rest of Europe were central to the development of credible commitment.  In 
the narrative advanced by Pincus, the threats to the existing nobility of England made the process of 
institutional change a far more violent one than the account advanced by North and Weingast (Pincus 2014).    	
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forced European leaders to look for additional sources of revenue in order to survive.  
Bargaining between the sovereigns and their constituency led to an increased revenue 
base for the former and more protections for the latter from arbitrary state power.  
Furthermore, as individuals increased their knowledge and skill base in order to better 
profit from economic transactions, these same actors came to see the value of the state in 
securing their property rights.  Traders forming associations with their colleagues, using 
merchant courts to settle disputes, and the inducing of sovereigns to protect their goods 
from brigands came about as individuals sought to maximize their gains from exchange 
(Lin & Nugent 1995: 2333; North & Weingast 1989).  The evolution of institutions 
required that the state take over enforcement of increasingly costly property rights.   
 However, Ha-Joon Chang disputes the above narrative regarding the development 
of institutions.  Chang agrees that institutional evolution is a slow process but he is 
especially critical of the historicity of the account and the assumptions regarding the 
efficiency of existing institutions.  Chang offers a divergent account of how the 
institutional arrangements came to be and how they persist in the LDCs that are the focus 
of the project.    
 Chang traces the historical pathways of a number of contemporary industrialized 
countries and finds evidence of significant economic growth with so-called “bad 
institutions.”  Chang critiques the conventional wisdom connecting institutions and 
economic growth by focusing on the advice currently offered to developing economies.  
Transnational donors and the international policymaking community, in their dealings 
with developing countries, privilege institutions found in developed economies of the 
contemporary period.  These institutions include democracy, a professionalized 
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bureaucracy, an independent judiciary, a central bank largely insulated from political 
pressure, and strongly enforced property rights.  However, this focus is ahistorical.  The 
institutions international policymakers deem critical for economic growth did not come 
into being until the late 19th or early 20th centuries, at which point the industrialized 
economies of today were already significantly developed.  While both North and Chang 
agree the process of institutional development is an incremental process, the former does 
not take into account how long it took for contemporary developed countries to have the 
kinds of institutions he deems necessary for economic growth.  Many LDCs actually have 
a much greater level of institutional development than the NDCs at comparable stages in 
their history (Chang 2002).  Overall, North largely sidesteps local conditions and local 
context in his account of the institutions that facilitate economic growth (Rodrik 2000).   
These local conditions are critical to my argument regarding changes in land tenure and 
the resulting effects on agricultural productivity after the end of a civil war.25 
 Additionally, the assumption that increasing knowledge and specialization will 
yield the most efficient institutional arrangements is flawed.  The narrative proposed by 
North suggests that more efficient institutions develop in response to changing societal 
conditions such as technological innovation or shifts in the factors of production. The 
institutional arrangements that are currently in place are then wrongly assumed to be 
efficient (Migot-Adholla, et al. 1991).26  Institutions generally persist for two reasons.  
																																																								
25 There is considerable institutional diversity in contemporary economies.  The institutions that scholars 
like North identify as critical in the rise of capital markets are not the full set of possible outcomes.  
Roberto Unger argues for a need to be skeptical of claims that a specific institution is the only one of its 
kind compatible with a functioning market.  Local conditions/local contexts are a necessary but often 
ignored part of the narrative linking institutions with development outcomes.  Taking into account local 
conditions will be critical in the country cases I have chosen for the project (Unger 1998).   
26 North does acknowledge that some inefficient institutions persist because of the strength of their 
defenders.  New institutions may arise as a result of changing societal conditions or shifts in the factors of 
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First, the costs of shifting institutional arrangements prove a sufficient barrier to 
institutional change.  Second, and on a related note, institutions are generally not quick to 
adapt to changing circumstances (Lin & Nugent 1995: 2314).  This is most relevant to the 
project given that many of the institutions that exist prior to conflict are difficult to 
change.  Discussions of how institutions change and the impact of warfare on institutional 
arrangements are then crucial to my argument. 
 
Institutional Change 
 Changes in institutional arrangements can be divided into two overarching 
categories: the design perspective and the evolutionary perspective.  The design 
perspective tends to treat institutions as originating with a centralized authority, operating 
under largely unified plans and purposes.  This top-down characterization of institutions 
applies to arrangements set up by both local political elites and intervening transnational 
powers.  As a result, institutional change can come about as a result of the decision 
making of these same centralized authorities.  In contrast, the evolutionary perspective 
deems institutions are the result of the generally uncoordinated and aggregate choices of 
many actors within a polity.  The decisions made then lead to a larger system of norms 
and rules that allow agents to direct their behavior and expectations.  The bottom up 
processes of the evolutionary perspective denote that changes in the expectations of the 
populace can lead to greater societal shifts in institutional arrangements (Kingston & 
Caballero 2009). Therefore, institutional changes come as a result of external forces (such 
as a foreign intervention or major technological breakthrough), and internal forces (such 
																																																																																																																																																																					
production, as previously mentioned, however, this is no guarantee these new institutional arrangements 
will be widely adopted (North 1981). 
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as changes in individual beliefs or preferences).  Significant systemic shocks can alter 
personal norms and the expectations people possess about others to the extent that 
societal constraints and rules are profoundly affected (Voors & Bulte 2014: 456-457).27 
The way in which institutional change takes place largely depends upon whether such 
arrangements are top down or bottom up in origin.   
 Institutional change in LDCs in particular has been difficult to achieve for a 
number of reasons.  Historical precedent for institutional change may be lacking, 
eliminating new possibilities due to a lack of knowledge (Basu, et al. 1987). For example, 
villagers in sub-Saharan African countries may simply not be aware of different tenure 
systems beyond customary forms.  Furthermore, there may be a lack of resources for the 
enforcement of new institutions.  Hesitation to offer loans to farmers and a lack of access 
to credit due to postwar volatility has slowed the adoption of freehold tenure systems 
throughout Africa.  Additionally, there is often resistance from those who would lose 
from institutional changes.  Different tenure systems require and would often reduce the 
power of traditional authorities, such as chieftains and tribal councils in sub-Saharan 
African countries.  Also, the economic underpinnings of novel institutional arrangements 
may not be fully understood.  The benefits of the increased availability of credit or the 
ability to sell land may not be fully appreciated in countries undergoing land tenure 
reform.  In addition, the prejudices of the era may prevent the adoption of new 
institutions.  In the country cases, female inheritance of property has faced stiff resistance 
																																																								
27 A major shock such as a war or technological advance is not necessary for institutional change; there are 
several categories of gradual institutional changes that are no less weighty in their consequences.  
Incremental changes over a significant period of time can lead to lasting institutional changes.  While there 
are cases of abrupt institutional change, such scenarios are rather rare. Tipping points are a way to refer to 
small changes over time that have far reaching institutional effects.  Punctuated equilibrium refers to long 
periods of stasis broken by an exogenous shock prompting considerable institutional changes  (Beissinger 
2002; Djelic & Quack 2003; Pempel 1998; Pierson 2004). 
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due to longstanding cultural norms.  Lastly, the links between existing institutional 
arrangements may forestall the adoption of new institutions (Chang 2002: 117).  Freehold 
land tenure systems rely on central banking systems for their viability.  Central banks 
may not be in place or functioning in the postwar period.  For the country cases in the 
project, these factors serve to impede institutional changes.  However, civil war can 
upend the institutional status quo, based on post-conflict observation. 
 
Land Tenure 
 Land tenure is a key institution I will be analyzing in the postwar period of each 
country case.  Land tenure security is defined as the right of individuals, households, and 
groups of people to protection from their government against forcible evictions.  Tenure 
itself refers to the status of individuals, households, and groups of people in relation to 
property.  Thus, land tenure is far more encompassing than property rights, as the former 
concept deals with questions of how the latter is allocated within whole societies.  Land 
tenure can be divided into three categories: use rights, control rights, and transfer rights.  
Use rights denote the ability to make a profit from the resources of the land through 
activities such as grazing, mining, subsistence farming, etc.  Control rights focus on who 
is able to make decisions regarding the use of land, such as the kind of crops to be 
planted or the distribution of profits derived from the piece property.  Transfer rights 
involve any movement of ownership through inheritance, sale, mortgage, or allocation to 
another individual within the community.  Therefore, land tenure is a combination of 
both rights to land and access to title of ownership (Boudreaux & Sacks 2000).  Land 
rights are necessary in order to make improvements beneficial for agriculture while 
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access to title is a requirement for credit to make such enhancements possible (Bruce, et 
al. 1994: 16).28   
 The rural poor in the country cases are most familiar with a form of customary 
tenure where community leaders assign land use rights to members, but such an 
arrangement is often challenged by government initiated land reform programs.29  
Governments tasked with land reform programs allocate property largely on the basis of 
ancestral claims and the length of time a single family has lived on a particular plot of 
land.30 On a much larger scale, governments initiating land reform programs can change 
the dynamic of access to land for the rural poor through redistribution.  These reforms 
often take place as a way to correct historic injustices or distribute land more equitably 
(especially if there exists an entrenched class of large-scale landowners).  The 
mechanisms that facilitate the transfer of property from large landowners to the rural poor 
are quite controversial even when the benefits of such a course of action are broadly 
understood.  Increasing access to credit and agricultural subsidies are some of the most 
common ways to implement land reform apart from redistribution schemes (Shivji 1998).   
 Security of tenure is based upon the idea that the rights of an individual or family 
to land will be recognized and protected by others when specific challenges are 
																																																								
28 There is yet another distinction to be made between formal and informal property rights.  Formal 
property rights are officially acknowledged by the state and upheld through various national and local legal 
means.  Informal property rights lack official recognition and protection from state authorities.   The 
distinction between formal and informal property rights is not always clearly defined.  Within the specific 
local context, informal property rights can be quite secure without recognition from state authorities or 
formal legal means (Boudreau & Sacks 2000).   
29 The main types of land tenure arrangements are customary, leasehold, and freehold.  Leasehold tenure is 
a form of land tenure where one buys the rights to occupy land or buildings for a set length of time.  
Freehold tenure is where one buys the right to an estate with no set length of time attached to ownership.  
Both the leased estate and freehold property can be bought and sold on the open market (FAO 2002).   
30 Purchasing, leasing/renting, sharecropping schemes, inheriting property, and illegal squatting are all 
strategies employed by individuals to gain access to land (FAO 2002).  	
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encountered.31  Some scholars argue only freehold systems of tenure with widespread 
private ownership are truly secure.  Hernando De Soto argues the lack of proof of 
property ownership in the developing world is a major detriment to capital accumulation.  
Formalized tenure is a way for those in the developing world to more easily transfer 
property and use the equity from their homes for a whole host of capital investments vital 
to a market economy (De Soto 2000).  According to this line of thinking, those without 
transfer rights in other systems of tenure are subject to the whim of owners (who do 
possess such rights).  However, in many parts of the world with prevalent customary 
tenure, as is the case in this dissertation, limited transfer rights does not necessarily 
equate to insecure tenure.  Customs regarding inheritance and the strict rules in place for 
making sure lands are transferred only to community members contribute to security of 
tenure in such a context (FAO 2002).   
 There are numerous sources of tenure security in practice.  First, recognition of 
the community of the rights of an individual to a particular tract of land is a critical 
component of customary tenure systems.  Neighbors, water use associations, and farmers’ 
organizations can make an individual feel considerably more secure by recognizing their 
property rights.  Second, governments can provide political recognition of the rights to 
land.  While this is important for tenure security, governments generally recognize the 
rights of communities, not particular individuals, to settle on a piece of land.  Third, the 
state administration protects landowners from their property rights being infringed upon 
by lawbreakers while the formal legal system helps to resolve disputes through 
																																																								
31 Length of time is critical in terms of tenure security.  A household with a lease of less than one year may 
feel secure in committing resources to short-term investments, but not long-term ones.  Feeling safe from 
eviction, regardless of length of tenure, is critical in how secure people feel regarding their property rights.  
In summary, how secure people perceive their tenure to be is crucial (FAO 2002). 
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established court systems.  Fourth, authorities that emerge during times of civil unrest can 
serve to uphold security of tenure (FAO 2002).  The security of tenure is determined by 
the sum total of all the aforementioned sources.32   
 Those individuals and household with insecure tenure will have to face competing 
claims on their land/or lose their land through eviction.  A lack of tenure security is a 
hindrance to being able to procure sufficient food and maintain a sustainable livelihood in 
a rural community.  Most relevant to this study, social changes and periods of distress are 
major causes of tenure insecurity.  The spread of disease for instance, often leaves 
women and their children in a customary tenure system in a precarious position.  As men 
generally have priority when it comes to inheritance, a widow may be pushed off her 
property by the male relatives of her deceased husband, given their stronger claim.  
Arguably, one of the most prominent periods of distress is internal warfare.  People that 
have lost family members or are forced to flee as a result of conflict will often outright 
abandon their lands or partake in forced sales to quickly detach themselves from their 
property for their own safety.  When these same individuals return after war, determining 
their rights to their land, if any, is a major concern for rebuilding communities (Bruce, et 
al. 1994).  One of the key institutional changes in my dissertation is the improvement of 
people in a condition of tenure insecurity postwar. 
 
Land Tenure & Agricultural Productivity 
																																																								
32 Developing countries that seek to improve tenure security generally attempt to shore up the legal aspects 
of the concept.  Formalizing previously informal property rights, moving away from government-issued 
permits to leases that offer more option for landholders, allowing members of communities to outright own 
their traditional land holdings, and the improving of land administrative structures to better define property 
rights are commonly used methods (Boudreau & Sacks 2000). 
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 Questions remain about the security of customary tenure in sub-Saharan Africa 
and whether farmers would be better served by a move to a freehold system.33  Since the 
era of colonial domination of the African continent, there has been a tendency to view 
customary tenure as backward and in need of reform to maximize the efficient usage of 
land. Colonial regimes pushed freehold systems with an emphasis on individualized 
tenure in their administrations (Bruce, et al. 1994: 12-24).  As the era of colonial 
domination ended, a number of state and private actors continued this push toward 
freehold systems of tenure.    
 In the contemporary period, attempts to attract foreign capital and immense 
population pressure has led to a relaxing of the customary tenure regimes of the African 
continent and a simultaneous move in a more individualized direction.  Both private 
interests and those in positions of formal authority have systematically violated the land 
rights of the rural poor via land seizures.  Private interests have aggressively displaced 
small farmers with game hunting companies and hotel chains in order to entice foreign 
tourists.   Economic growth via market liberalization has often been used as an excuse for 
government officials to take land from the rural poor in densely populated and desirable 
areas (Shivji 1998: 35-36).  The conventional wisdom that links a freehold system of 
tenure (where individual property rights are held sacrosanct) as a necessary condition for 
agricultural investment and productivity undergird many of the aforementioned policies.  
 Four assumptions in particular serve as the logical foundation why security of 
tenure is a critical component for economic growth.  First, secure property rights yield 
																																																								
33 Legislative measures to change land tenure often have a great deal of difficulty in overcoming the 
ingrained behavior of peasant households.  In studies of Kenyan tenure reform, farmers were hesitant to sell 
their lands without family approval, despite laws put in place to facilitate such individual transactions 
(Barrows & Roth 1990). 
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greater access to credit as a result of the increased value of land, more creditworthy 
projects, and numerous avenues for investment.  Second, and on a related note, increased 
investment in property through land improvements will lead to greater agricultural 
productivity.34  Third, more efficient uses of land will be promoted and less efficient 
activities will be discouraged due to property transactions made possible by secure 
tenure.  Fourth, where secure tenure exists, there is an expectation of reduced tensions 
over land ownership (Feder, et al. 1988; Barrows & Roth 1990).    
 There is some evidence of the effects of land tenure arrangements on agricultural 
outcomes.  Areas in India in which rights to land have historically been granted to large-
scale landowners experienced significantly less agricultural investment and productivity 
in the post-independence period, when compared to areas where such rights have 
traditionally remained in the hands of small-scale cultivators.  Additionally, areas where 
rights were given to landowners have significantly less investment in education and 
health than their counterparts (Banerjee, et al. 2005).  Divergent historic institutional 
pathways in terms of investment decisions led to different policy outcomes.  In the post-
independence period in India, the lack of investment in health and education was a 
significant factor in the relatively poor economic performance of areas where property 
rights were granted to large-scale landowners.  This is in stark contrast to the strong long-
term economic growth of areas where land rights were granted to small-scale cultivators. 
 Additionally, who is granted rights to land may be more important than the 
specific tenure arrangements themselves.  Security of tenure is a wholly different concept 
																																																								
34 For farmers, land improvements relevant to increasing productivity can consist of canals, dams, fertilizer 
distribution, greater mechanization, irrigation systems, new seed types, and the construction of wells, 
among other enhancements (Bruce, et al. 1994). 
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for investors and peasant communities.  Investors view land as a factor of production and 
prioritize profit.  Thus, they are concerned with their title being uncontestable and the 
freedom to sell their land without constant challenges.  Peasant communities prioritize 
survival and often worry about being alienated from their land.  Security for peasants is 
then a matter of having enough to eat and to sell surpluses to a local market (Shivji 1998: 
96-97).  Issues of perception are critically important to an understanding of tenure 
security for peasant communities.  According to farmers in Uganda, formal registration 
helped to minimize all too frequent disputes over land, particularly with larger and more 
influential ethnic groups in the country.  Thus perception of tenure security tied to 
procurement of formal land title is often enough to alleviate social conflict so damaging 
to economic growth prospects in LDCs.  Demands for land titling in much of sub-
Saharan Africa are often a product of the fear of arbitrary land seizures; farmers with 
official registered holdings are acting preemptively to avoid state authorities pushing 
them off their land for any and all reasons.  Formal title is often valued by peasant 
communities for its perceived value as a shield against arbitrary state authority. 
 However, the link between secure tenure and agricultural productivity is not 
necessarily borne out in the lives of farmers.  Investment by farmers may be marginal 
even with secure tenure due to a lack of knowledge about technological options and the 
possibility of risky returns for land improvements.  Demand for investment may rise with 
secure tenure, but the credit supply could still be inelastic, as existing financial 
institutions may not be developed enough in their delivery of services to rural areas.  
Also, land improvements may not necessarily improve agricultural yields, as some 
farmers may invest in off farm activities for additional revenue or focus on boosting crop 
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variety instead of total output (Bruce, et al. 1994: 17-18).  Land registration is most 
effective in increasing agricultural outputs where land is scarce or unusually productive, 
produces cash crops, and has access to markets. 
 
Local Government Participation & Agricultural Productivity 
 Increased political participation at the local level and the decentralization of 
authority has often been linked to the effectiveness of land tenure reforms for agricultural 
productivity.  There are three reasons why greater political participation is characterized 
as being important to land reform and the resulting agricultural productivity.  First, a 
more open polity should facilitate information flows and yield greater transparency in 
negotiations among actors involved in a transactional exchange.  Thus, it is significantly 
easier for lawmakers and local government officials to make credible commitments to 
landholders in such an environment.  Second, in the realm of gathering of information, 
monitoring of agreements, and enforcement of contracts, representative bodies at the 
local level share the administrative burden that would normally be borne by national 
government officials.  Third, residents of rural areas who benefit from more secure and 
exclusive land rights should seek should to defend these arrangements through 
representative mechanisms.   Land reform should protect peasants from arbitrary 
government seizure of their assets as well as allow their land to be used as collateral for 
needed capital.  Land reforms not only receive support from local peasants, but these 
same landholders should continue to agitate for greater tenure security through their local 
representative bodies.  In the scholarly literature, a crucial factor in the success or failure 
of land reforms has been the level of participation from residents in rural areas (Boone 
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2012).  Participatory political institutions are self-reinforcing; they aggregate local 
knowledge to build better institutional frameworks (Rodrik 2000: 19). 
 However, there is an opposing literature that disputes the idea of a link between 
participatory mechanisms at the local level and more secure and exclusive land rights.  
The rise of distributional conflicts brought about by increasing population pressures 
across the African continent challenge the view linking increased political participation at 
the local level and decentralization of authority with the effectiveness of land tenure 
reforms for agricultural productivity.  Specifically, population pressure on limited arable 
land will cause the size of the average farm to shrink, decrease the interval of time in 
which farmers can allow crops to remain fallow, and lead to a reduction in soil fertility on 
the land that is cultivated.  In a context of rapidly increasing population density, 
governments in sub-Saharan Africa push tenure security and transfer rights as a response 
to land scarcity and soil degradation, and not political pressure from peasants (Otsuka & 
Place 2014).  While I acknowledge the importance of population density and the resulting 
effects on land policy in sub-Saharan Africa, the demographic argument overlooks the 
question of agricultural productivity, which is central to this study.  Additionally, the 
demographic argument does not speak to how land policies come to be, even in a context 
of increasing population density.  A focus on participation at the local level and 
decentralization of authority serves to identify where land reforms originate. 
 
Social Divisions & Agricultural Productivity 
 How armed actors navigate divided postwar societies in is an issue that requires 
further examination.  Preexisting societal cleavages can hamper growth prospects post-
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conflict.  Dani Rodrik focuses on the nature of social divisions in a war-torn society to 
explain variance among countries and regions of the world in postwar economic 
development. 
 Dani Rodrik identifies institutions of conflict management as being critical to the 
development process.  Institutions of conflict management aim to resolve distributional 
disputes through a framework of clearly defined rules and procedures and without 
bloodshed and open hostility (Rodrik 1999: 386).  He defines institutions of conflict 
management as quality of governmental institutions and rule of law, an effective 
judiciary, representative political bodies, free elections, independent trade unions, social 
partnerships, institutionalized minority representation, and social insurance (Rodrik 2000: 
12).  The institutions most tied to economic growth help facilitate collective action and 
reduce risk in transactions.  
 Strong social divisions plus weak institutions of conflict management lead to the 
economic shocks of warfare being magnified by distributional conflicts.  Social 
conflict/social divisions is defined as the depth of those prewar splits in society based 
upon household wealth, ethnic identity, region of origin, etc.35 As Dani Rodrik asserts, 
these distributional conflicts hamper productivity by creating uncertainty in the economic 
environment, delaying adjustments to fiscal policies and key relative prices (such as the 
real exchange rate and real wages), and diverting resources from productive to 
redistribute activities (Rodrik 1999: 385). 
 Social divisions are particularly detrimental to the agricultural sector because of 
the uncertainty generated by conflict and how resources are diverted from economically 
																																																								
35 Rodrik operationalizes social conflict by proxy via measures of income inequality, ethnic and linguistic 
fragmentation, and social trust (Rodrik 1999). 
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productive activities.  For example, coordination failures are one of the reasons 
governments have postponed needed price stabilization programs in the agricultural 
sector in times of crisis, even though such delays pose a cost to all social groups (Alesina 
& Drazen 1991).  In this context, coordination failures are instances where social groups 
fail to agree on outcomes that would be of mutual benefit to all parties involved.   
Institutions of conflict management are relied upon to solve these problems of 
coordination among actors.  Institutions of conflict management serve two purposes: to 
admonish the “winners” of any social conflict of the limited nature of their gains and to 
assure the “losers” in such a dispute that they will not be exploited (Rodrik 2000: 12). 
 Relating to agriculture specifically, if the price of a cash crop drops in a country, a 
number of distributional conflicts rise to the surface.  If the price of coffee in a country 
particularly dependent on exports of the crop were to crash, currency devaluation and 
reducing fiscal expenditures are two solutions commonly employed to prevent an 
economic downturn from spiraling out of control.  However, the ways these two solutions 
are implemented can bring social divisions to the fore.  Wage controls, import tariffs, and 
tax increases are just three of the measures that often accompany currency devaluation. 
Reducing spending will unleash debate over what form of expenditure should bear the 
biggest margin of the cuts.  All of the above prescriptions have distributional 
consequences for the society implementing these measures, as each course of action 
creates winners and losers in the society undergoing a price drop in coffee (or any export 
commodity for that matter).  The course of action to be taken then depends on the nature 
of the social conflicts within the country (Rodrik 1999: 386).  A great deal of scholarship 
has asserted the importance of underlying social and political institutions in how societies 
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deal with external shocks.  I propose conceptualizing civil war as one such external shock 
that could lead to a protracted economic crisis or pave the way for institutional changes 
that will improve postwar economic outcomes (Ozler & Rodrik 1992; Sachs & 
Williamson 1985). 
 
Case Selection & Research Design 
 Case selection is limited to countries in the developing world that have 
experienced a civil war.  I exclude developed countries that have experienced civil war 
because the institutions needed for long-term economic growth have generally already 
been established in nations at a high level of development.  Since I aim to make 
generalizable statements about the effects of the postwar settlement on recovery of the 
agricultural sector, the civil war will need to have concluded in order for a country to be 
included as part of the research design.  Furthermore, enough time will need to have 
passed after the conclusion of hostilities in order to access records on the postwar 
agricultural sector and local institutional changes.  I chose country cases based upon the 
most similar case selection criteria put forward by Jason Seawright and John Gerring 
(Seawright & Gerring 2008).36 I sought cases that differed on the independent variable 
(the postwar political settlement), and had minimal variation on other factors to avoid 
confounders in my research.  All three of the country cases had different political 
settlements in terms of the nature of the state/who maintained control of the state 
apparatus in the postwar period.  Regarding my dependent variable of agricultural 
productivity, all three of the country cases show considerable variation in postwar 
																																																								
36 This is also known as the method of difference according to J.S. Mill.   
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outcomes.  Additionally, in terms of control variables, all of the cases are heavily 
dependent on the farming sector, are struggling with issues of increasing population 
density directly relating to tenure security, and are facing considerable pressure from 
multilateral development agencies and NGOs to move toward freehold systems of land 
tenure (Otsuka & Place 2014). 
 The central African state of Burundi will be the first country case.  The local 
institutional changes that took place during the civil war raging from 1993 to 2005 should 
prove to be a feasible way to test whether agricultural productivity was facilitated or 
hampered by institutional changes postwar.  I argue the structure of the state in postwar 
Burundi did not change, but power changed hands from Tutsi-dominated political parties 
to a Hutu-dominated political party.  Unfortunately, with little change in the institutional 
arrangements critical for agricultural productivity, the same predatory practices of 
government employees toward local farming communities in prewar Burundi continued 
postwar, to the detriment of the agricultural sector.   
 The Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies of Burundi (ISTEEBU), in 
coordination with the Ministry of Planning and Reconstruction of the Republic of 
Burundi has significant archives on the destruction left in many villages as a result of the 
civil war, as well as records on the new arrangements that sprang up across the various 
localities in the country.  The Burundi Community Survey (BCS) and the Burundi 
Households Priority Survey (BHPS) will be employed to gauge changes in living 
arrangements and socioeconomic status of households in the postwar period.  
Additionally, and most relevant for this dissertation, the BCS and BHPS data detail how 
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volatility at the local level in the postwar period led to shifts in agricultural practices by 
households.    
 The West African state of Sierra Leone will be the second country case.  A 
number of local institutional changes took place during the course of the eleven-year 
intrastate conflict with significant beneficial effects for postwar recovery.  However, I 
argue neither the structure of the state nor control of the state changed in postwar Sierra 
Leone, with mixed results for agricultural productivity.  Paramount chiefs in Sierra Leone 
historically hampered agricultural investments through restrictive land access policies, 
and the continued influence of these local leaders has remained an impediment to the 
development of farming communities in the aftermath of the 1991 civil war.   
 The Government of Sierra Leone Institutional Reform and Capacity Building 
Project (IRCBP) in conjunction with Statistics Sierra Leone provide extensive 
information regarding the impact of war on local communities and institutional 
arrangements.  The IRCBP conducts a national household survey annually in order to 
gauge how individuals react with and perceive local institutions.  The Sierra Leone 
Integrated Household Survey (SLIHS) offers insight into the movement of people, school 
enrollment from the ages of 5 to 18, and household per capita consumption expenditures.  
The Sierra Leone Household Survey (SLHS) measures prewar and postwar per capita 
expenditures.  The Institute for Development Studies (IDS) has extensive records on the 
ways in which civil war wrought local institutional change in Sierra Leone, particularly in 
the realm of village chiefs.  The IDS report “A Village Up View Of Sierra Leone’s Civil 
War and Reconstruction: Multilayered and Networked Governance,” contains significant 
archival data of the effects of the civil war on Sierra Leone on leadership in rural 
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communities, as well as the personal testimony of those caught in the midst of conflict.  
Surveys of youth in Kono and Kayima District conducted by Richard Fanthrope and Roy 
Maconchie illustrate the ways in which people devastated by conflict interacted with 
village chieftains and how they coped in a different economic climate.  
 The third country case will be the state of Uganda.  Despite the devastation of the 
civil war that took place from 1980 to 1986, Uganda made an impressive economic 
recovery, as evinced by the growth in the agricultural sector postwar.  I argue that both 
the structure of the state and control of the state shifted in postwar Uganda.  Local 
councils of villagers supported sweeping changes in land tenure in Uganda, greatly aiding 
postwar agricultural productivity, through increased investment in land improvements 
and credit access.  Power shifted away from political parties centered on ethnicity to the 
inclusive coalition forged by Yoweri Museveni during the civil war.  These institutional 
changes helped to address longstanding ethnic tensions in the country that have had 
serious negative consequences for both the functioning of the political process and 
implementation of development policy. 
 The case study of Uganda will utilize data compiled by Francis E. Warnock and 
Frank J. Conway for national economic growth rates and an overview of the agricultural 
sector in the postwar period.   Social cohesion/ the management of social conflicts will be 
measured by tracking changes in local government postwar.  Databases compiled by 
Eliott Green and Daniel Treisman will be used to this end.  Finally, changes in land 
tenure will be measured in their relationship to agricultural productivity.  The scholarship 
of Patrick McAuslan and Diana Hunt will be important in detailing domestic and 
	
	 53	
international sources of institutional changes that took place in the context of the rebel 
victory in the 1980 civil war.  
	
	 54	
Chapter 3: The Plight of Postwar Agriculture in Burundi  
Introduction 
 Burundi has been the site of numerous instances of ethnic violence between the 
majority Hutu and the minority Tutsi since the country was granted independence from 
Belgium in 1965.  The following chapter introduces the unfortunate situation of postwar 
agriculture in Burundi and explains how shifts in local institutions (namely the 
governance of local villages and land tenure security) account for a lack of productivity 
in the selfsame sector.  Rapacious officials within state industries and fears of lingering 
ethnic violence greatly impacted the nature of agricultural recovery in Burundi. 
 Although there have been many instance of mass violence in Burundi since 1965, 
I focus on the civil war that began in 1993 with the assassination of President Melchior 
Ndadye of the Frodebu Party, the institutional changes wrought by the conflict, and the 
resulting implications for the agricultural sector upon the end of the conflict in 2006.  
Additionally, although there were a number of armed actors in the 1993 Burundian civil 
war, I focus on the local government changes and the land policy changes brought about 
by the National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Front for the Defence of 
Democracy (CNDD-FDD) in particular.  After the conclusion of hostilities, the CNDD-
FDD became the dominant force in Burundian politics.  After years of Tutsi domination 
in the Burundian armed forces, the primarily Hutu CNDD-FDD have been integrated into 
a new national police force and currently comprise over 40% of the national military, a 
major shift in the postwar period (Huggins, et al. 2005: 132; Nindorera 2012: 25).  
Additionally, after 2005 parliamentary elections, the CNDD-FDD, under the leadership 
of Pierre Nkrunziza, became the dominant party in the Burundian legislature.  The 
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actions of the CNDD-FDD during the 1993 civil war are critical in understanding the 
course of agricultural recovery in Burundi. 
   
Postwar Economic Outcomes 
 The ongoing outbreaks of internal strife and mass violence in Burundi has led to 
devastating economic consequences for both the development of the country and the lives 
of individual citizens.  In 1990, the per capita income of Burundi was 220 USD, a low but 
otherwise respectable figure for the region at the time.  Between 1990 and 2002, the per 
capita income of Burundi was cut in half by persistent conflict, making the country 
among the poorest in the world.  The proportion of people living in poverty in Burundi 
nearly doubled during the internal strife of the 1990s, rising from 35% of the citizenry in 
1990 to 68% of the populace in 2002.  Furthermore, the spread of civil war to multiple 
regions of the country in the 1990s led to double-digit inflation rates (rising to 30% in 
1997) and overall monetary disaster (IMF 2007: 34).   
 There were also marked regional differences in the way the civil war unfolded.  
Insurgent strongholds in the North Kivu region adjacent to the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo and the western border provinces between the two states were the first 
locations to experience the toll of conflict.  Additionally, the location of the extremely 
dense Kibira forest allowed rebels to pass relatively undetected through the provinces of 
Kayanza and Ngozi, opening a southern front to the Burundian civil war (Chretien & 
Mukuri 2000).  It is at the level of the individual and households, however, where the 
consequences of warfare are felt most strongly.   
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 Overall, civilians have felt the effects of the 1993 civil war in Burundi through a 
variety of means.  The effects of population displacement, the looting of household 
assets, and the destruction of farm crops are the primary ways in which the populace was 
affected during the civil war.   
 Over half of the entire population of Burundi had been displaced at least once 
between 1994 and 2001 (Bundervoet, et al. 2009: 537).  During the course of the conflict 
from 1993 to 2006, approximately 300,000 people were killed and roughly 150,000 were 
displaced.  10% of the entire male Hutu population of Burundi was killed during the 
course of the civil war.  Additionally, 75% of the educated Hutu (those having the ability 
to read and write) were slaughtered during the hostilities (Krueger & Krueger 2009: 29). 
Those who fled from such violence experienced significantly greater risk of contracting 
diseases borne via contaminated water sources and contact with insect vectors during 
their time in hiding.37  Since displaced people often flee in a desperate rush to avoid the 
horrors of being caught in a warzone, these individuals often did not carry enough food 
supplies and their own nutrition was jeopardized as a result.  Those who had left their 
homes had no means to access markets or public health services since roads were unsafe 
with the movements of armed groups and infrastructure was severely compromised in the 
midst of the fighting.  People moved into resettlement camps dealt continually with 
overcrowded conditions and a lack of potable water, food supplies, and waste disposal 
																																																								
37 Infectious disease rates in Burundi skyrocketed as a result of the refugee crisis caused by the civil war.  
By December of 1993, only a few short months after the start of the conflict, 130,000 Burundian citizens 
were internally displaced within the country.  Approximately 700,000 had fled to neighboring Rwanda, 
Tanzania, and Zaire. Displaced people suffered from repeated outbreaks of dysentery due to water 
contaminated with bacteria of the Shigella genus.  Refugees also had to endure a reemergence of epidemic 
typhus through contact with infected fleas and ticks.  Epidemic typhus was not seen in Burundi for well 
over a decade up until the outbreak of the 1993 civil war.  Lice infestations among the displaced persons 
living in confined quarters also led to outbreaks of trench fever.  The people of Burundi underwent a major 
regression in public health outcomes as a result of the civil war (Human Rights Watch 2000). 
	
	 57	
(Human Rights Watch 2000).  After the end of the conflict, those who had been forced to 
flee were able to return to their homes for the most part.  However, humanitarian 
assistance for the returning population was quite scarce with the absence of governmental 
organizations and NGOs, barred from aiding needy people through the continued 
insecurity and poor travel conditions of the country.  Furthermore, CNDD-FDD forces 
started attacking aid workers and journalists by early 1995, prompting many of these 
outside organizations to flee Burundi and thereby making the process of assisting the 
disadvantaged during wartime even more difficult.  With the alienation of the aid 
community, international assistance declined considerably during the Burundian civil 
war, from approximately 320 million USD before 1993 to less than 100 million USD in 
1999 (IMF 2007).  
 The average length of time individuals were displaced was one year or three 
growing seasons, directly impacting the agricultural production so central to the 
Burundian economy (Bundervoet, et al. 2009: 537).  The wartime movement of people 
led to a 15% decline in cereals, an 11% decline in roots and tubers, and a 14% drop off in 
fruits and vegetables from 1993 to 1998 (FAO 1997). 
 Beyond the deleterious effects of population displacement, both government 
forces and insurgent organizations engaged in widespread looting of household property 
and agricultural yields.  Livestock in particular were sought after, as absolute numbers of 
goats and heads of cattle were distinct markers of wealth and societal status for those 
engaged in a pastoral lifestyle.  Thus, the loss of these animals led to sharp declines in 
individual and family wealth for Burundians.  From 1990 to 1998, herds of livestock 
owned by households dropped 23% due to the looting of actors engaged in civil war 
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(FAO 1997).  According to a United Nations survey, average livestock numbers dropped 
on a per household basis from 2.37 at the start of the conflict to 0.42 by 2001 (United 
Nations Population Fund 2002).  Additionally, the theft and wholesale destruction of 
crops was widespread during the Burundian civil war.  Since the state of Burundi is 
largely dependent on coffee exports, Hutu militias set fire to coffee plantations in order to 
weaken government revenue collection.  Some farmers on small plots of land rely on 
coffee to bring in additional funds for their families, and CNDD-FDD troops targeting 
this cash crop left many Burundian peasants impoverished.  As a result of the loss of their 
coffee crop, small farmers in Burundi had less money with which to buy food crops and 
healthcare (Longman 1998: 11).   
 Given the aforementioned challenges facing individuals and households during 
the conflict, Burundi as a whole experienced minimal economic growth after the end of 
the civil war in 2006.  The various measures of economic growth postwar serve to reveal 
the limited recovery that took place after the conclusion of hostilities. 
Table 3.1 Economic Overview of Postwar Burundi 2006-2014 
Series	
Name	





















1.74	 1.14	 1.39	 -0.12	 0.24	 0.69	 0.58	 1.18	 1.27	
Source: World Development Indicators: World Databank 
 Minimal economic growth in Burundi postwar is reflected in the lack of 
productivity in the agricultural sector upon the end of the civil war in 2006.  Annual 
growth of agriculture remained poor in the postwar period.  Additionally, the percentage 
of total land devoted to agriculture increased significantly while productivity per worker 
fell, thus indicating the collapse of the manufacturing and service sectors (and a return to 
subsistence farming) in Burundi in the years following the conclusion of hostilities. 
Table 3.2 Agricultural Productivity of Postwar Burundi 2006-2014 
Series Name 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Agricultural	land	
(%	of	land	area)	




3.15	 -8.81	 -2.10	 3.01	 3.91	 4.39	 5.43	 0.98	 3.35	
Agriculture,	value	
added	(%	of	GDP)	





















Source: World Development Indicators: World Databank  
 While the economic growth of Burundi (as measured by GDP and GDP per 
capita) was largely anemic, researchers at ISTEEBU noted a significant decrease in 
poverty for both individuals (4%) and households (3.5%) from 1998 to 2007.  However, 
there is a clear split in the fortunes of the older and younger households that emerged in 
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the midst of warfare.  Many of the original family units of Burundi splintered as a result 
of the death and displacement of the conflict.  Additionally, in the time frame of the 
survey (1998 to 2007) many individuals in the sample left their original households and 
started new families of their own.  Thus, new heads of households and living 
arrangements emerged.  The Burundi Panel Priority Survey of 2007 surveyed 6,668 
households (3908 of which were living in rural areas while 2760 were living in the 
capital of Bujumbura) for the purposes of tracing their living standards as the Burundian 
civil war progressed.  The panel tracked down one thousand households within the 
original sample to see how they fared after nearly ten years of civil war.   Original 
households experienced a poverty rate of 79% in 1998 while the family units that 
splintered from them saw their rates of poverty drop to 62.3%, a highly significant 
decrease over the same time period.  The discrepancy is most likely due to the social 
mobility of the newer households as a result of the death, displacement, and economic 
opportunities warfare could present.    
 
The 1993 Burundi Civil War & Ethnic Violence 
 The ethnic nature of the clash between government forces and Hutu militias 
greatly impacted local communities in the Burundian countryside.38  At no time was this 
more evident than in the immediate aftermath of the 1993 assassination of the President 
Pierre Ndadye, the first of the Hutu ethnic group to be elected chief executive of the 
																																																								
38 A number of Hutu militias were active during the civil war in Burundi.  In the immediate aftermath of the 
assassination of President Pierre Ndadye, outraged Hutu peasants rose up and often sought Tutsis upon 
which to enact a measure of revenge.  These unorganized acts of mass violence gave way to a few 
prominent militia groups.  The FDD forces were the largest and most active of all the Hutu militia during 
the Burundian civil war.  The Forces for National Liberation (FNL) were the second largest of the Hutu 
militia and fought against government forces long after the other armed groups committed to end hostilities 
(Krueger & Krueger 2009).  
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country, as a member of the Frodebu (Burundian Democratic Front).  The Tutsis, who 
constituted the core of the national military, commenced a killing spree designed to 
eliminate the possibility of any viable Hutu leadership in the future.  The Tutsi-dominated 
armed forces and paramilitary groups roamed the country, killing Hutu government 
officials and village leaders alike. Furthermore, Tutsi armed organizations terrorized 
Hutu communities in order to prevent future exercise of the civil and political rights of 
the latter (Krueger & Krueger 2009: 77).  Many of the Hutus of Burundi, however, 
organized into militias and began preemptively striking at ethnic Tutsi communities after 
the assassination.39  Additionally, Hutu militias targeted army barracks filled with Tutsi 
soldiers in the wake of the death of President Ndadye.   
 Hutus had largely been conditioned to expect ethnic violence during previous 
decades of strife between the two groups.  Upon independence from Belgium, 
competition for power in Burundi was fought among three groups: the Tutsi-Hima 
(wealthy pastoralists), the Tutsi-Banyaruguru (courtiers in the royal court during 
monarchial period of the country), and a small cadre of Hutu elites.  The Tusti-Hima won 
this competition through their control of the security forces and brutally suppressed the 
other competitors for power. From 1966 to 1993, the Tutsi minority occupied nearly 
every prominent political and economic post in Burundi.  The Tutsi-Hima fostered 
considerable resentment due to their repressive tactics.  1972 proved to be a seminal year 
in the history of ethnic tensions in the country, as the primarily Tutsi army was sent to 
quell a Hutu rebellion in southern Burundi.  The army began a two-month slaughter of 
																																																								
39 Frodebu played a pivotal role in organizing many of the Hutu within Burundi in the wake of the 
assassination of President Ndadaye.  However, in the early years of the civil war, the Burundian 
Democratic Front splintered into a radical branch known as the National Council for the Defence of 
Democracy (CNDD), an armed wing known as the Front for the Defence of Democracy (FDD), and those 
who sought a political solution to the civil war violence (Uvin 1999).  
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Hutu civilians that left over 100,000 dead and forced approximately 150,000 to flee their 
homes.  In 1988, 1991, and 1992, smaller scale occurrences of violence between Hutu 
peasants and corrupt Tutsi local administrators led to similar reprisals from the national 
army (Uvin 1999: 256-259).  This pattern of ethnic violence was replicated after the 
assassination of President Ndadye in 1993. 
 During the start of the 1993 conflict, Tutsis within the national military responded 
to Hutu raids by launching indiscriminate attacks upon their ethnic rivals, often resulting 
in significant numbers of casualties among noncombatants.  Civilians became proxy 
targets in the larger conflict between the different ethnic groups (Human Rights Watch 
1998: 15).  Hutu militias responded in kind and the numbers of civilian dead continued to 
increase as the cycle of violence grew ever more unstable. 
 Armed groups in Burundi frequently employed indiscriminate violence against 
civilians of different ethnic backgrounds, often as a result of the difficulties in 
distinguishing between friend and foe in wartime.40 However, in the history of the 
country, such tactics were also used as a means of exterminating political opponents, 
enacting proxy revenge upon ethnic rivals, and exerting a measure of control over 
opposing ethnicities (Krueger & Krueger 2009: 81).  There is little evidence of the use of 
selective targeting of civilians in the civil war in Burundi, and the national army as well 
																																																								
40 The fear of ethnic reprisals has historically been ever present in Burundi, as both Hutus and Tutsis have 
resorted to attacking each other before actual threats emerge.  Hutu are in constant fear of pogroms carried 
out by Tutsi affiliated with the Uprona Party.  These fears have historical grounding given the frequent 
massacres of Hutu by Tutsi-led governments from 1966 to 1993.  Tutsi are in constant fear of a wave of 
Hutu-led violence as observed in neighboring Rwanda. Therefore, they are loathe to give up control of the 
Tutsi-dominated armed forces or rein in the brutal excesses of the national military in their interactions 
with Hutu civilians.  Mass violence in Burundi can often be instigated at the slightest rumor of an 
impending attack from the opposing ethnic group.  This strategy of preemptive violence is employed to 
ensure safety for the ethnic group using such methods but has greatly increased harm to civilians in these 
conflict episodes (Krueger & Krueger 2009). 
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as the CNDD-FDD cadres and organized groups of Hutu peasants attacked diverse 
communities throughout the country (André & Platteau 1998: 32-37; Uvin 1999: 255).  
The national army and Hutu militias of the country were not dissuaded from carrying out 
their arbitrary attacks against civilians by matters of social status, educational attainment, 
and household income.41  However, ethnicity was often the sole criterion for which 
populations would be targeted by the state armed forces and various ethnic militias.   
 The ethnic nature of the attacks launched by the armed forces of Burundi is 
further illustrated by assaults on Hutus within regroupment camps.  The national army set 
up these temporary outdoor shelters in areas of suspected CNDD-FDD activity in order to 
cut off supplies and various other means of support to Hutu militias.  Hutu civilians in 
areas perceived to be staging grounds for CNDD-FDD operations were forcibly evicted 
from their homes and moved into regroupment camps, which housed people in poorly 
constructed hovels made of grass, reeds, twine, and mud.  These facilities housed over 
220,000 people at their greatest capacity and the Burundian national army subjected those 
Hutus interned in these camps to systematic murder, rape, torture, and theft of property 
(Kruger & Krueger 2009: 87).  Additionally, the Rwandan armed forces made up of 
Tutsis in the former Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), as well the Burundian national army, 
participated in the abuse and slaughter of Hutu refugees.  As a result, the state policy of 
regroupment camps in the midst of the civil war became an extension of the ongoing 
																																																								
41 The Tutsi of Burundi sought to exterminate literate Hutu from the population first and foremost, but they 
did not have the information to distinguish the lettered from the unlettered among their ethnic rivals.  
Therefore, they looked to outward markers of literacy in order to choose Hutu targets.  Thus, they would 
kill Hutu for any clothing or accessory that could indicate a Hutu was literate, such as a pen in a shirt 
pocket.  As a result, Tutsi-dominated armed forces and militia groups killed many literate and illiterate 
Hutu (Uvin 1999).  	
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ethnic violence in the rest of the country.  Those that refused to be placed in such 
facilities were summarily executed by the armed forces (Human Rights Watch 1998: 29).  
 Transitional governments in Burundi during the civil war struggled to broker 
peace between the many warring Hutu and Tutsi militia forces.  Major Pierre Buyoya of 
the Uprona Party overthrew the new government of Burundi in July 1996.  As a Tutsi 
from the Bururi province of Burundi, he had previously ruled the country from 1987 to 
1993, until the election of Hutu leader Melchior Ndadye.  The coup led by Pierre Buyoya 
was poorly received by the international community, in no small part because of his role 
in numerous massacres of the Hutu population of Burundi in 1988.  An international 
embargo followed the events of the takeover, but the sanctions regime became less severe 
over time as the Buyoya government included more Hutu within the administration.  
However, this measure did little to assuage the fears of the Hutu militias or the larger 
Hutu population.  Buyoya was ultimately unsuccessful in bringing Hutu militias to the 
negotiating table, but he did secure a ceasefire agreement among the government and 
three Tutsi groups during the Arusha Accords in the year 2000.  In 2003, Domitien 
Ndayizeye, a Hutu from Frodebu, succeeded President Buyoya for a three-year term as 
part of a power sharing agreement (Vandegiste 2009). 
 The commitment on the part of the most active Hutu militias to give up hostilities 
signaled one of the most difficult challenges of the peace process in Burundi.42 The 
																																																								
42 During the civil war in Burundi, transnational actors played a significant role in terms of both mediation 
and peacekeeping.  Nelson Mandela of South Africa led talks between Hutu and Tutsi militias in 2001.  
While unable to secure agreement from Hutu groups on the conclusion of hostilities, the talks set up a new 
transitional government where power would be shared among the warring ethnic groups.   A key part of 
this agreement was setting up an orderly process by which power could be transferred from an outgoing to 
an incoming government in order to prevent succession crises from leading to bloodshed, as had often been 




CNDD-FDD in particular experienced numerous changes during the course of the 
fighting.  Under the leadership of Pierre Nkurunziza, the CNDD-FDD signed an 
agreement with President Ndayizeye in Tanzania in the aftermath of a brutal attack on the 
capital of Bujumbura that caused thousands to flee their places of residence.  The CNDD-
FDD became recognized as a political party and won parliamentary elections in 2005.  In 
the same year, many of the CNDD-FDD members that had fought against the government 
were incorporated into a new national army.  Furthermore, after voters in Burundi 
approved of a new power sharing constitution, Pierre Nkurunziza of the CNDD-FDD was 
elected president in 2005 (Vandegiste 2009).43  The political recognition of former Hutu 
militia groups and their transformation into national parties signaled the end of the civil 
war.  
 Peacekeeping efforts in Burundi attempted to address the root causes of the 
conflict in addition to support of postwar reconstruction efforts.  The African Union in 
Burundi (AMIB) had been present in Burundi from 2003 to 2004 with a mandate to 
support the peace agreement signed between President Ndayizeye and FDD leader Pierre 
Nkurunziza.  The United Nations Operation in Burundi (UNIB) took over peacekeeping 
duties from AMIB in 2004 and stayed in the country until the end of 2006.  At that time, 
the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), established by UN Security 
Council Resolution 1719, replaced UNIB.  The main responsibility of BINUB was 
postwar reconstruction and development of the country.  BINUB focused primarily on 
																																																								
43 The FNL remained active and committed to fighting for longer than the FDD.  The FNL signed a 
ceasefire agreement with the government of Burundi in 2006.  The leader of the FNL, Agathon Rwasa, 
achieved political recognition after having his forces disarm in 2008.  Most recently, there have been 
clashes between the FDD and FNL over the fairness of the electoral process.  Rwasa fled Burundi in 2010 
after charging Pierre Nkurunziza with rigging district elections prior to presidential elections took place 
(Vandegiste 2009).  
	
	 66	
addressing the competition for land, refugee resettlement, and widespread landlessness as 
underlying causes of the civil war.  To this end, 35 million USD was allocated to BINUB 
for the purposes of post-conflict reconstruction (Huggins 2007: 77-78).   
 As the conflict culminated, the people of Burundi started to more strongly identify 
with their own ethnic group.  During the civil war, Hutu and Tutsi lived in communities 
distinct from each other whereas before the civil war, casual interethnic mixing in regards 
to places of settlement was not uncommon (Laely 1997: 695).  At the height of the 
fighting in the countryside, the Tutsi fled to secure IDP camps while the Hutu, as 
previously mentioned, were often forcibly moved into regroupment camps.  The capital 
of Bujumbura was divided into Hutu and Tutsi quarters and moving haphazardly from 
one area to the other would result in certain death for the offending party (Human Rights 
Watch 1998).  Criminal gangs operating in urban areas of Burundi had long been 
biethnic, but the events of the civil war shaped both the makeup and mission of these 
organizations.  By 1995, many of these gangs became monoethnic and became the 
primary militia forces roaming the countryside targeting ethnic rivals.  Considerable out-
group hostility further divided the populace in a time conflict (Bratchet & Wolpe 2005: 
6).  Local institutions took on a different meaning in the light of stronger ethnic group 
identity.  
 
Local Government Changes 
 The state of Burundi has exhibited many of the key features of neopatrimonial 
regimes since its independence and these traits have shaped the trajectory of postwar 
economic recovery.  Many sub-Saharan African states are often rightly characterized as 
neopatrimonial in their organization: these countries combine the bureaucratic features 
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one normally associates with modern polities with extensive patron-client ties steeped in 
ethnic, kin, or religious loyalties.  Thus, many African states will have a written 
constitution, formal laws, and informal practices aimed at restraining the arbitrary 
exercise of executive power, while exhibiting all of the problems that come with 
unaccountable decision-making authority as a result of highly personal relationships 
among a small cadre of ruling elites. These ties among the national leadership supersede 
formal laws and institutions in a neopatrimonial state.  Presidents in such an arrangement 
enrich themselves with state coffers in order to stay in power and surround themselves 
with loyalists based on ethnicity and blood ties in their struggle to build a base of support 
with which to stay in office (Bach & Gazibo 2013).  These loyalists in turn use every 
opportunity to profit through government posts.  Neopatrimonial regimes seek to generate 
private goods for those in power based on who can deliver the biggest bribes or 
budgetary subsidies instead of public goods accessible to the majority of the population 
for the purposes of economic development.  
 The changing role of big men or chiefs is crucial to an understanding of adherence 
to local authority and the resulting effects on land policy in Burundi.  The authority of the 
village elders, or Bashingantahe, has been consistently undermined in post-independence 
Burundi, with observable consequences for the perceptions of the effectiveness of local 
institutions tasked with land registration.  The Tutsi-dominated Uprona Party (the same 
political group that comprised much of the Burundian military prior to 2005 
parliamentary election) sought to remove as many tribal leaders as possible in the Hutu 
majority countryside.  The Uprona Party brought in leaders from the capital of 
Bujumbura to administer local villages.  Burundian peasants looked upon these Tutsi 
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village elders originating from the state capital with immediate suspicion and distrust 
(Voors & Bulte 2014: 458).    
 Upon their ascension to political power after the end of the civil war, the Hutu 
majority CNDD-FDD has been eager to limit the influence of traditional male elders 
given the overwhelming majority of Tutsi village chiefs brought in by the Uprona Party 
in the past.  Thus, the CNDD-FDD has favored elected councils for the purposes of 
village administration.  However, many of these council members of Burundi are still 
reliant on ties to the capital and barred from running in local elections unless approved by 
senior party leadership or through negotiations between the CNDD-FDD and the Uprona 
Party in Bujumbura (and staffed primarily by city-dwelling Hutus) (Voors & Bulte 2014: 
459).  The new hill councils, hand picked from Bujumbura and reliant on the CNDD-
FDD for the furtherance of their careers, served to implement the land policy that would 
prove critical in the postwar period.  Therefore, the gulf between the locals and the 
leadership at the village level has largely remained.  The views of rural Burundians on 
local land policies have largely been informed by both the ethnic divisions reinforced by 
the civil war and the continued appointment of village leaders from the capital instead of 
the local communities themselves.  
 During the events of the Burundian civil war, a parallel administration was 
established by the CNDD-FDD in areas under their control.  The material and moral 
support from the Hutu population was absolutely critical to the success of the CNDD-
FDD.  To this end, leaders of the insurgency mobilized peasants to set aside a set amount 
of food for the combatants.  In return, members of the CNDD-FDD protected peasants 
from attacks by other armed groups through the creation of units tasked with public 
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safety in rural areas.  The CNDD-FDD (as well as the other active armed groups in the 
1993 Burundian civil war) promised tracts of land to those willing to fight in their ranks.  
In a country as densely populated as Burundi and suffering from chronic land shortages, 
it was a promise with a widespread appeal.  The CNDD-FDD organized the sale of coffee 
and tea from local plantations outside Burundi and diverted funds from the sale of these 
items to resupply the organization.  The CNDD-FDD also created a number of revenue-
generating ventures (such as association dedicated to the sale of bicycles and 
motorcycles) and owned significant land for cultivation.  In Mitakaka, in western 
Burundi, the insurgents owned large plantations and taught cultivation techniques to local 
peasants with the express purpose of self-sufficiency in agriculture.  Furthermore, 
insurgents instructed local entrepreneurs in how to better navigate the pitfalls of local 
markets and market their produce accordingly (Nindorera 2012: 18).  The experience in 
land administration and securing agricultural rents from Hutu peasants during the war 
would prove vital for the CNDD-FDD in the postwar period.  Rent-seeking behaviors on 
the part of the CNDD-FDD, exacerbated by lingering ethnic tensions, served to impede 
agricultural recovery after the end of hostilities.   
 Initially however, the CNDD-FDD became popular largely through their rejection 
of the ethnic discourse favored by the establishment Uprona and Frodebu parties in 
national politics. While years of armed struggle against Tutsi dominated governments 
endeared the CNDD-FDD to Hutu populations, in its earliest formation, the insurgency 
was multiethnic and comprised of individuals from many different provinces as well as a 
multitude of faith backgrounds.  The group benefited from not taking part of the power-
sharing agreements put in place by the Uprona and Frodebu parties from 1993 to 2005.  
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In fact, the CNDD-FDD accused both the Uprona and Frodebu parties of overall 
ineptitude in failing to reform the security forces and using their time in power in order to 
enrich their leadership cadre (Reyntjens 2006: 123).  
 Despite the lofty rhetoric, ethnic and regional cleavages persisted in both the 
leadership of the CNDD-FDD and among the rank and file.  The members who had spent 
time in exile in neighboring Rwanda (and Hutus who had lost relatives in previous 
episodes of violence with the Tutsis) had a strongly ethnic interpretation of the events of 
the Burundian civil war and were nonplussed by the inclusive rhetoric of the CNDD-
FDD.  Propaganda songs and anti-Tutsi slogans were widely used to mobilize popular 
support in Hutu-dominated areas.  Leonard Nyangoma, a founding member of the rebel 
movement, assumed control of the CNDD-FDD in 1996 but his leadership was marked 
by regional rivalries and widespread corruption.   He was a Hutu from Bururi province 
who showed open favoritism to others from his region for top positions in the CNDD-
FDD.  Additionally, he was accused of avoiding military engagements in his home 
province and tolerating those within his circle of advisors who had been accused of 
embezzlement.  His successor, Pierre Nkrunziza, sought to correct many of the failings of 
his predecessor, by encouraging social events in order to make followers from different 
provinces mingle, extensive outreach to people outside the movement, and being a visible 
presence with the rank and file members (Nindorera 2012: 15-16).  While he was able to 
improve the perception of the leadership in terms of financial integrity, favoritism toward 
Hutus continued as a key part of CNDD-FDD practices. 
 
Land Tenure Security 
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 The ethnic rivalries of Burundi can help explain the troubling performance of the 
agricultural sector in the postwar period.  As the rent-seeking mechanisms of Burundi 
shifted primarily to CNDD-FDD control in the postwar period, government policy began 
to shift away from Tutsis and favor Hutus.  The ethnicity based favoritism carried over 
into the administration of land in postwar Burundi.  The following section details how the 
conflict brought about a move toward formalized land title postwar.  Movements from 
customary to freehold systems of tenure are assumed to bring about increased investment 
in property as a result of land ownership, the promotion of more efficient uses of land due 
to the possibility of land transactions, and reduced conflict over land ownership due to 
the prevalence of formal title (Feder, et al. 1988; Barrows & Roth 1990).   While there 
was a shift away from customary tenure in the postwar period, a number of the assumed 
benefits of a move toward freehold tenure did not manifest in Burundi.  These shifts in 
land title did not bring about increased productivity in agriculture given extensive state 
interference in the farming sector and fears of conflict recurrence limiting investment.   
 Survey research in Burundi indicates how exposure to violence during the civil 
war is linked to tenure security.  The Burundi Priority Household Survey (BPHS) 
contains data from 872 households in roughly 100 collines or communities.  These data 
were collected in two stages.  The World Bank commenced the first stage by sampling 
Burundian households to be included in the sample in 1998.  Local researchers, in 
conjunction with ISTEEBU and the Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies of 
Burundi and Micro Level Analysis of Violent Conflict or MICROOCON, collected data 
for the second stage of the survey in 2007 by seeking to sample the same households.  
Approximately 42% of the household plots of land in the sample are titled.  The BPHS 
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data highlights the ways in which exposure to violent conflict shapes questions of tenure 
security at the local level.44  There is a statistically significant and strong correlation 
between land titling and conflict intensity.   
 There are a number of possible explanations for the relationship between conflict 
and tenure security in Burundi.  Land has long been formally titled in cities while passed 
down through customary means in the countryside.  After the war, informal property 
markets began to develop in rural areas to respond to the imbalances caused by 
widespread death and displacement of populations (Lin 1995: 236-239).  Some 
individuals and households sought to claim land in areas where the original inhabitants 
fled and subsequently challenge any returning refugees for ownership (ICG 2003: 7-9).  
Finally, with aid packages provided by external actors such as the Norwegian Refugee 
Council (NRC) beginning in 2003, some Burundians sought to buy land and title deeds 
outright (NRC 2007: 2).  This formalization of property ownership occurring in the 
aftermath of conflict signaled a major normative shift in centuries’ old Burundian 
approaches to issues of land tenure.  The BPHS figures serve to illustrate the tension 
between the traditional and contemporary approaches to questions of land tenure in 
Burundi.    
 Increased formal title did not lead to increased investment in the farming sector in 
Burundi due to the actions of local government officials.  Historically, agricultural yields 
in Burundi have been heavily taxed in order to satisfy the rent-seeking prerogatives of 
leaders.  (This is not an uncommon state of affairs on the African continent) (Bates 
																																																								
44 In Burundi, land ownership is rarely formally titled; instead land registration and mediation duties are 
part of the responsibilities of the Bashingatahe, or the local council of elders.  Individuals are usually 
granted informal titles known as petit papiers.  (Only about 1% of land ownership in Burundi is formally 
titled) (Voors & Bulte 2014: 459).   
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1981).45 While the dominant party in Burundi changed after the end of the 1993 civil war, 
the patterns of predatory state behavior through SOEs continued under CNDD-FDD rule 
(Nindodera 2008).  A long-running aspect of conflict in Burundi since independence has 
been contestation over which ethnic group controls state institutions and their 
corresponding rents (Uvin 1999).  This persistent rent-seeking behavior has largely 
negated the expansion of formal title in the Burundian countryside, and as a result, the 
accumulation of capital needed for long-term growth in the agricultural sector has been 
severely limited.  
 Increased land title in the Burundian countryside did not help to address 
longstanding problems of volatility in agricultural markets.  The majority of Burundian 
farms sought to grow as wide a variety of food crops as possible to guard against the 
instability of a market affected by frequent conflict.  The movement away from cash crop 
production and toward subsistence farming is a critical component of the low agricultural 
productivity observed in postwar Burundi. According to household survey data, 80% of 
households in Burundi produce beans, 72% produce sweet potatoes, 64% produce 
banana, 58% produce maize, and 52% produce cassava.  The crops are often grown in 
areas that are not ecologically suitable but are planted regardless in order for households 
to avoid hunger.  In order to have enough food to survive, many households in Burundi 
sought to grow a variety of crops for their own consumption, and thus matching types of 
plants to ideal ecological zones was simply not a priority during wartime.  Additionally, 
in response to consistent conflict, Burundian farmers decreased their production of food 
																																																								
45	Excessive taxation of farmers by local officials is one of the key reasons Burundi lags behind the rest of 
the African continent in the percentage of the population working in the manufacturing and service 
industries (as both sectors are reliant on the productivity of agriculture for their own foundation) (Chenery 
& Syrquin 1975; Ngaruko & Nkurunziza 2002: 11).	
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due to the heightened possibility of theft.  Survey research has found that farmers 
consumed 64% of the food produced on average, indicating a move away from market 
exchange during periods of conflict (De Janvry et al 1991).  Due to the move away from 
the market as indicated by the increasing diversification of food crops at the household 
level, overall agricultural productivity declined and the amount of food produced overall 
has fallen in Burundi (Ngaruko & Nkurunziza 2002: 53). 
 A return to subsistence agriculture is not unusual given the insecurity brought 
about by civil war; however, state land policies have greatly informed this shift in 
farming patterns in Burundi.  Employees of the state, known as extension agents, have 
long demanded people grow cash crops in suboptimal conditions instead of food crops.46 
This forced specialization was done with little thought to soil conditions, labor costs, or 
incentives for farmers.  Survey research conducted in the coffee growing regions of 
Burundi has found that even though a single hectare of potatoes was six times as 
profitable as the same area set aside for coffee (with a fraction of the labor involved), 
extension agents continued to push the latter.  In Burundi, extension agents often act as 
both police and representatives of local parties.  Thus, their political backgrounds inform 
their advice to farmers they are supposed to be supporting and training (Kaburahe 2001).  
Upon the end of the civil war, the CNDD-FDD now has their own extension agents in 
rural communities; in addition to those allied with the long-established Uprona and 
																																																								
46 Extension agents are government employees normally tasked with working alongside rural people in 
order to improve their livelihoods, but they serve a variety of functions.  They seek to aid farmers in 
improving their productivity gains by offering technical assistance, implementing education programs, and 
discussing long-term strategies for cultivation.  Extension agents also serve as liasions between farmers and 
the national government: agricultural workers express their fears for the future and what they need in terms 
of resources from local/national authorities (Kaburahe 2001).  
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Frodebu parties.  These agents are able to skim revenue from export crops through 
predatory taxation schemes (Nindorera 2008).  
 The production of cash crops in Burundi also did not escape interference from 
local officials.  Coffee in particular, the dominant cash crop in the country, has long had 
its prices depressed to support patronage efforts.  (The price of Burundian coffee is the 
lowest in the region by far).  80% of Burundian exports come from the production of 
coffee.  Given its primacy among cash crops in Burundi, coffee production has been and 
continues to be a critical source of rents in the agricultural sector (Oketch & Polzer 
2002).  The state systematically undermined farmers’ associations that sought to pool the 
costs of marketing the cash crop and diverted profits from coffee to agents of the political 
party in power/party functionaries for patronage purposes  (Ngaruko & Nkurunziza 2002: 
49).  A significant portion of the 60% margin from coffee production is reserved for state 
extension agents and supporters of the regime in Bujumbura.  Thus, the profits made 
from coffee are used to link those officials dependent upon rents to the ethnically based 
national parties of Burundi.   Much like the aforementioned struggles over the control of 
the Burundian state and its corresponding rents, local officials viewed exploiting coffee 
production as a route to easy profits.   
 An increase in formal land title was unable to facilitate agricultural investment in 
Burundi because of the well-founded fears of ethnic violence restarting as well as the 
presence of extension agents.  The rate of gross investment in Burundi declined from 
17.5% in 1990 to 5.6% in 1998 (MPDR 2001).  From 1991-2000, Burundi experienced 
negative annual growth in agricultural research and development spending.  For 
households, the fear of conflict outbreak has led families to spurn investing in land 
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improvements and opt instead for hoarding any and all surpluses from farming.  
Extension agents made this hoarding more commonplace by pushing Burundian peasants 
to grow cash crops.  Peasants would avoid growing cash crops during times of political 
volatility and instead opt to plant food crops that are far more profitable, less labor-
intensive, and less likely to degrade the soil.  However, extension agents would often raze 
areas with food crops to make room for coffee or cotton production and threaten farmers 
who eschewed planting cash crops (Ngaruko & Nkurunziza 2002: 53-55).    Thus, 
farmers would often grow food crops such as tomatoes under the cover of cash crops 
such as cotton.  This suboptimal use of land reduced the output of both types of crops.  
Thus, profit from agricultural yields, and therefore the funds used for land improvements, 
was jeopardized in order to avoid interference from extension agents (Nkurunziza 1987).  
Fear of recurring conflict has led to sharp declines in investment in the agricultural 
sector.   
 The plight of those displaced from their land in Burundi illustrates how an 
increase in land title did not bring about resolution to deeper ethnic conflicts.  President 
Ndadye attempting to give land back to Hutu refugees displaced as a result of previous 
instances of mass violence in the post-independence period was a key trigger for his 1993 
assassination and the subsequent civil war.  Many of the homes and plots of land 
President Ndadye sought to give back to Hutu refugees belonged to wealthy and 
politically connected Tutsis from the upper ranks of the military as well as local and 
national government.  Entrenched Tutsi interests at the national level in Burundi opposed 
any reforms aimed at remedying the situation of landless Hutus (Ngaruko & Nkurunziza 
2002: 25).  At present, any attempt to address the issue of refugee resettlement is met 
	
	 77	
with tremendous hostility from both sides of the ethnic divide.47  (Burundian refugees are 
almost entirely Hutu while those that have occupied the land of displaced people are 
made up primarily of Tutsi peasants).  Thus, Hutu refugees cast any policy meant to 
assist Tutsi occupiers of their property as discriminatory and vice versa.  (Daudelin 2003: 
16).   
 Local leaders friendly to the CNDD-FDD have allowed the aforementioned 
patterns of government interference harmful to agriculture as a whole to continue.  
Traditionally, the Bashingantahe settled land disputes between families. Members of the 
Bashingantahe settled roughly one in three property conflicts while local courts resolved 
41% of similar territory claims.  Starting with the 2005 elections that brought the CNDD-
FDD into power, there has been a clear movement away from customary forms of land 
titling in Burundi.  The Catholic Church and the political parties of the country have 
greatly undermined the Bashingantahe through the employment of their own conflict 
resolution mechanisms.  Since the arrival of the CNDD-FDD into power in Burundi, the 
jurisdiction of the Bashingantahe in regards to local disputes has been further reduced in 
favor of elected hill councils.  However, there remains a significant variation in the 
powers of the village elders and the hill councils in the different regions of the country.  
The local laws establishing the hill councils mandated that these elected bodies actively 
cooperate with the traditional Bashingantahe.  However, the level of cooperation between 
the hill councils and Bashingantahe vary greatly across Burundi.  For instance, in Ngozi 
province, the hill council and the Bashingantahe are in near constant conflict over 
jurisdiction and the ability to settle land disputes, with the latter being barred outright 
																																																								
47 Restitution of land for refugees may not be possible due to chronic land shortages as a direct result of the 
booming population (Wily 2009: 31).   
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from operating at all.  There are far more cooperative arrangements in other provinces, 
indicating the powers of the Bashingantahe in regards to tenure security remain context 
and region specific (Huggins 2007: 76).  
 
Competing Explanation: International Assistance 
 The role of international assistance fails to explain why the farming sector of 
Burundi struggled after the end of hostilities triggered by the 1993 civil war.  In addition 
to addressing land disputes a central cause of the civil war, BINUB sought to improve 
agricultural outcomes in Burundi postwar.  Property disputes and rural poverty were 
viewed as inextricably linked by UN observers.  BINUB therefore sought to allocate aid 
in rural areas to increase farm yields for peasant households.  However, the outside aid 
that was available to improve agricultural outcomes for Burundian peasants was 
mismanaged or not directed in areas beneficial for farmers.  As previously mentioned, 
BINUB allocated 35 million USD for postwar reconstruction but only a small fraction of 
the money has been spent addressing land issues.  28 million USD was spent on large 
agricultural development projects that will take many years to complete in order to 
observe any wider benefit to crop yields or productivity per worker.  700,000 USD of the 
35 million USD was used for addressing problems such as refugee resettlement and 
finding shelter for those left landless as a result of the fighting (Huggins 2007: 78).  
Outside aid was available in Burundi postwar for the purposes of facilitating agricultural 
recovery.  However, the mismanagement and misallocation of funds by international 
actors in the post-conflict period serves to explain why aid from external actors is not 





 The history of Burundi is fraught with ethnic and regional rivalries that have 
spilled over into mass violence.  Furthermore, there is a long history of political parties in 
Burundi stoking ethnic and regional rivalries over control of state institutions.  These 
conflicts have led to a sharp decline in agricultural productivity in the country via 
changes in local government and land tenure that have exacerbated the aforementioned 
tensions. 
 The growing allegiance individuals and households had for their own particular 
ethnic group was an outgrowth of the Burundian civil war.  The violence of the civil war 
had a clear ethnic dimension as Hutu communities united in the face of attacks from 
outside militias comprised of Tutsis and vice versa.  Communities that were once 
integrated rapidly segregated over the course of the civil war.  The CNDD-FDD and 
other armed groups both took advantage of and further stoked these societal cleavages in 
their management of local populations under their territorial control. 
 Changes in local government and tenure security initiated by the events of the 
civil war are instructive in understanding the poor outcomes of the agricultural sector in 
Burundi.  The victorious Hutu-dominated CNDD-FDD took control of the state apparatus 
that had belonged to Tusti-dominated political parties for many decades.  Once in power, 
the CNDD-FDD subverted leadership in local settings through the manipulation of the 
village councils.  CNDD-FDD party elites in the capital of Bujumbura handpicked 
loyalists to serve on village councils.  CNDD-FDD approved local officials acted in ways 
to improve their own rent seeking opportunities with a clear negative impact for the 
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agricultural sector.  First, extension agents emphasized coffee production in areas where 
it was not suitable to plant the cash crop (as they were able to divert profits from exports 
to enrich themselves).  Second, since extension agents would often destroy food crops 
planted by peasants and demand cash crops be planted instead, farmers would plant food 
crops in secret.  This use of land lowered agricultural yields as farmers would often plant 
food crops under the cover of cash crops to deceive extension agents.  Third, increasing 
interference from extension agents (and the aforementioned destruction of food crops) 
prompted farmers to avoid investing in agricultural improvements on their land.  The 
civil war is significant in agricultural recovery as a fight over control of the state and the 
resulting rent-seeking opportunities. 
 In the following chapter, I test my hypothesis in Sierra Leone, a country case with 
considerable ethnic diversity much like Burundi.  However, the fault lines of their 1991 
civil war were not explicitly ethnic.  I argue that the lack of clear dividing lines between 
friend and foe in the conflict in Sierra Leone positively shaped the nature of agricultural 
recovery in the postwar period by foregoing the ethnicity based patronage networks so 
central to Burundi. 
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Chapter 4: Postwar Agricultural Recovery in Sierra Leone  
Introduction 
The 1991 civil war in Sierra Leone devastated economic outcomes in the West 
African country.   The widespread theft of food crops and the destruction of peasant 
farmsteads greatly hampered the productivity of agriculture in particular.  However, upon 
the conclusion of hostilities, Sierra Leone posted impressive growth in the agricultural 
sector.  The resumption of agricultural productivity could not have occurred without an 
institutional environment conducive for economic growth in place.  Far and away the 
most powerful institution at the village level in Sierra Leone was that of the paramount 
chief.  The study aims to show that the changes that took place at the level of local 
institutions (namely the paramount chiefs) during the war had significant effects for 
postwar recovery.  
 The chapter proceeds as follows.   First, the conditions of postwar Sierra Leone 
will be discussed.  The extent of destruction wrought as a result of the conflict and the 
affects of the fighting on a variety of communities within Sierra Leone will be presented 
in this first section.  Second, a brief background of the 1991 civil war will be 
introduced.  The focus of this section will be on the actions of the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) during the conflict and the implications of their activities for rural 
communities throughout Sierra Leone.  Third, the changes in local government that took 
place in the aftermath of the conflict will be analyzed.  Paramount chiefs accepted limits 
on their authority as a result of pressure from the newly elected government of Sierra 
Leone and international donors.  However, the chiefs also themselves acknowledged the 
need for changes in village administration given the strong support/sympathy for the RUF 
	
	 82	
among marginalized youth in rural communities.  Fourth, the postwar changes in land 
tenure will be detailed.  Changes in property rights helped facilitate postwar investment 
in the agricultural sector.  Paramount chiefs, as custodians of village lands, had to be 
open to reform of long-held practices of customary tenure in Sierra Leone.  Fifth, the 
chapter concludes with some competing explanations for the growth of the agricultural 
sector postwar and why these are not convincing.     
 
Postwar Economic Outcomes 
 The consequences of the civil war in Sierra Leone were strongly felt by 
individuals and households.  From 1991 to 2002, approximately 75,000 people were 
killed and over 500,000 people were forced to flee the country.  The conflict displaced 
approximately half of the national population of 4.5 million (Tamm 2002).  Economic 
activity at the level of rural villages largely ceased during the years of armed intrastate 
conflict.  A lack of shelter became a near constant concern for civilians during the 
fighting, as clashes between government forces and insurgents resulted in destroyed 
homes that were not rebuilt due to prevailing economic uncertainty.48 Additionally, tens 
of thousands of women were subjected to rape and sexual assault during the course of 
warfare (Human Rights Watch, 1999).  According to the United States based Physicians 
for Human Rights, between 215,000 to 257,000 women and girls experienced sexual 
violence during the civil war in Sierra Leone.  Rape was routinely employed by the RUF 
																																																								
48 As the conflict progressed, the government of Sierra Leone and international NGOs contributed building 
materials to assist local communities (Human Rights Watch, 1999).   
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to dissuade civilians from collaborating with government authority and to force 
compliance with the demands of the insurgents (Cohen 2013).49  
 Conflict had a detrimental impact on the availability of food for the average 
citizen of Sierra Leone and this scarcity was often a trigger for RUF attacks.  Rice was 
available during the first year of the conflict, but supplies quickly ran out and became 
cost prohibitive as the fighting continued.  The RUF waited for farmers to plant their 
crops and secure their harvest before launching their attacks.  As a result, peasants in 
Sierra Leone began to dedicate less of their land to agriculture and rely on wild plants and 
roots (as well as usually inedible vegetation) for their sustenance.  The availability of salt 
was another area of concern, as there were major shortages of this essential mineral in the 
southeast of Sierra Leone.  A number of casualties during the civil war in Sierra Leone 
were as a result of a lack of salt, and children in particular were the most affected.  
Women would often place themselves in considerable danger by traveling great distances 
from their local communities during wartime in order to procure salt.  The salt shortage 
became so severe that areas with copious amounts of the essential mineral were often 
targets for RUF attacks (Vincent 2012: 11).50 
																																																								
49 Rape was also used to force socialization among groups of combatants during wartime.  Interviews 
conducted in Sierra Leone have revealed the tremendous pressure placed on women and youth of the RUF 
in particular to participate in heinous acts of sexual violence.  New members of the RUF took part in sexual 
crimes as something of an initiation that needed to be completed in order to be accepted by rebel 
commanders as a member of the insurgency (Cohen 2013). 
50 In addition to food and salt shortages, the increased difficulty of obtaining needed medicines during 
wartime posed an additional hardship on the people of Sierra Leone.  The distribution of medicine in Sierra 
Leone changed a great deal as a result of the conflict.  There were few private pharmacies before the onset 
of the civil war; most citizens relied on government hospitals or health care centers for needed treatments.  
However, as the civil war progressed, health personnel fled their facilities for fear of being forcibly 
recruited into RUF ranks.  Additionally, medication was often the first item to be sought after by the rebels 
during their attacks.  As a result, many villages relied on local herbalists for needed treatments (and the 
identity of these individuals was also kept a strict secret to prevent RUF recruitment).  A few NGOs such as 
the International Red Cross (IRC) and GOAL attempted to meet this tremendous need for medication, but 
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 The children of Sierra Leone (and particularly those youth forced to join an armed 
group) experienced the deleterious effects of conflict in a variety of ways.  One of the 
most internationally recognized tragedies of the civil war in Sierra Leone was the use of 
children as frontline combatants.  Child soldiers were employed extensively by the RUF 
during the Sierra Leone civil war.51  Their particular experience during the conflict and 
the struggle of former soldiers to reenter civilian life upon the end of the hostilities 
continues to prove a major challenge in the postwar recovery of Sierra Leone.  The 
abduction of children by both the forces of the government and the RUF was not 
uncommon.  Approximately 15,000 to 22,000 youth were kidnapped and pressed into 
military service during the course of the civil war in Sierra Leone. These young people 
were forced to serve their kidnappers by carrying out domestic chores in addition to being 
frontline combatants (McKay and Mazurana 2004).  The abducted youth were often 
forced to commit horrific acts of violence in their local communities in order to 
discourage any possibility of a return home.  Furthermore, sexual abuse and drug usage 
was quite high among the children kidnapped.  Given the litany of horrors the youth 
pressed into military service witnessed firsthand and in which they participated, 
reintroducing such a traumatized population back into the civilian life was a major 
challenge upon the end of hostilities.52  After the end of the civil war in Sierra Leone, 
																																																																																																																																																																					
their efforts ultimately were out of reach for the vast majority of war-affected civilians (McKay and 
Mazurana 2004).  
51 Children in Sierra Leone largely stopped attending school upon conflict outbreak.  The Ministry of 
Education was in charge of school prior to the start of hostilities, but at the onset of the fighting, their 
control over schooling quickly eroded.  Many schools were burnt down as a result of the fighting and the 
RUF aggressively sought to conscript schoolchildren.  Parents pulled their children out of school out of fear 
and would often rely on older and more educated siblings to instruct their younger brothers and sisters 
(McKay and Mazurana 2004).	
52 Some of the RUF combat units were widely known for their propensity to commit terrible atrocities 
against the civilian population.  Based on interviews conducted in postwar Sierra Leone, if child soldiers 
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programs geared toward disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) were 
aimed at former child soldiers (Betancourt et al 2008).53  However, persistent battles with 
PTSD symptoms threatened to impede the reintegration process for many of the young 
former combatants.   
Table 4.1 Economic Overview of Postwar Sierra Leone 2004-2014 
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1.55	 0.20	 2.07	 5.09	 2.90	 0.89	 2.99	 3.58	 12.65	 17.49	 4.67	
Source: World Development Indicators: World Databank 
 As the above chart indicates, Sierra Leone slowly began to recover upon the end 
of hostilities.  By 2011, the country regularly posted growth rates “…way above the sub-
																																																																																																																																																																					
were known to have been part of combat units that took part in such terrible acts against civilians, they 
would in fact not be welcomed back to their communities (Humphreys & Weinstein 2009). 
53 Ultimately, many of the programs catering to the needs of former child soldiers suffer from major 
organizational oversights that harmed educational outcomes for certain segments of the population in the 
aftermath of the civil war in Sierra Leone.  Many young girls that were kidnapped and forced to serve as 
part of the RUF were overlooked as potential beneficiaries of DDR programs since they generally did not 
serve as frontline combatants.  DDR initiatives also came under fire for diverting resources away from 
students who did not get caught up in the fighting among government and insurgent forces, in an already 
overburdened and poorly performing countrywide network of primary and secondary schools (Betancourt 
et al 2008).  			
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Saharan average,” according to Ibrahim Ansu Bangura, a senior macro-economist at the 
African Development Bank (AfDB), based in Freetown.  
Table 4.2 Foreign Direct Investment in Postwar Sierra Leone 2004-2014 
Series	Name	 2004	 2005	 2006	 2007	 2008	 2009	 2010	 2011	 2012	 2013	 2014	
Trade	(%	of	
GDP)	




4.27	 5.57	 3.12	 4.42	 2.12	 4.50	 9.25	 32.77	 19.84	 7.79	 14.27	
Source: World Development Indicators: World Databank 
 The economy of Sierra Leone was growing at a significant rate due to the influx 
of foreign direct investment and the resumption of both rural agricultural production and 
the iron ore industry.  Postwar Sierra Leone witnessed the return of an infant tourism 
industry, the repatriation of educated elites that had fled conflict, and an increasing 
presence of foreign mining corporations, all of which further spurred employment and 
economic growth in the aftermath of the civil war.  British firms involved in the 
extraction and export of minerals such as African Minerals Ltd and London Mining PLC 
were responsible for much of this postwar productivity in the mining sector.  According 
to Ibrahim Tommy, executive director of the Centre for Accountability and Rule of Law 
(CARL), in Freetown, these two corporations alone employed close to 10,000 people in 
Sierra Leone, more than any single employer other than the government (Ford 2015).  
The revival of the mining sector propelled the growth rates of Sierra Leone to some of the 
highest in the world in 2012 and 2013. 
Table 4.3 Agricultural Overview of Postwar Sierra Leone 2004-2014 



















.927	 .990	 1.049	 1.188	 1.268	 1.319	 1.365	 1.432	 1.486	 1.554	 1.567	
 Source: World Development Indicators: World Databank 
 As the above chart indicates, the agricultural sector was a linchpin of the 
economic recovery of Sierra Leone.  Farming communities and the mining sector have 
historically had enduring connections in Sierra Leone.  Traditionally, from September to 
November of each year, farmers would grow rice and other food crops to sell in areas 
where mining was taking place.54  The profits from the sale of food crops would be 
reinvested back into peasant farmsteads for the planting of cash crops such as coffee, 
cocoa, and citrus fruits (Binns 1981).  However, the civil war interrupted this 
arrangement as over 2.5 million people fled their homes to escape conflict.  Since many 
of the displaced were farmers, food to the miners and cash crop production stalled during 
the conflict years.  Survey research in both Sandor Chiefdom and the Lower Bambara 
Chiefdom illustrate how food and cash crop production recovered after the end of the 
civil war (Maconachie & Binns 2007: 373). Furthermore, the links between farmers and 
mining communities have resumed upon the conclusion of hostilities.  This is despite 
																																																								
54 In fact, at least one member of many peasant households in Sierra Leone report working as in mines on a 
seasonal basis in order to supplement their income (Maconachie & Binns 2007: 368). 
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ongoing challenges with unreliable transportation networks in Sierra Leone that have 
affected the movement of agricultural products to mining communities. 
 
The 1991 Sierra Leone Civil War 
 There are a number of interrelated factors that serve to explain the outbreak of the 
civil war in Sierra Leone.  Similar to Burundi, the leadership of Sierra Leone after 
independence relied on extensive networks of patronage to secure their privileged 
positions.  The resulting patrimonial state suffered from problems of effectiveness in both 
the civil and military services while simultaneously finding it difficult to motivate 
government employees.  Furthermore, in many parts of the country, young men in 
particular were disillusioned with the leadership of local chiefs.  Chiefs were often the 
clients of elected officials and played a significant role in suppressing free speech and 
political association deemed threatening to state interests (Fanthorpe & Sesay 2009).  
Additionally, paramount chiefs often abused their considerable authority to enrich 
themselves at the expense of their people.  These disenchanted youth felt paramount 
chiefs blocked their access to the land and resources they would need to settle down, 
marry, and establish families.  The young men who felt disenfranchised by local leaders 
in such a manner would join the RUF with little hesitation (Vincent 2012, 10).55 In turn, 
one of the primary targets of the RUF throughout the civil war were local governance 
																																																								
55 The humiliation of life under the rule of powerful paramount chiefs drove many youth to take up arms 
against local leaders in order to gain a sense of agency and empowerment. In many ways, the civil war in 
Sierra Leone was about the social exclusion individuals living in the countryside felt in the shadow of 
paramount chiefs.  Additionally, many young people reported a sense of feeling powerful upon handling 
firearms, something they had not previously experienced.  Using force to coerce and humiliate paramount 
chiefs was a common practice by youth who had joined the RUF ranks, as they sought to transfer their 
feeling of shame over to those who previously had power over them (Keen 2005).   
	
	 89	
structures, as exemplified by attacks upon village chiefs, the Native Administration of 
Sierra Leone, and the Sierra Leone Police (Richards 1998).   
 Arguably the most important underlying factor in the civil war in Sierra Leone 
was the consistent failure of the state to promote economic development. The All 
People’s Congress (APC) dominated Sierra Leone from 1968 to the start of hostilities.  
For two decades, the country was a one-party state that catered to the needs of political 
insiders and foreign diamond merchants, to the detriment of the larger population.  Due to 
the orientation of the APC towards its own members and outside business interests, 
public services in the country rapidly declined since independence.  In 1990, Sierra 
Leone had the second worst human development ranking in the world as a result of years 
of economic mismanagement (United Nations 1993).  Additionally, the absence of 
development in Sierra Leone led to a dearth in employment opportunities for the youth of 
the country.  Young people grew increasingly disaffected and were ready to fight against 
the state after decades of stagnant economic growth (Richards 1996).  Thus, the 
disillusioned youth of Sierra Leone made up the core contingent of those violently 
opposing the government in the 1990s. 
 The armed conflict in Sierra Leone began when the Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) invaded the country from various points in neighboring Liberia on March 23, 
1991.56 The strategy and tactics of the RUF changed frequently as their struggle against 
the government in Sierra Leone progressed.  Foday Sankoh, a former army sergeant 
																																																								
56 The initial incursion was comprised of approximately one hundred dissidents from various universities 
within Sierra Leone.  Liberian forces loyal to Charles Taylor and a small mercenary group from Burkina 
Faso also supported the initial forays into the territory of Sierra Leone.  The rebels began their assault by 
invading the Bomaru and Kailahan districts in the eastern region of Sierra Leone.  They opened a second 
front by attacking targets in the southern areas of Pujehun district via the Mano River Bridge linking 
Liberia and Sierra Leone (Ndumbe 2001: 94).   
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implicated in a coup d’état attempt in the 1970s, led the RUF, with the stated goal of 
removing the APC from power.  He argued the party had lost its political mandate due to 
its clearly corrupt practices and emphasis on tribal favoritism.  However, the practices of 
the RUF in its campaign often diverged sharply from the rhetoric espoused by the 
leadership of the organization.  Instead of challenging government forces in the capital of 
Freetown, the RUF opted instead to deploy brutal tactics against civilians in order to 
demonstrate the weakness of the central state apparatus in providing protection.  In this 
way, the RUF took advantage of already existing rural resentments against the 
government in Freetown to further divide the citizens of the countryside from the national 
leadership.  After engaging in a policy of brutalizing civilians for several months, by 
January of 1992, the RUF began to target diamond mines in the southeast of Sierra Leone.  
After securing a steady flow of income via the capture of precious mineral resources, the 
RUF began to raid government convoys and further delegitimize President Momoh, who 
was increasingly worried about the deteriorating security situation in the country and 
rising dissension from within the national armed forces.  His worst fears were realized 
when Captain Valentine Strasser led a number of junior officers in a successful coup 
attempt in May of 1992 (Ndumbe 2001: 95).  President Strasser signaled a shift in 
strategy in terms of civil war prosecution and promised to open talks with the leadership 
of the RUF.57  The ouster of President Momoh was the first in a long series of military 
																																																								
57 President Strasser met with some initial military success in his relations with the RUF and their 
leadership.  After initial attempts at negotiations with the RUF were rebuffed by what he felt were 
unreasonable demands, President Strasser replaced many of the military personnel who held cabinet level 
positions within his administration with civilians in order to signal his good faith and commitment to peace 
talks.  (He also felt having civilians holding cabinet posts would have an overall calming effect on the 
hostilities in Sierra Leone).  President Strasser sought to halt the advance of the RUF and to this end, his 
government experienced some military success against the RUF.  The national military under President 
Strasser was able to force the RUF to leave the highly profitable alluvial diamond mines in the southeast.  
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takeovers of the civilian authority that ushered in new governments during the civil war 
in Sierra Leone. 
 The actions of the RUF contributed greatly to the breakdown of many key 
institutions in Sierra Leone.  RUF soldiers deliberately targeted village chiefs for 
elimination, burned schools and courthouses, and forcibly scattered the civilian 
population.  Furthermore, young recruits in the RUF were sent to commit heinous crimes 
against their home villages in order to further destabilize local communities amidst the 
fighting (Keen 2005: 60).  While more armed factions entered the fray as the conflict 
progressed, well over 75% of all battles in the civil war in Sierra Leone involved the RUF 
as the primary fighting force (Smith et al., 2004).  According to the records of truth and 
reconciliation commissions held by the government of Sierra Leone postwar, RUF 
fighters committed well over 70% of the human rights abuses reported during the 
intrastate conflict (Conibere et al., 2004).  The fighting that spread throughout the country 
led to two coups at the national level and a marked deterioration in the discipline of the 
Sierra Leone Army (SLA).   This erosion of discipline greatly changed the character of 
the intrastate conflict in Sierra Leone and therefore increased the threat posed to civilian 
populations (Bellows and Miguel 2006).  
 External actors played critical roles in both the prosecution of the civil war and in 
the events surrounding the peace settlement.  Increasing RUF attacks prompted President 
Momoh to ask the British for military assistance in May of 1991 to combat the rebel 
threat, a request that was denied at the time.  In March of 1995, his successor, President 
Strasser, invited the South African mercenary force, Executive Outcomes (EO) to 
																																																																																																																																																																					
However, the armed forces of the country were unable to sustain this momentum, prompting President 
Strasser to look abroad for sources of military assistance against the RUF (Keen 2005). 
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dislodge the RUF from the areas surrounding Freetown.  By December 1995, EO was 
successful in expanding their operations beyond the capital and recapturing vital diamond 
mines from the RUF.  Cooperation between the EO and the largest of the local militias, 
the Kamajors, proved critical in strengthening the latter as a viable military force.  (In the 
early years of the conflict in Sierra Leone, Kamajors undertook a defense of local 
communities under attack from the RUF and gained credibility with peasants while the 
largely absent central state was simultaneously exposed as corrupt and inept in terms of 
village protection). Additionally, pressure from the British and French governments was 
also crucial in the scheduling of elections on February 25, 1996.  Ahmad Tejan Kabbah 
was elected president and signed a peace accord with the RUF, which unfortunately 
collapsed the following year.  Major Johnny Paul Koroma deposed Kabbah in yet another 
coup, leaving the former president to flee to Guinea to begin to mobilize international 
support for his return.  The Economic Community of West African States Military 
Observer Group (ECOMOG), led by Nigeria, intervened in Sierra Leone in February of 
1998 and drove the RUF from the capital of Freetown.  International Alert, a London 
based human rights advocacy NGO, played a crucial role in organizing peace talks in 
November of 1996 between the RUF and the government of Sierra Leone.  The Security 
Council created the UN Mission of Observers in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) on July 13, 
1998, as per a recommendation from Secretary-General Kofi Annan.  UNOMSIL was 
entrusted with oversight of the disarmament and demobilization of the warring parties in 
Sierra Leone, while simultaneously training and reorganizing the national police force.  
UNOMSIL was highly limited from its inception with an inadequate staff, funds 
amounting to 22.6 million USD, and a mandate that lasted only until March 13, 1999.  
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Ultimately, UNOMSIL was forced to leave Sierra Leone in 1999 (Amnesty International 
1997).  
 Intervention from the international community was ultimately crucial in bringing 
about an end to the civil war in Sierra Leone.  The United Nations, the Organization for 
African Unity (OAU), and the Nigerian-led Economic Organization of West African 
States (ECOWAS) aimed to bring the warring parties to the negotiating table.  After 
UNOMSIL withdrew from Sierra Leone, the primary responsibility for ending the 
instability in the country fell to the OAU.  The OAU sought to gather information about 
the plight of women during the Sierra Leone conflict and encourage female participation 
in the conflict resolution process.  To this end, the OAU created the African Women’s 
Committee on Peace and Development.  On February 4, 1999, the newly formed 
organization released a statement condemning the widespread human rights abuses 
perpetrated during the civil war in Sierra Leone and threw their support behind the 
Kabbah regime for attempting to end the fighting via peaceful means.58  To this end, the 
OAU tasked ECOWAS with restoring the Kabbah regime.  ECOWAS used a variety of 
military and nonmilitary strategies to bring about an end to the civil war.  ECOWAS 
sought to restore the Kabbah government by imposing sanctions on the military junta in 
Sierra Leone, continuing to support ECOMOG forces in enforcing such punitive 
measures, and initiating talks with the leadership of the coup.   The efforts of ECOWAS 
led to the Conakry peace plan signed in Guinea on October 23, 1997.  The agreement 
called for the return of the Kabbah government by April 22, 1998 (a provision that 
																																																								
58 Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was the third president of Sierra Leone.  He was an international civil servant with 
the UNDP for over two decades.  Upon his retirement from the UN, he returned to his homeland and served 
as president from 1996-1997 and then again from 1998-2007.  He fled to Guinea after a successful military 
coup by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) in 1997.  While in exile, he was instrumental in 
calling for British and UN support in putting an end to the Sierra Leone civil war (Posthumus 1999).   
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remained unheeded by the ruling military junta) (Posthumus 1999).  Ultimately, the 
conflict between the government and the RUF reignited and the ensuing bloodshed 
prompted international actors to step in and put an end to the fighting. 
 Ultimately, outside intervention became a necessity in order to halt the civil war 
in Sierra Leone. The United Nations created a new mandate allowing for UNAMSIL (UN 
Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone) in 1999 and deployed nearly eighteen thousand 
troops to RUF held areas of the country.  After a brutal RUF attack on the city of 
Freetown, numerous UNAMSIL soldiers were taken hostage.  As part of Operation 
Palliser, British paratroopers intervened to save captured UNAMSIL soldiers and bring 
about a negotiated settlement to the civil war.  Furthermore, British forces captured RUF 
leader Foday Sankoh in May of 2000.  UNAMSIL facilitated peace talks among the 
warring parties and initiated a disarmament campaign in RUF held areas in 2002.  Foday 
Sankoh of the RUF and President Kabbah agreed upon amnesty and economic 
opportunities for adult rebel fighters while child soldiers would be placed in schools and 
reunited with their families.  Increased stability within Sierra Leone, as well as the aid of 
various NGOs and external actors, yielded the first postwar national elections in 2002 and 
the first postwar local elections in 2004 (Bellows and Miguel 2006).59 Additional local 
elections were held in 2007, and national elections were again conducted in 2008 
(Bellows & Miguel 2009). 
 
Local Government Changes 
																																																								
59 The significance of local and national elections was not lost on the people of Sierra Leone, as the 
citizenry had not had the opportunity to vote in over three decades. At the national level, the Sierra Leone 




 During the civil war in Sierra Leone, a number of new participatory mechanisms 
developed at the village level.  Many of these arrangements persisted postwar and yielded 
strongly beneficial effects for the communities in which they arose.  The Hindo-Hindo (a 
group of Kamajors made up of the Hindo ethnic group), Mammy-Queens (a coalition of 
female chiefs that led villages or townships during wartime), chairman in refugee or IDP 
camps, motorbike riding clubs, the Sierra Leone Awareness Movement (SLAM), the 
CDF (Civil Defense Forces), and the Civil Development Union (CDU) all grew out of the 
conflict and continued to function afterwards.  Of the previously mentioned associations, 
the CDF and CDU were formed after the urging of both the Sierra Leone Army and 
village chieftains.  As a result, these groups had widespread legitimacy among villagers 
and commanded some level of respect.  The Poro, Wonde, Gbangbani, Hunting, Ojeh, 
and Bondo secret societies dramatically changed their orientation during the civil war by 
taking on a host of new activities.  These secret societies patrolled villages to monitor 
security threats, hunted for game to distribute among the general population in order to 
alleviate local food shortages, held religious ceremonies, and otherwise mobilized a 
public caught up in the midst of conflict through their emphasis on bringing stability to 
war-torn communities (Vincent 2012: 14).   
 The secret societies and CDF often took charge in place of village chiefs that had 
been killed or forced into hiding.  For those villages where the traditional chief was alive 
during the conflict, the numerous secret societies and local chapters of the CDF 
nonetheless proved vital in terms of ensuring security.  The men’s secret societies were 
critical in organizing young people to arm themselves in defense of their villages from 
marauding bands still roaming the countryside after the end of the civil war.  The more 
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martial dimension of these secret societies is reflective of one of the most common social 
processes of civil war: the militarization of local governance (Wood 2008).  The role of 
Mammy Queens, which was an innovation the RUF brought to communities they 
controlled, persisted after the end of the conflict.  The RUF empowered the Mammy 
Queens to serve vital law making and conflict resolution functions in rural settings.  Due 
in part to the desires of paramount chiefs to be more inclusive in their leadership and to 
the considerable support for women’s rights from international peacekeepers and 
humanitarian actors on the ground, every village in Sierra Leone had their own female 
chief (who served as a liaison between village women and paramount chiefs) (Vincent 
2012: 21).  Thus, gender roles in Sierra Leone were transformed in rural leadership 
postwar.  
 The events of the civil war in Sierra Leone toppled many of the traditional power 
structures at the village level and the end of the conflict signaled changes in the authority 
of paramount chiefs.  The conflict greatly damaged the system of chieftaincy as many 
local leaders were killed by the RUF.  Additionally, insurgents kept many paramount 
chiefs alive in order to publicly humiliate them for past abuses (Keen 2005).  After the 
conclusion of hostilities, village chieftains were restored to power in roughly 80% of 
rural villages through considerable assistance from the Department for International 
Development (DFID), but the nature of their reinstatement varied depending upon the 
dynamics of the conflict in the particular locale (Thomson 2007: 10).60  In some villages, 
																																																								
60 The DFID spent significant sums on the return of national parliamentary elections and the restoration of 
paramount chiefs almost immediately after the end of the Sierra Leone civil war in 2002.  The focus of the 
DFID was to restore, as soon as possible, essential services and security to regions the government of Sierra 
Leone had lost control of to the RUF.  The DFID was pushing for systemic local and national government 
reforms but sought to work within existing institutions such as the paramount chiefs.  Paramount chiefs 
were restored by DFID primarily to oversee aid distribution and bring continuity in the lives of rural 
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the RUF created their own version of paramount chiefs, and after the civil war, these 
proxy chiefs gave up power voluntarily.  However, in northern Sierra Leone during the 
same time period, local leaders installed by the RUF displayed considerable resistance to 
being removed from power and these individuals had to be removed militarily or were 
forced to abandon their posts by the steadfast refusal of villagers to recognize their 
authority.61 Insurgents operating in areas in which the CDF was active during the civil 
war did not attempt to install their own proxy chiefs in local villages, fearing immediate 
reprisals from volunteer armed forces.  Thus, in these areas, the postwar transition took 
place without much difficulty. The RUF did not establish formal leadership structures in 
most of the areas they controlled during the civil war.  The challenge then in these areas 
was not reincorporation but ousting those squatters that had occupied property abandoned 
during the fighting.  Given the stresses of conflict and the sheer numbers of village 
leaders killed or forced into exile, the office of paramount chief would not have survived 
in postwar Sierra Leone if not for the assistance of the DFID (Vincent 2012: 19).   
 After the end of the civil war, the SLPP government and international donors 
initiated a plan of decentralization of authority at the village level.  The government of 
Sierra Leone noted that the abuse of authority by paramount chiefs was a crucial 
component in the alienation of the youth that later joined the RUF in armed resistance 
against the state.  The World Bank, DFID, and the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) argued that the inclination of the paramount chiefs to uphold customary 
																																																																																																																																																																					
residents.  However, control over crucial postwar development initiatives was given to newly formed 
village councils (see discussion on pages 19-21) (Thomson 2007).   
61 The army of Sierra Leone, local chapters of the CDF, and UNAMSIL led the fight against recalcitrant 
proxy chiefs in the northern areas of the country (Vincent 2012).  
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practices was a barrier to investment.62  Areas of Sierra Leone with more powerful chiefs 
have considerably worse development outcomes.  These parts of the country have 
significant lower educational attainment, poor literacy rates, and dismal figures on non-
agricultural employment.  The aforementioned international donors pointed out that 
paramount chiefs with few limitations on their authority would prioritize personal 
enrichment over village development (Acemoglu, et al. 2014).  Democratically elected 
village councils thus became the means to facilitate rural development initiatives and to 
check the power of the paramount chiefs. 
 Top down pressure from the Sierra Leone government and international donors 
caused a split in functions between paramount chiefs and village councils.  The Local 
Government Act of 2004 established separate spheres of authority for the paramount 
chiefs and village councils: law and order for the former and development initiatives for 
the latter.  By splitting the functions of the local councils and paramount chiefs, the 
authority of the latter was diminished relative to their prewar status while the former 
offered an avenue for citizenry to be included in decision making at the village level. 
Disaffected rural youth in particular, who during the war joined the RUF in large 
numbers as a means to express their objections to the arbitrary authority of paramount 
chiefs, used village councils in the postwar period to air their grievances and voice 
concerns over the state of their economic prospects.  Such open dialogue between youth 
and village leadership was unthinkable in the prewar period.  Women’s groups and men’s 
secret societies also asserted themselves through participation in the newly formed 
																																																								
62 While both the SLPP government of Sierra Leone and international donors had harsh criticisms of the 
system of paramount chiefs, getting rid of the institution was not discussed.  Abolishing paramount chiefs 




village councils (Fanthorpe & Sesay 2009).  Additionally, a number of the transparency 
mechanisms of the Local Government Act of 2004 in regards to the activities of 
paramount chiefs were welcome in rural communities: regular auditing of financial 
accounts, more thorough census collection, and making lists of taxpayers publicly 
available (Fanthorpe 2005: 43-44).63 Paramount chiefs are still influential figures in 
contemporary Sierra Leone.  However, without the civil war exposing the fundamental 
problems of paramount chiefs, a postwar push for reform of the selfsame institution 
would not have taken place. 
 
Land Tenure Security  
 The primacy of the paramount chiefs in decision-making regarding land had been 
a considerable obstacle to land reform and rural investment in Sierra Leone.  Using land 
as collateral (even for critically needed development loans) had long been frowned upon 
by paramount chiefs who view such a practice as a means of losing control of land within 
their chiefdom to outside owners.  All negotiations involving land have to be signed by 
the relevant paramount chief and lease terms are periodically updated in order to 
correspond to inflationary payments.  In Sierra Leone, a general lack of legal contracts 
and leasing arrangements has had a negative effect on utilizing farmlands for credit 
assistance (Salazar 2004). Disagreements over property lines have been a further drain on 
rural investment in Sierra Leone, as landowning families often devote their resources to 
																																																								
63 There are many criticisms of the move toward decentralization at the village level.  There has been rising 
tension between paramount chiefs and village councils over revenue collection.  There exists strong support 
for paramount chiefs in the realm of customary land rights as many villagers view them as a bulwark 
against intrusion by bureaucrats from the central government. Additionally, paramount chiefs have a 




bitter legal disputes with their neighbors over disputed territorial boundaries (GoSL 2005; 
Renner-Thomas 2004; Gamanga 2004). 
 Labor dynamics in the countryside have been greatly shaped in the aftermath of 
the civil war given the large population of displaced, maimed, or killed agricultural 
workers.64 There was a sharp postwar reduction in labor availability, which was 
exacerbated by a decline in livestock herds that increasing mechanization could not 
alleviate (SDAA 2005).  A clear solution to the ongoing challenge of labor shortages 
seems to be allowing individuals seeking employment to come in from outside the 
community to work on unused tracts of land.  However, this was blocked by pervasive 
fears from paramount chiefs of losing property by allocating land to outsiders (Turay 
2004).  These fears manifested in restrictions on allowing outsiders to rural communities 
to work as tenants for landowning households.  As an example, there has been long held 
restrictions on farm workers from outside the chiefdom planting trees or making land 
improvements that could facilitate their permanent residence in a rural community 
(Johnny 1980).  In many chiefdoms, outsiders were never allowed to permanently settle 
for fear they might start to claim territory for themselves (Salazar 2004).   
 New national polices promulgated upon the end of the civil war greatly shaped 
land tenure in Sierra Leone.  As per their traditional role, paramount chiefs remained the 
																																																								
64 Issues of land tenure are particularly critical for food security and investment in postwar reconstruction. 
To this end, the Ministry of Agriculture of Sierra Leone has lobbied vigorously to make hunger eradication 
a priority in order to better secure the economic future of the country.  Sierra Leone possesses fertile land, 
predictable seasonal weather patterns, and a historical legacy of production of a diverse array of cash crops.  
Additionally, Sierra Leone does not have territory littered with landmines left over from previous conflicts 
(an issue that continues to plague much of the African continent and serve as an impediment to agriculture).  
However, one of the lingering problems in Sierra Leone after the end of hostilities is the large tracts of land 
that remain uncultivated (well over four million hectares) despite the favorable conditions present in the 
countryside for food security and investment.  In the immediate aftermath of the civil war, there existed a 
clear disconnect between the presence of favorable conditions in Sierra Leone for agricultural productivity 
while large areas remain fallow (MAFFS 2005; Unruh & Turray 2006: 1).   
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gatekeepers to the approval of property transactions in rural communities, however, their 
authority was challenged by new legislation (GoSL 2005).  As previously mentioned, the 
postwar government sought to attract monies from international donors, such as the 
World Bank, DFID, and the UNDP, all of whom have strict land privatization 
requirements for assistance.  A move away from customary tenure and towards greater 
privatization in the land market was a clear signal to investors of how serious the SLPP 
government was in increasing investment in rural areas.65 The new National Lands Policy 
of 2004 necessitated that extensive land records be kept in order to prevent disputed 
property lines from leading to conflicts among rural households.  The 2004 Lands 
Commission Act created offices at the national, provincial, and district levels in order to 
oversee the application of the National Lands Policy.  The main function of the Lands 
Commission Act is to mediate conflicts between paramount chiefs in Sierra Leone and 
rural peasants over land access.  The 2004 Commercial Use Of Land Act sought to 
formulate legislation in order to modernize laws dealing with the commercial use of land 
to better attract foreign investment.  Leasing terms were significantly extended in order to 
encourage investment in rural areas specifically (LRC 2004).  The Commercial Use Of 
Land Act also simplifies the process of entering into joint ventures by having the 
paramount chief countersigning agreements between two parties in order to make their 
contract legally binding (Unruh & Turray 2006: 32).  These changes in the realm of 
tenure security in Sierra Leone helped bring about a more predictable land market in 
Sierra Leone.  
																																																								
65 Attempts at privatization of the land market in Sierra Leone run into the obstacles of how to manage land 
access rights among individual family members.  In a country with immediate food and security 
requirements, such a path could be highly destabilizing.  Paramount chiefs serving as gatekeepers to land 
transactions and new national legislation formalizing the transfer process helped to ease the fears of rural 
residents regarding familial disputes over property (Hussien and Gnisi 2005).   
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 In the aftermath of the civil war and spurred on by the new legislation, 
marginalized groups within the population began to vigorously agitate for their rights to 
land ownership.  Outsiders to rural communities in Sierra Leone (including those 
displaced due to the conflict), secured leases to work on unused tracts of land from which 
they had been previously been barred.  Additionally, these outsiders were finally allowed 
by paramount chiefs to make improvements on their leases such as planting trees or 
digging wells.  Thus, outsiders to rural communities were able to access land for their 
own short-term food needs while simultaneously investing in the long-term productivity 
of the leased property (Unruh 2003).  Paramount chiefs allowing outsiders to their 
villages access land in this manner is a break from hundreds of years of recorded practice 
in Sierra Leone, where local leaders would strictly limit the rights of individuals in terms 
of property ownership and land improvements, if they originated from another village or 
district.  Paramount chiefs in Sierra Leone favored leasing arrangements over the sale of 
property since leases bring a steady cash flow.  The chieftains view the ideal leasing 
arrangements as those that have an “element of continuation,” by bringing sustained cash 
flow to the larger community (Unruh & Turray 2006: 20).   
 In a postwar scenario, with many men in the community missing or killed, the 
ability of women to inherit property is critical for economic recovery (Unruh & Turray 
2006: 8).  The transformation of gender roles was a wartime social process that shaped 
the opportunities of women in many areas throughout Sierra Leone (Wood 2008).  The 
increasing visibility and producing power of women’s farm collectives in postwar Sierra 
Leone has helped shape cultural norms of property ownership.  In the southern and 
eastern parts of the country, women of the Tenme tribe have pooled their lands inherited 
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from dead relatives into farming collectives with significant productive capacity.  NGOs 
such as the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE), the Coalition of 
Women’s Movements, and the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) have 
further assisted the organizing of all-female farm collectives through a variety of methods.  
The Coalition of Women’s Movements and MRD sought to educate rural women about 
their inheritance rights in the postwar period.  (The death and displacement of men as a 
result of the civil war prompted paramount chiefs to loosen traditional restrictions on 
women in Sierra Leone being able to inherit property).  CARE also has a number of 
projects in Sierra Leone devoted to capacity building for the development of female 
farmers’ associations.  CARE hopes these projects will help secure long-term land rights 
for women throughout Sierra Leone.  However, at present, the increasing participation of 
women in farming collectives has helped to make use of land that would have otherwise 
gone uncultivated due to the deaths of male relatives.   
 The youth of Sierra Leone have grown increasingly vocal upon the end of the 
fighting in regards to rural social reform in general and their land rights in particular.  
Shortly after the end of the civil war, youth groups have, for the first time, been able to 
lease property directly from landowners.  Additionally, youth groups have been 
instrumental in pushing paramount chiefs to allow for the pooling of lands among 
multiple families in order to obtain the labor needed for large-scale agricultural 
improvements.  Whether farming in the upland or swamp territories, the clearing of land 
required a tremendous amount of labor traditional smaller family units could not hope to 
muster.  The larger plots of land necessitated the pooling of labor and greater collective 
effort and to this end, reciprocal labor gangs known as boma were formed throughout the 
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country.  Agricultural tasks were parceled out and taken on in turns among the different 
families in these collectives (Maconchie 2008).  (The number of casualties and displaced 
people as a result of the conflict also made this sharing of labor necessary).  This 
assertiveness on the part of youth towards paramount chiefs for their own lease rights as 
well as the establishment of reciprocal labor gangs is a far cry from their subservience to 
village authorities in the prewar years (Sawyer 2008: 387-403).  As Table 4.3 indicates, 
the percentage of agricultural land that is being used in Sierra Leone has steadily 
increased in the postwar years.   There have also been across the board increases in the 
production of rice, cassava, sweet potato, groundnut, and maize.  The boma arrangements 
have played a significant role in opening up new lands for cultivation and the resulting 
increases in agricultural yields (Larbi 2012). 
 Many challenges remain regarding a shift away from customary forms of tenure 
in Sierra Leone.  Fieldwork in Sierra Leone conducted by the Livelihood Support 
Program in 2006 has revealed consistent fears of agreement regarding leasing 
arrangements, due to a lack of literacy in the countryside and the binding nature of these 
contracts (GoSL 2005).  Outsiders to rural communities are still restricted from 
purchasing property outright by paramount chiefs, even though leasing terms have been 
significantly relaxed in the postwar period.  Furthermore, the rights of women in regard 
to land ownership are quite varied depending upon the particular region of Sierra Leone; 
women in the south and east can inherit property while their counterparts in the north are 





 James Fearon, Macartan Humphreys, and Jeremy Weinstein study the effects of 
aid disbursements in postwar reconstruction and argue institutional changes did not yield 
appreciable changes in overall material welfare.  They focus particularly on Community 
Driven Development (CDD) or Community Driven Reconstruction (CDR) programs that 
are present in multiple post-conflict countries.  These programs dole out block grants 
combined with strategies to improve local government.  Technical advisors assist in the 
election of councils tasked with overseeing local development initiatives.  The 
involvement of communities is assumed to bolster the material impact of development 
projects in postwar settings (Fearon, et al. 2009).  Another core assumption of these 
programs is the idea that social cohesion or cooperation at the local level is an essential 
ingredient in economic growth and political stability (Mansuri & Rao 2012).  
 Based on field experiments testing the efficacy of CDD/CDR programs in Liberia, 
the authors find considerable evidence of improved social cohesion in rural settings but 
they acknowledge that there has been little improvement in the material welfare of village 
residents.  However, there are key differences between my study and the work of James 
Fearon, Macartan Humphreys, and Jeremy Weinstein.  First, I do not only focus solely on 
CDD/CDR programs per se in Sierra Leone.  While the village councils created in the 
aftermath of the Sierra Leone civil war would fall under the framework of a CDD/CDR 
program, these representative bodies were just one aspect of the postwar institutional 
changes brought about upon the conclusion of hostilities.  Second, the program the 
authors study did not explicitly seek to improve material outcomes.  Instead, the 
CDD/CDR program in Liberia sought to enhance intra-community cooperation and the 
distribution of local public goods.  Much of the aforementioned legislation and grassroots 
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advocacy in postwar Sierra Leone was aimed directly at increasing investment in the 
agricultural sector and boosting the productivity of farm households.  While the results of 
James Fearon, Macartan Humphreys, and Jeremy Weinstein differ from those in this 
study, they do acknowledge the importance of local contexts in their research, albeit with 




Institutional changes during the 1991 conflict helped bring about an environment 
conducive to postwar agricultural recovery in Sierra Leone.  Highly influential patronage 
ties between chiefs and the once-dominant APC diminished upon the conclusion of 
hostilities and the ascension of the SLPP.  The government of Sierra Leone enacted a 
number of policies to bolster an agricultural sector damaged by battles between the 
national army and insurgent forces.   The SLPP government, in their attempts to court 
international donors, put pressure on paramount chiefs to share power with village 
councils in matters of development.  While the chieftaincy remained an important 
institution, local leaders had to contend with the increasing prominence of female chiefs 
and the participation of men’s secret societies and youth groups on village councils.  The 
paramount chiefs accommodated the need for changes in village leadership.  As young 
people could choose the option of moving to towns and leaving villages and exploitative 
local leaders behind, reforms became a way for the paramount chiefs to avoid losing the 
next generation. While paramount chiefs are still roundly criticized for a lack of financial 
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transparency and democratic accountability, the shift in patronage networks combined 
with the mobility of young people prompted significant shifts in local administration.  
In the postwar period, the authority of paramount chiefs regarding land tenure in 
rural settings was also challenged from a variety of sources.  National legislation 
extended leases, facilitated better record keeping, and set up property dispute resolution 
mechanisms in order to promote investment from international donors.  Paramount chiefs 
remained as gatekeepers for property transactions but faced increasing pressure from the 
government of Sierra Leone to move toward privatization.  Young people and women in 
Sierra Leone, long marginalized in terms of inheritance and communal land allocation, 
became far more assertive in regards to claims to their property rights in light of the 
significant postwar labor shortages and resulting unused tracts of land.  Changes in land 
tenure to include population subgroups normally discouraged from property ownership, 
helped make for a productive postwar economy as more land area came under cultivation 
(see Figure 4.3).   
 As previously mentioned, the social divisions of Sierra Leone were not along 
ethnic or tribal lines but between peasant households and paramount chiefs.  The youth in 
particular felt disenfranchised and profoundly disrespected by the demands of paramount 
chiefs. The following chapter on the postwar agricultural recovery of Uganda highlights 
the role of ethnicity as a root cause of the civil war.  However, unlike in Burundi, the case 
of Uganda illustrates how ethnic conflicts being resolved during civil war can serve to 
facilitate postwar agricultural recovery. 
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Chapter 5: Postwar Agricultural Improvements in Uganda 
Introduction 
 Although Uganda has an abundance of natural resources and extensive 
infrastructure (in comparison with many of its neighbors) decades of mismanagement and 
ethnic strife imperiled growth prospects for the central African country.  Most of the 
chief executives in the post-independence period sought to advance the causes of their 
own ethnic group and thus fueled intergroup tensions that often led to violence.  During 
the 1980 civil war, government forces aggressively attacked insurgent National 
Resistance Army (NRA) positions and the civilians therein.  However, the actions of the 
NRA served as the foundation for a reduction in tensions among ethnic groups in 
different regions of the country.  The NRA needed to expand beyond its own narrow base 
of support and prove its appeal to a variety of ethnic groups in Uganda.  The organization 
placed considerable emphasis on building and administering a multiethnic coalition in the 
areas under their control.  This logic of insurgency extended beyond the prosecution of 
the civil war to the governance of Uganda following the victory of the NRA.  Once in 
power, the leadership of the NRA sought to reduce historic tensions among ethnic groups 
in the country by resolving disputes centered on property rights.  Postwar land tenure 
reforms and changes in local government were pursued for this reason.  These changes 
not only served to address the fractionalization of national politics in Uganda, but also 
facilitated agricultural recovery postwar.  In the postwar period, the exogenous shocks of 
the civil war were mitigated as a result of the ways conflicts among various ethnic groups 
were addressed.  
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 The chapter proceeds as follows.  First, the state of postwar Uganda will be 
discussed.  While the civil war exacted a considerable human toll, postwar recovery has 
been promising, especially when compared to many other conflict cases on the African 
continent.  The focus of this section will be the post-conflict growth of the agricultural 
sector and its importance in the overall economic recovery of postwar Uganda.  Second, a 
discussion of the long-running ethnic conflicts in Uganda will be connected to the politics 
of the post-independence period.  How these ethnic rivalries have historically hampered 
growth prospects in Uganda will be examined.  Third, a brief summary of the events of 
the 1980 civil war will be introduced.  I focus on how the actions of the NRA during the 
conflict set the stage for broader institutional changes in the postwar period.  Fourth, I 
detail the local government changes the NRA instituted in order to both reduce 
destabilizing ethnic tensions and build support for the land policy changes needed for 
agricultural growth.  Fifth, I discuss how the specific land tenure changes initiated by the 
NRA facilitated agricultural recovery in Uganda.  In the Ugandan case, a move to 
freehold tenure and away from customary forms of titling led to an expansion of credit 
access for farmers, the diversification of the cash crop economy, and the reestablishment 
of large-scale commercial enterprises.  The chapter concludes with an examination of 
competing explanations for agricultural recovery in postwar Uganda and why these are 
not convincing.    
  
Postwar Economic Outcomes 
 The disputed return to power of Prime Minister Milton Obote triggered a 
devastating civil war in Uganda with considerable loss of life and extensive damage to 
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national infrastructure.66 The human cost of the civil war was devastating, as estimates of 
the civilian death toll range from 300,000 to 1 million people.  Most of these casualties 
occurred at the hands of the government forces led by Obote.  Needed infrastructure was 
crippled throughout northern and central Uganda during the conflict, where the fighting 
was heaviest.  148 schools were destroyed and 25,000 children had their studies 
interrupted in Luwero, Mpigi, and Mubende districts.  Hospitals and clinics were 
destroyed as a result of the fighting.  Additionally, many medical personnel fled to 
protect themselves, making access to needed health services extremely challenging for 
civilians caught in the crossfire.  The damage done to springs, wells, dams, and roads as a 
result of the fighting severely hampered transportation across Uganda (Weinstein 2006: 
71).   The considerable human toll of the conflict combined with the damage to needed 
infrastructure would prove to be a major challenge to overcome in the postwar years.    
 The agricultural sector of Uganda was considerably compromised during the 
conflict, but there was a divergence in the fortunes of large estates and small, family-
owned farms.  This divergence is clearly seen in the performance of various cash crops in 
Uganda during the war years.  In 1986, coffee production was at 73% of 1965 levels.  
This is in sharp contrast to cotton production, which was at 7% of 1965 levels in 1986 
(Warnock & Conway 1999: 5).  Coffee tends to be grown in small plots cultivated by 
family labor and thus proved remarkably resilient during the civil war because of its 
dispersal throughout the country.  However, the cultivation of cotton, sugar and tea, 
generally taking place in large estates, collapsed during the conflict years, as large estates 
																																																								
66 Obote was the first chief executive of Uganda after independence.  However, after only six short years, 
he did away with the democratic constitution of the country.   
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were raided by armed groups and the owners fled for their safety.67  Overall, the cash 
crop economy declined considerably during the conflict, as agricultural commodities that 
required large-scale cultivation procedures were unable to withstand the volatility of the 
civil war.  Export crops grown in small household plots performed quite well but were 
unable to make up this shortfall in productivity during the conflict years (Masiga & 
Ruhweza 2007). 
 The 1980 civil war subjected a Ugandan economy rife with serious flaws to 
further instability.  The administration of Idi Amin in the 1970s squandered much of the 
post-independence promise of a vibrant Ugandan economy and wealthy society.  Uganda 
had some of the lowest growth rates in the world during the Idi Amin regime.  The 
country experienced a 40% decline in GDP per capita in the period beginning with the 
rise to power of Idi Amin in 1971 to the end of the civil war in 1986 (Collier 1999: 1).  In 
the same time period, the rate of GDP growth in Uganda was among the lowest in the 
world at average of -2.6% per year (Warnock & Conway 1999: 4).68    
 
Table 5.1 Economic Overview of Postwar Uganda 1991-2001 
Series Name 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
																																																								
67 The revival of these estates and their cash crop production became a priority for the government in the 
postwar recovery of Uganda (Warnock & Conway 1999). 
68 I start each series in 1991, even though the Ugandan civil war ends in 1986.  The first several years upon 
the end of conflict are marked with considerable volatility and this is observed in economic measurements 
that are not reflective of postwar growth trajectories as a whole.  Thus, I start the measurement period 












2.095	 0.088	 4.903	 3.105	 8.127	 5.814	 2.007	 1.818	 4.818	 -.033	 1.852	
GDP	growth	
(annual	%)	






3.658	 3.783	 4.098	 4.361	 4.863	 5.304	 5.575	 5.848	 6.319	 6.518	 6.856	
Source: World Development Indicators: World DataBank 
 However, both scholars and members of the international business community 
view Uganda as a successful example of post-conflict recovery in the African continent.  
The growth of Uganda in the 1990s rivaled some of the best performing economies in the 
world.69 The fortunes of individuals rapidly improved in the years following the 
conclusion of hostilities in Uganda.  A significant reduction in poverty also took place in 
the postwar period due to the considerable national economic growth of the country.  The 
average household income of Ugandans increased by 40% in the period between 1987 
and 1997.  According to surveys, the proportion of citizens living in poverty decreased 
from 56% to 35% from 1992 to 2000 (Mallaby & Rosenblum 2005). 
Table 5.2 Foreign Direct Investment in Postwar Uganda 1991-2001 
																																																								
69 In the 1990s and early 2000s, GDP growth averaged approximately 6% per year and this expansion was 









0.030	 0.105	 1.695	 2.210	 2.106	 2.003	 2.791	 3.189	 2.337	 2.595	 2.594	
Source: World Development Indicators: World DataBank 
 A rebel victory in Uganda (and the subsequent ascension of the NRA as political 
leadership) fostered an environment friendly to foreign direct investment in the postwar 
years.  Foreign aid began to steadily flow into Uganda beginning in fiscal year 1986/1987, 
as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and international donors sought to 
further assist one of the few successful cases of postwar recovery in Africa (Warnock & 
Conway 1999: 17).   
 A critical component of the postwar economic recovery of Uganda was the 
revival of the agricultural sector.  26% of the population is employed as farmers and 40% 
of the productive capacity of Uganda is derived from the agricultural sector (Warnock & 
Conway 1999: 4-5).  According to 2005/2006 figures, 78.8% of households in Uganda 
made their residence in rural areas, accounting for 84.6% of the total population.  In some 
provinces, 85% to 90% of household income is derived from subsistence agriculture.  
While roughly 40% of rural households engaged in trade and manufacturing to make 
their living, agriculture is by far the most important source of income (Gollin & Rogerson 
2010: 1-8).  Therefore, the health of this facet of the Ugandan economy is a strong 
indicator for the overall state of affairs in the country.  
Table 5.3 Agricultural Overview of Postwar Uganda 1991-2001 













1.402	 1.389	 1.518	 1.545	 1.636	 1.705	 1.724	 1.754	 1.857	 1.848	 1.994	
Source: World Development Indicators: World DataBank 
 A considerable shift back to cash crop production marked the postwar agricultural 
recovery of Uganda.  Extensive government funding sought to boost cultivation of both 
traditional cash crops (coffee, cotton, tea, and tobacco) and nontraditional cash crops 
(beans, maize, peanuts, sesame seeds, soybeans, and a number of fruits).  Ugandan tea 
exports rose from roughly 2,500 tons in the late 1980s to well over 7,000 tons in 1991.  
Sugar production rose from nil in 1987 to over 40,000 tons in 1991.  However, traditional 
cash crops contributed little to the real GDP growth of Uganda during the postwar period, 
but the cultivation of nontraditional cash crops made up 30% of observed real growth 
after the end of the civil war (Warnock & Conway 1999: 19).  Although Ugandan farmers 
still struggle as a result of a lack of diversification in export crops and ongoing volatility 
in commodity prices, the strength of the agricultural sector has been quite promising 
(Masiga & Ruhweza 2007: 16-17).70 
 
Prewar Uganda (1966 to 1971)   
																																																								
70 One of the recent sources of volatility in Ugandan agriculture has been the rise of the coffee wilt disease.  
Beginning in 1993 in central and western Uganda, this fungal disease ravaged fields throughout the country, 
resulting in the loss of between 20% to 40% of coffee production in the 1990s and early 2000s.  The 
Ugandan government devoted significant resources to replanting afflicted areas with coffee beans resistant 
to the fungus (Baffes 2006).   
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 The 1980 civil war in Uganda had a number of interrelated root causes.  First, 
there was a long tradition of ethnic identity politics stemming from British rule. 71  
Second, economic decline exacerbated tensions that arose between ethnic groups and 
different regions of Uganda. 72  Third, a lack of institutionalization of the state authority 
and prevalent political mismanagement led to unconstitutional seizures of power 
(Mudoola 1996).   
 The administration of Idi Amin typified many of the fundamental issues central to 
the later Ugandan civil war.  While in office, Amin oversaw a period of heightened ethnic 
favoritism in national politics.  Amin was a young army commander who overthrew 
Prime Minister Obote of the Ugandan People’s Congress (UPC) in a coup in 1971.73 Idi 
Amin placed Sudanic ethnic groups from his own West Nile region in prominent political 
and military posts.  Additionally, Amin expelled the Asian community of Uganda and 
appropriated their personal property and business assets.  Larger firms would fall under 
direct state control while smaller enterprises were distributed among the Sudanic ethnic 
																																																								
71 The British imperial authority favored the Buganda region and gave its people special privileges relative 
to other ethnic groups in the country.  The Buganda were granted individual land tenure, allowed to elect 
their own leaders, and permitted to reject colonial taxes.  Both the Buganda and Busoga regions were set 
aside by the British as areas of cash crop production, with the rest of the Ugandan periphery ordered to 
supply cheap labor.  The Buganda region was the site of a highly centralized monarchy with a common 
language, territory, and system of administrative control. Thus, the British imperial authority felt they could 
lean on the already existing administrative structures of the Bugandan kingdom to assist in ruling the entire 
colony, despite the ire of neighboring ethnic groups (Mudoola 1996). 
72 The ethnic groups in Uganda have been highly stratified historically.  Social historian A.B.K. Kasozi 
groups the ethnic groups in terms of political influence and wealth relative to other ethnic groups. The 
Buganda people were the most privileged in terms of both political power and wealth in the pre-colonial 
period.  Busoga, Bugishu, Teso, Toro, and Ankole make up the semiperiphery while Kigezi, West Nile, 
Bunyoro, Lango, and Acholi comprise the periphery.  The Karamoja are the poorest and least influential 
ethnic group in Uganda. 
73 The ethnic favoritism of the Amin administration was also a staple of the previous Obote regime.  Obote 
ruled Uganda from 1962 to 1971.  He used his time in office to place those from his own Lango ethnic 
group into prominent positions and marginalize those hailing from the Buganda province.  The extensive 




groups, Bugandan Muslims, and the national military.  On the economic front, Idi Amin 
led Uganda into financial disaster.  He greatly increased the budget of the armed forces 
and intelligence services.  Additionally, Amin printed money recklessly to pay for 
monitoring and repression of civilians (Jorgenson 1981).  Once the rule of the Idi Amin 
ended, however, Uganda had a number of short-lived chief executives who were unable 
to manage the myriad political factions of the country competing for power.74  
 The disputed election of 1980 served as watershed moment in igniting the 
rebellion.  After the rule of Idi Amin, there was widespread hope that national elections 
would bring back democratic governance, but these contests were plagued with extensive 
vote rigging.  Milton Obote, now of the Ugandan National Liberation Front (UNLF), 
sought to return to power using a fraudulent election as cover.   Supporters of Milton 
Obote and the UPC used their positions on the Ugandan Electoral Commission to restrict 
party competition.  Thus, the UPC had tremendous influence over voter registration, the 
nomination of candidates, the drawing of constituencies, and the appointment of local 
monitors to oversee voting practices.  The acting head of government, Paulo Muwanga, 
compromised the integrity of the Electoral Commission by decreeing that all of the 
ballots cast should be submitted to him personally.75  A mere two days after the election, 
Muwanga declared Obote the winner.  In exchange for his assistance in securing the 
electoral victory, Obote appointed Muwanga as both his vice president and the secretary 
																																																								
74 Idi Amin was outdone by his territorial ambitions.  His attempted annexation of the Kagera region of 
Tanzania was an unmitigated disaster.  President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania formed the Ugandan National 
Liberation Front (UNLF) from Ugandan exiles living abroad.  Yoweri Museveni and Milton Obote, with 
the support of the Tanzanian government, led the UNLF against Idi Amin, culminating in the ouster of the 
dictator in April of 1979 (Jorgenson 1981).  
75 Those that did not heed the demands of Paulo Muwanga during the election process were subject to a 
fine of as much as 70,000 USD. 
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of defense.  As a result of the election, Obote gained control of the organs of Ugandan 
government in addition to his role within the UNLF.  Museveni cited the rigged election 
in 1980 as a key factor in the mobilization of opposition against the Obote regime 
(Mutibwa 1992; Kasozi 1994).   
 Museveni anticipated the theft of the 1980 election and was readying those allied 
to him to arm themselves upon announcement of the results.  Museveni competed in the 
1980 election as a member of the Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM).  However, fearing 
electoral fraud, he mobilized his supporters in advance of the new government taking 
power.  As a result, the forces of Museveni were prepared to initiate attacks on 
government outposts if the election was rigged (Brett 1995).  The end of the hope for a 
democratic Uganda after many decades of authoritarian rule led the disillusioned to 
associate with Yoweri Museveni and his insurgent organization.76  
 International actors turned a blind eye to both the fraudulent election of 1980 and 
the increasing violence in Ugandan in the aftermath of the return of Obote to power.  As a 
result, Museveni and his allies had to look internally for resources and recruits in order to 
maintain a viable insurgency against government forces.  Additionally, Museveni had to 
expand his appeal beyond his kin or those of the Banyankole ethnic group.  This inward 
orientation was reflected in the interactions of the NRA with civilians and their attempts 
at civilian administration in areas of Uganda where they exercised territorial control 
(Weinstein 2006: 69). 
 
																																																								
76 In a contemporary irony, Museveni has replicated many of the authoritarian tendencies of his 
predecessors, initial promises notwithstanding.  At the time of writing, he has served as president of 
Uganda for over 30 years.  He has been brought to power in increasingly questionable national elections.  
Museveni is currently the sixth longest ruling non-monarchial leader on the African continent. 
	
	 118	
The Ugandan Civil War (1980-1986) 
 By late 1981, Museveni and his allies would put into practice the strategies that 
aided in mobilization of the masses.  Based in Kampala, their main priorities were to 
secure food, clothing, medicine, and a host of other resources for the growing insurgency.  
Museveni and his allies accomplished this by organizing civilian support committees 
throughout the country.  After a failed attack on an armory in Kampala, the rebel 
movement hid for three months in the Luwero Triangle, focusing on the mobilization of 
civilians in support of their endeavor, the buildup of resistance councils, and the 
recruitment of additional militants to their cause.  During these three months, Museveni 
took no action against the UNLA until he felt assured that his forces had the necessary 
strength to wage a concerted campaign against the government (Kasozi 1994).  During 
the period spent in the Luwero Triangle, Museveni and his allies named themselves the 
National Resistance Army.77  
 The Ten-Point Program of the NRM was central to the ability of the organization 
garner external assistance and build domestic support for their activities.  The agenda of 
the organization included a commitment to restore democracy and security, the 
promotion of national unity, an end to sectarian politics, a plan to consolidate state 
institutions, the creation of a self-sustaining economy integrated with the outside world, a 
commitment to eliminate corruption, and an end to the regular abuses of power that 
routinely took place at the highest levels of government. The rank-and-file soldiers of the 
NRM were expected not only to understand the proposals of the Ten-Point Program, but 
																																																								
77 The insurgency soon split into a military wing known as the National Resistance Army (NRA) and a 
political wing known as the National Resistance Movement (NRM).   Museveni took on the role of leader 
of the NRA while Yusuf Lule, a former Ugandan president who joined the struggle against the Obote 
regime, assumed the role of chairman of the NRM (Kasozi 1994). 
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also to share the political agenda with the civilian population of Uganda.  Spreading the 
details of the plan among the masses served to endear the NRA and their cause to the 
people in the areas the insurgents controlled.  During the prosecution of the war, the NRA 
grew to over 20,000 soldiers capable of seizing and reshaping the Ugandan government 
by 1986 (Kazuya 2007; Mamdani 1988). 
 The NRM, under the leadership of Museveni, established Resistance Councils 
(RCs) in every village under their control.  The RCs elected their own governing bodies 
that started off representing local villages and in some cases expanded to district-wide 
jurisdiction (Olaka-Onyango 2004).  The RCs served highly divergent functions in 
wartime and peacetime.  The NRM maintained a strong connection to the village RCs in 
wartime in order to enlist recruits to their cause, divert food to the war effort, and gather 
intelligence on the movements of government forces. Furthermore, RCs brought all of the 
adults in the village together to make decisions about issues critical to the lives of 
peasants and resolve a wide variety of local interpersonal disputes (Ori Amaza 1998). 
 The UNLA proved unable to make any significant inroads in their struggle against 
the NRA in the early years of the Ugandan civil war.  Government forces were plagued 
by corruption and a lack of discipline that made a concerted campaign against the NRA 
difficult to mount.  Government forces looted private property, destroyed infrastructure in 
the Luwero Triangle, and routinely massacred civilians in the region.  (The UNLA would 
often leave the bodies of killed peasants in the open as a grisly warning against 
cooperation with Museveni).  UNLA excesses often led directly to local peasants looking 
to the NRA for protection (Mutibwa 1992).   
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 Additionally, the UNLA found it difficult to concentrate resources against the 
NRA in the Luwero Triangle because of the presence of numerous insurgent groups 
operating throughout Uganda.  The Uganda National Rescue Front launched numerous 
attacks against the UNLA in the West Nile district in northern Uganda starting in 1980.  
By 1982, the Uganda National Rescue Front held most of the district and made it nearly 
impossible for government forces to traverse the north of the country safely.  The UNLF 
Anti-Dictatorship was also highly active in mobilizing civilians against the government 
in Western Uganda.  The Uganda Freedom Movement, led by former president Godfrey 
Binaisa, disagreed with the approach of Yoweri Museveni and the NRA.  Instead of 
preparing for a protracted armed struggle against the UNLA as the NRA sought, the 
Uganda Freedom Movement instead orchestrated highly mobile strikes against 
government facilities.  The goal of these attacks was to strike fear in urban populations in 
order to spark mass protests that could destabilize the Obote regime for good (Mutibwa 
1992).  As a result of the activity of numerous insurgent organizations, government 
forces were completely cut off from the Luwero Triangle, while the NRA moved freely 
among the local population, mobilized popular support, and administered life in the 
region.  
 The Grand Offensive against the NRA changed the strategic calculus of the 1980 
Ugandan Civil War.  The Obote regime launched an extensive attack on the NRA in the 
Luwero Triangle in January 1983 after gathering together approximately 75% of the 
military to go after the growing insurgency with a concentrated effort.  Over the next four 
months, government forces attacked numerous NRA positions within their central base of 
operations.  This attack dispersed the NRA operating within the Luwero Triangle and 
	
	 121	
forced the insurgents to flee to the plains of Singo in neighboring Mubende district.  
(Roughly 1.5 million civilians who lived in the Luwero Triangle and were administered 
by the NRA fled with the insurgents).  The loss of their operational headquarters was a 
major strategic blow to the NRA.  The NRA was unable to meet their subsistence needs 
in the far less fertile Singo Plains.  Additionally, the insurgents faced continuous attacks 
from government forces that made establishing a new base of operations exceedingly 
difficult.  In yet another blow to the rebel organization, the NRA encouraged civilians 
whom they could no longer feed or protect to settle back in areas of government control.  
Stripped of arable land and access to loyal civilians, the NRA had to rebuild in the face of 
steadily increasing government attacks (Mutibwa 1992). 
 After almost two years within the Singo Plains, the NRA rebuilt their strength and 
greatly expanded the scope of their efforts against the UNLA.  By April 1985, the NRA 
started to mount attacks against government forces in western Uganda (in the home 
district of Museveni).  The insurgents soon replicated their approach in the Luwero 
Triangle in western Uganda: the NRA established a zone of liberation for peasants 
fleeing UNLA control, created a functioning government administration, and made 
extensive preparations to attack the capital of Kampala.78  After defeating the last of the 
																																																								
78	Tito and Basilio Okello, two army officials, overthrew the Obote regime in a military coup on July 27, 
1985, before Museveni could carry out his invasion plans.  (The continuous marginalization of the Acholi 
officer corps of the UNLA and the favoritism shown toward the Longo ethnic group was the primary 
reason for the takeover).  Tito Okello served as president of Uganda while Basilio Okello was commander 
of the armed forces.  The Okello brothers fully recognized the popular sentiment supporting the NRA and 
acknowledged their growing military might.  As a result, they encouraged Museveni to attend peace talks in 
Nairobi in order to properly plan a full political transition for Uganda.  However, the NRA left the 
settlement talks in Kenya when the Okello brothers did not appear interested in fundamentally reshaping 
Ugandan politics in the ways envisioned by Museveni in the early 1980s. The insurgency then moved 
against the Okello brothers by attacking Kampala from two fronts at the end of 1985.  Tito Okello was 
exiled to neighboring Kenya while Basilio Okello sought refuge in Sudan (Lindemann 2011).	
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UNLA forces, Yoweri Museveni was sworn in as president of Uganda in January 1986, 
ending a struggle lasting six years (Lindemann 2011).    
 
Postwar Uganda: Local Government Changes 
 Changes in Ugandan local decision-making structures served to address 
intergroup conflicts and marshal support for the reforms of the Museveni administration.  
After the end of the conflict in 1986, the power of the RCs expanded greatly as these 
bodies were institutionalized in the new government as a result of the NRM victory.  The 
NRM-led government installed the RCs, now known as Local Councils (LCs), in every 
village in Uganda.  The LCs wholly replaced the institution of the village chieftain and 
leadership by male elders in Uganda.  The Local Government Act of 1997 infused the 
LCs with needed resources to strengthen their authority and expand their reach beyond 
the village and to the district level (Kabwegyere 2000).  
 The LCs played a significant role not only in the leadership of local communities, 
but also in the drafting of a new Ugandan constitution.  The LCs effectively mobilized 
the masses to partake in the drafting of a new constitution for Uganda as well as the first 
national elections in the postwar period.  The writing of the Ugandan constitution was 
truly a broad based effort with a considerable level of societal participation from all 
ethnic groups and regions of the country. The Uganda Constitutional Commission (UCC) 
held nearly one hundred seminars at the district level in order to distribute information 
and garner suggestions (Moehler 2006).  Ugandans elected a national Constitutive 
Assembly (CA) that would debate the draft constitution for a period of sixteen months 
until voting for the document in 1995.   In the first national election held since the end of 
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the civil war, the turnout rate was 87%, a figure unheard of in post-independence Uganda 
(Weinstein 2005: 17).  Many of the ethnic groups that had historically been left out of 
national administration were eager to be represented in the drafting process, as evidenced 
by the high turnout figures across all districts.79 
 After the victory of the NRM, the organization established a “no-party 
democracy.” This state of affairs lasted until 2004.  All adults in Uganda were registered 
as part of the NRM.  Abolishing parties was a key part of NRM propaganda directed 
toward civilians during the civil war.  Museveni expressed his fervent desire to avoid the 
near constant sectarian strife that had plagued Ugandan politics since the period of British 
colonization and he feared the potential destabilizing effects of parties organized along 
explicitly ethnic lines.  This was done as an extension of the NRM philosophy during the 
Ugandan civil war to build a broad base of support within the center and south of the 
country.  Museveni in particular could not use a strategy of exclusion via political parties, 
since his own ethnic group, the Banyankole, was far too few in number to effectively 
administer the country or even his insurgency (Kasfir 1998; Tripp 2004).   
 Furthermore, elections are held at every level and the personal merit of candidates 
has been emphasized over previous considerations of party affiliation (normally tied to 
the status as being a member of a privileged ethnic group in Uganda).  To this end, 
Museveni sought to uncouple ethnicity from access to the state bureaucracy.  While the 
Ugandan bureaucracy was still compromised by aforementioned patronage ties, an 
extensive system of merit-based testing was instituted for the purpose of filling vacancies 
																																																								
79 This high level of participation is consistent with the findings of James Fearon, Macartan Humphreys, 
and Jeremy Weinstein in Sierra Leone regarding social cohesion and exposure to participatory mechanisms.  
Relations between people at the community level increased greatly when engaging in locally derived forms 
of participation, such as the LCs of Uganda.  However, this effect decreases when the aforementioned 
participatory mechanisms originate from foreign interveners.  	
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in government posts.80 Additionally, for those in the upper echelons of the state 
bureaucracy, Museveni made sure to appoint a multiethnic cabinet to avoid appearance of 
favoritism that dogged former chief executives of Uganda (Weinstein 2005: 18).  He 
went so far as to include within his government leaders of the many diverse movements 
that mobilized against Milton Obote in the 1980s (Warnock & Conway 1999: 6).   
 The Museveni administration sought to defuse some of the more destabilizing 
ethnic conflicts within the country by giving groups greater autonomy in the form of their 
own districts.  In the aftermath of the civil war, Museveni began an expansion of 
subnational units that continues to this day.  When compared with other sub-Saharan 
African countries, Uganda has far more subnational political units.  Furthermore, there 
are far fewer citizens per district in Uganda than in neighboring states. 
Table 5.4 Average Population Size Per Subnational Unit In 10 African Countries 
Country Name of Unit Number of Units Avg Pop Per Unit  
Uganda District 111 345, 218 
Nigeria State 37 5,028,469 
R Sudan State 18  2,040,527 
Tanzania Region 30 1,749,424 
Ethiopia State 11 9,306,767 
DR Congo Province 26 3,128,117 
Mozambique Province 10 2,593,015 
																																																								
80 Ha-Joon Chang notes a professionalized bureaucracy came quite late in the development of now 
developed countries or NDCs.  Nepotism and the outright sale of public offices were quite rampant in 
NDCs.  The same holds true for a late developing country or LDC like Uganda.  While multiethnic 
appointments and merit based testing are positive signs, Uganda still struggles with the doling out of 
bureaucratic offices as a reward for political loyalty to the Museveni regime. 
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Ghana  Region 10 2,690,826 
South Africa Province 9 6,033,412 
Kenya County 47 995,548 
Source: Elliott Green 2010/CIA World Factbook  
 Generally, the primary rationale for such a high level of decentralization is the 
management of ethno-linguistic conflicts (as in other sub-Saharan country cases like 
Nigeria) (Mawdsley 2002; Suberu 1991).  Uganda, one of the most ethnically 
fractionalized countries in the world, with 65 ethnic groups officially recognized by the 
national constitution, has taken significant steps to curb intergroup tensions with the 
increasing decentralization of power (Alesina et al. 2003).  The Museveni administration 
created 47 new districts for this purpose (Treisman 2007).  Of these 47, 13 newly created 
districts (27.7% of all new subnational units created) led to a minority ethnic group 
becoming a majority within a particular administrative division.   
 Ethnic or linguistic groups that were once minorities in larger provinces received 
autonomy within their own subnational units, as was the case of the Aringa people in 
northwestern Uganda, near Lake Albert.  The Aringa were a minority within the Arua 
province.  The vice president of Uganda under Idi Amin was an Aringa, and as a result, 
the entire ethnic group was perceived to be close allies with the murderous dictator.  The 
UNLA consistently harassed the Aringa and scattered them from their lands during the 
late 1970s/early 1980s.  The Aringa had historically been restricted from speaking their 
own native language and other forms of cultural expression until the creation of Yumbe 
district in 2000, where the Aringa now comprise the majority of inhabitants.  Presently, 
the Aringa are free to speak their native language openly and make choices regarding the 
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development of their ancestral lands through LCs as a result of the decentralization of 
Uganda (Prunier 2004). 
 However, the host of new subdivisions of the Ugandan state served a purpose 
beyond the alleviation of ethnic tensions: the cultivation of new sources of patronage for 
the Museveni administration.  In particular, the growth of both public and private sector 
jobs brought on by the decentralization of the country served as a way for Museveni to 
make sure regional elites were loyal to his administration.  The new districts in Uganda 
require a host of administrative, clerical, and technical staff to fill numerous positions 
(Green 2010: 93).  Additionally, the creation of new district capitals is a significant 
windfall for private construction companies who are tasked with building new 
headquarters.  Finally, new districts attracted significant attention from international 
donors who established operating centers in new regional capitals.  These donors created 
new job opportunities via infrastructure projects funded through generous grants to 
districts.  The renovation of Entebbe International Airport, the maintenance of crumbling 
road networks, the installation of new village water systems, and a variety of worker 
training programs became sources of patronage for local officials (Walford 2006).  
Humanitarian NGOs such as World Vision and the Adventist Development Relief 
Agency established themselves in Uganda in the early 2000s, and resulting job creation 
and funds from donors also served as opportunities for local patronage (Green 2010: 94). 
 The creation of new subdivisions allowed political elites to extend networks of 
patronage to rural areas, as shown in the area of social welfare funding (Crook 2003).  
Although the Ugandan government became increasingly decentralized, provinces were 
still heavily dependent on funds from the federal government for schools, medical 
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facilities, and poverty reduction programs.  (For example, 80-90% of the expenditure in 
Kibaale and Kabarole counties during the 1990s came from the federal government).  
Local officials would then divert funds set aside for social services (and investments in 
infrastructure in particular) (Sverrisson 1999; Belshaw 2000).  In fact, there is significant 
evidence of elites in the countryside using their positions to divert education funds in 
particular to their own patronage networks (Reinikka and Svensson 2004).  As a result of 
these reinvigorated patronage networks, regional elites in the countryside were reliant on 
the Ugandan government.   These same regional elites ensured Museveni would be able 
to implement his more ambitious land reform programs with their full support. 
 The return of the Asian population is another manifestation of the Museveni 
administration policy of mitigating otherwise damaging policies toward ethnic minorities. 
Idi Amin castigated the wealthy Asian community (who primarily made up the urban 
commercial class) as “bloodsuckers” directly responsible for the economic malaise of the 
country.  Amin expelled Asians en masse to the great detriment of the Ugandan business 
sector.  The Museveni administration partnered with roughly five hundred Asian exiles 
and returned to them their assets.81  For those Asians that were plantation owners prior to 
the Amin regime, the Museveni administration invested in their estates with great effect.  
The return of the Ugandan Asians spurred an increase in the production of cash crops 
such as tea and sugar but such effects were minimal given the small numbers of the 
returning population (Ghosh 2012).  However, despite the minimal agricultural impact, 
																																																								
81 Idi Amin expelled roughly 90,000 Asians during the 1970s.  The overwhelming majority were either too 
poor to return or unwilling to come back given their memories of the resentments between Ugandan Asians 
and other ethnic groups in the country (Ghosh 2012). 
	
	 128	
the return of some of the Ugandan Asians spoke to the willingness of Museveni to 
address the destabilizing ethnic tensions of times past. 
 
Postwar Uganda: Land Tenure Changes  
 The local government reforms the Museveni administration put in place in the 
aftermath of the civil war helped to alleviate longstanding ethnically rooted tensions over 
land ownership.  Historically, legislation regarding land tenure goes back to agreements 
signed between the kingdom of Buganda and the British Empire in 1900.  The British 
sought to instill a primitive form of freehold tenure in Uganda in order to tie the people of 
Buganda closely to the imperial authority and establish some protections for expatriates 
living in the colony.  Under the previous system of tenure, local chiefs had divvyed up 
land among peasants working small plots of land in a system of reciprocal obligations.  
The Uganda Agreement of 1900 divided tracts of land into parcels measured in square 
miles, otherwise known as mailo land.  The British authorities granted half of these plots 
to the kabaka of Buganda to be distributed among noble families within the largely 
autonomous kingdom (Richards 1954: 126-127).82  The mailo system allowed property 
owners (the kabaka and his notables) to buy and sell land, as well as bestow it to 
whomever the possessor wished.83  (The already dominant Bugandan ethnic group 
became further privileged in terms of property rights due to the workings of the mailo 
system).  The Busulu and Envujo Law of 1927, promulgated by the British, commuted 
the traditional dues owed by peasants to a fixed annual payment (busulu) and promoted 
																																																								
82 The other half of the plots was to be held as a protectorate of the Crown.  Under the British protectorate, 
the imperial authorities granted freehold and leasehold tenure arrangements throughout the kingdom of 
Buganda and elsewhere in Uganda (Richards 1954). 
83 The kabaka was both the king and the spiritual leader of the kingdom of Buganda.	
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an additional levy per acre (envujo) for cotton production (Hunt 2004: 175).  However, 
neither the Uganda Agreement of 1900 nor the Busulu and Envujo Law of 1927 granted 
occupiers of land long-term tenure security.    
 In 1969, seven years after the independence of the country, the Ugandan 
government led by Milton Obote passed the Public Lands Act.  This piece of legislation 
invested power in the Land Commission to verse property held under customary tenure.  
The Public Lands Act did allow those landholders under customary tenure to be 
consulted/receive compensation should they have their plots converted to freehold or 
leasehold systems (McAuslan 1998: 5). 
 The Idi Amin regime attempted to make drastic changes to land tenure that would 
have proved highly destabilizing if they could have been implemented.  The 1975 Land 
Reform Decree was in many ways an expression of the hostility Amin had toward the 
Bugandan ethnic group. Amin declared (as was his wont to rule by decree) that the public 
owned all land in Uganda.  Any freehold or mailo systems (most prominent in the 
kingdom of Buganda) would be converted to leasehold properties with the state as the 
sole owner.  In theory, customary tenure was also severely weakened by the decrees of 
Idi Amin, as landowners had no recourse to prevent their property being seized.  
However, in practice, landowners and government administrators largely ignored the 
destabilizing proclamations of Idi Amin regarding land tenure (Hunt 2004: 176).84   
 In the aftermath of the NRA victory, the government of Uganda commissioned a 
study that would shape land tenure policies in the country.  The World Bank and USAID 
																																																								
84 The attempted replacement of all tenure systems with public ownership was one of the many sweeping 
changes Idi Amin attempted to initiate but failed to bring to fruition due to his limited influence beyond the 
armed forces of Uganda. 
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provided the funding while the University of Wisconsin Land Tenure Center and the 
Makerere Institute of Social Research carried out the research.  The report strongly 
recommended the adoption of freehold tenure throughout the country in order to establish 
a functional market for land and allow for land to be used as collateral for credit.  The 
promotion of commercial agriculture was identified as a key priority for the researchers 
and financial backers of the study in question (Hunt 2004: 176). 
 After the release of the recommendations of aforementioned study, large numbers 
of mailo landowners, absentee property owners, and women’s rights advocates put 
pressure on the Museveni regime to implement greater tenure security in the postwar 
period.  First, Museveni sought to compensate those victimized while living under NRA 
rule in the Luwero Triangle region of Kibaale County during the events of the civil war.  
Many of the citizens of the Luwero Triangle were mailo landowners (generally from less 
wealthy and less politically influential ethnic groups in Uganda).  After the conclusion of 
hostilities, mailo landowners witnessed a reduction in their rights (often as a result of 
being absentee landowners during the conflict) and demanded compensation from the 
Museveni administration.  Additionally, as a result of the national debate set in motion by 
the release of the study and the deaths of many male heads of households during the civil 
war, women and minors in Uganda advocated for the strengthening of their rights to land 
as well (Hunt 2004: 176). 
 The 1998 Land Act was the culmination of pressure placed on the Museveni 
administration by mailo/absentee landowners and women’s rights groups.  The Land Act 
sought to formalize traditional land rights, allow for a transition to freehold tenure, and 
provide additional tenure security for historically marginalized ethnic groups in Uganda.  
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Under the 1998 Land Act, individuals were able to obtain certificates of customary tenure 
and convert these arrangements to freehold title.  Land tribunals and decentralized local 
administrations were put in place by the legislation in order to resolve property disputes.   
Additionally, the 1998 Land Act empowered local governments to hold environmentally 
sensitive areas of Uganda in trust for the citizenry.  A Land Fund was created to support a 
certification process whereby tenants would receive officially recognized occupancy of 
their property.  (The Land Fund was also designed to compensate landowners for any 
financial losses they would incur as a result of the certification process).  Transactions of 
land were prohibited in cases where spouses or dependent children resided on property 
that could no longer be managed by the original owner (Hunt 2004: 177).  As a result, the 
land rights of women, children, and orphans were strengthened considerably.  
 One of the primary reasons for the push to freehold tenure as seen in the 1998 
Land Act was the hope that the ability to use land as collateral would lead to more 
productive farming and a quicker agricultural recovery.  However, barriers remained in 
the path of small-scale and commercial farmers trying to use their land as collateral for 
agricultural loans.  Since agriculture is inherently risky because of ever-present market 
volatility and natural disasters, banks in general are necessarily cautious when it comes to 
any farm loan.  In Uganda specifically, bank managers sought to avoid taking on 
excessive risk by being hesitant to give out loans to farmers with whom they did not have 
prior dealings or who were not well known in the community. Furthermore, 
administrative costs are generally higher to begin with in rural areas in need of 
agricultural loans due to the quality of transportation and communication infrastructure in 
these regions.  Finally, a banking crisis in Uganda in the late 1990s brought on by the 
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poor management of excessively risky portfolios, limited the amount of credit available 
to commercial farmers who had freehold title.  Despite these barriers, there has been a 
gradual climb in the level of credit available to small and large-scale farmers alike as a 
result of the 1998 Land Act and the ensuing tenure changes (Hunt 2004: 181-182). 
 Changes in existing property rights are often necessary for economic development, 
and this holds true in postwar Uganda.  A stable regime, as was the case with the mix of 
the mailo system and customary tenure in Uganda, may need to be substituted by other 
institutional arrangements in order for better growth outcomes to manifest.  In other 
words, security of property rights may not be a good in and of itself if such arrangements 
could potentially hamper economic growth (Chang 2002: 82).  The system of property 
rights in Uganda heavily favored the large-scale landowners (who generally hailed from 
the most politically influential ethnic groups in the country).  Small-scale cultivators 
(overwhelmingly represented by the most marginalized ethnic groups in the country) 
have had a fragile relationship with their land, given widespread tenancy and the resulting 
fees to the prominent landowners.85  However, for both large and small farmers in 
Uganda, a lack of access to credit was limiting to their overall productivity.  Changes in 
land tenure paved the way for the use of property as collateral for needed loans in the 
expansion of agricultural projects in the country.  
 
																																																								
85 As previously mentioned, much of the growth in the agricultural sector postwar was due to the increase 
in nontraditional cash crops.  Those hailing from marginalized ethnic groups commonly grow these crops 
in small estates.  In the aftermath of the war, changes in land tenure greatly impacted the productivity of 
small farmers from poorer or less influential regions of Uganda.  A more inclusive approach to matters of 
tenure increased credit flows as well as government assistance to traditionally marginalized ethnic groups 
who cultivated the nontraditional cash crops that accounted for much of the postwar economic recovery of 





        In order to explain how agricultural productivity recovers from the shocks of 
warfare, several competing models have been applied to conflict cases such as 
Uganda.  The explanations of donor assistance and the actions of an enlightened autocrat 
fail to adequately account for the nature of the growth of the farming sector that took 
place in the postwar period. 
        The first explanation is that of donor-induced recovery and policy reform in terms 
of pushing the privatization of land and structural adjustment programs (SAPs). 
Prominent actors within the international development policy community, such as the 
IMF and the World Bank, assume countries following the ten points of standard SAPs 
provide for themselves a strong foundation for significant economic growth.86  Museveni 
followed many of these precepts by reining in public spending through cutting the federal 
civil service (although there was expansion in the local bureaucracy due to the growing 
numbers of Ugandan provinces), devaluing the exchange rate to boost exports, moving 
away from customary forms of tenure, and liberalizing the coffee market so growers 
could keep a larger share of their profits in the early years of his administration.  In the 
midst of a coffee boom in the 1990s and other positive economic signs from Uganda, 
money from international donors like USAID, the IMF, and the World Bank flooded the 
																																																								
86 Ha Joon Chang notes that the international development policy community recommends institutional 
changes for countries experiencing economic turmoil.  The IMF, WTO, and the World Bank (among other 
organizations) assert that the “right kind of institutions,” are needed for economic growth.  These 
institutions strongly resemble the arrangements found in the United States and Western Europe, such as 
democracy, a professional bureaucracy, private property, an independent judiciary, well established 
banking institutions etc.  SAPs are then employed in developing countries as a way to realize these 
“optimal institutions.” (For the purposes of my dissertation, the privatization of land will be the primary 
research focus).  However, Chang argues the implementation of SAPs does not take into account the 
different challenges developing countries in the contemporary period have (when compared to the United 
States and Western Europe in the 19th century) or the length of time the so-called optimal institutions 
needed to take root in the developed world. 
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country.87 Donor funds went to a variety of programs aimed at reducing poverty, building 
needed infrastructure, and encouraging more efficient land usage (Weinstein 2005: 16). 
        However, by itself, changes in policy and aid from international donors are not 
sufficient as an explanation for the agricultural recovery of Uganda postwar.  The 
institutions that helped shape the Ugandan economy in the postwar years were 
homegrown, and not installed by technical advisors from the IMF or World Bank (Kasfir 
1998).  SAPs have been instituted in a number of financially struggling or war-ravaged 
countries, with an infusion of foreign aid, but the results have not been overwhelmingly 
positive.  Often, local changes brought on by SAPs would be rejected, sometimes 
violently, at the local level.  The Museveni administration empowered LCs with decision-
making authority and in so doing was able to approve economic reforms with the votes of 
rural Ugandans.  SAPs did help in bringing back the cash crop industry of Uganda with 
the aforementioned devaluation of the currency and liberalization of the coffee market.  
However, these reforms were contingent upon local approval as expressed through the 
LCs (Mallaby & Rosenblum 2005).  Thus, the institutional and policy changes in the 
postwar years were given an added legitimacy due to being supplemented by local 
initiative. 
        Another alternative explanation for the postwar agricultural recovery of Uganda is 
reliant on the characterization of Yoweri Museveni as an “enlightened autocrat.” A core 
tenet of this explanation is that the wise leadership choices of Museveni created an 
environment for the flourishing of the Ugandan economy postwar, including the 
agricultural sector (Mallaby & Rosenblum 2005).  Not only is this argument hard to 
																																																								
87 Some of these positive signs included a reduction in inflation and the accumulation of foreign reserves.  	
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apply beyond Uganda for those interested in postwar recovery, but it also does not 
comport with the facts of the country case.  First, such an account minimizes the need for 
the Museveni administration to balance the domestic pressure for government price 
controls and international pressure for exchange market reforms, for instance.  Most 
importantly, some of the appointments Museveni made early in his administration and the 
failure of initial economic recovery plans undercut the “enlightened autocrat” thesis.  The 
economic policies of his finance minister, Ponsiano Mulema, were disastrous for 
farmers.  Mulema initiated a reevaluation of the Ugandan shilling by abolishing the legal 
market rate.88 This prompted exporters to keep their capital abroad and pushed importers 
to obtain transaction licenses as quickly as possible to do business at the artificially 
favorable rate.  The reevaluation of the Ugandan shilling and exchange rate manipulation 
bolstered a highly profitable and visible smuggling industry in Uganda (Warnock & 
Conway 1999: 6).   Finally, the description of Museveni as an excellent economic 
manager places far too much importance on the role of the chief executive in postwar 
recovery while simultaneously minimizing the local efforts essential to an economic 
turnaround after the end of hostilities.  
        Although the rebel victory in the civil war facilitated greater representation at the 
village level through LCs and a move toward freehold tenure at the local level in Uganda, 
a number of persistent problems remain.  The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has been 
active in the northern regions of the country and has regularly terrorized 
civilians.  Dealing with the LRA insurgency has been a significant drain on the resources 
of the country and an ongoing security challenge.  Additionally, Yoweri Museveni began 
																																																								
88 Official transactions were carried out at 1,400 shillings to the dollar while all other legal market 
transactions took place at 5,000 shillings to the dollar (Warnock & Conway 1999).   
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to considerably strengthen the office of president of Uganda as soon as he took 
power.  He made numerous changes to the Ugandan constitution to facilitate increased 
executive powers and eased restrictions on term limits.89 After allowing a number of 
parties to compete both locally and nationally beginning in 2004, Museveni walked back 
many of these increased freedoms soon thereafter.  He greatly restricted political 
competition over the past decade (Weinstein 2005: 18).  Museveni has been the chief 
executive of Uganda continually since the NRA victory in 1986 and has entrenched 
himself at the top of the political system for the foreseeable future (Mugisha 2004).  
    
Conclusion 
 Attacks by government forces on NRA strongholds (and the limited appeal of an 
insurgent movement initially made up almost entirely of Banyankole) shaped the overall 
outlook of Museveni and his forces.  The NRA needed to appeal to a multiethnic 
coalition in order for their resistance to remain viable.  Furthermore, the constant pressure 
from the UNLA forged significant ties between the NRA and the ethnic groups the 
insurgency administered.  Changes in local government helped both broaden the appeal 
of the NRM and ensure that the policy shifts under the Museveni administration would 
receive considerable support from the population.  In fact, land reform would not have 
held if not for the support of Ugandan villagers as expressed through local councils. In 
the case of Uganda, local institutional changes persisted due to pressure from those 
																																																								
89 The office of the president of Uganda was already one of the most powerful chief executives on the globe.  
This was before the constitutional changes that significantly reshaped the powers of the presidency.  A 
great deal of the power of the office comes from extensive powers of appointment (the president can 
appoint up to ten members of the Ugandan Parliament) and the institutional foundations put in place by the 
NRM being able to avoid party competition for the first eighteen years after the end of the civil war (the 
party of Museveni is much wealthier, more nationally known, and has larger membership than any 
competing political faction in Uganda). 
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supporters of the NRA during their struggle against the UNLA (namely the 
mailo/absentee landowners and women’s rights advocacy groups).  
        Changes in institutional arrangements in Uganda created a more productive 
environment for agriculture postwar.  The gradual transition to a freehold system of 
tenure eased the market for credit and microfinance options for farmers.  Financial 
support from the Museveni administration to farmers shifting to freehold tenure in the 
postwar period helped to mitigate the expenses of the potentially costly transition.  The 
growth of the cash crop economy, the revival of large commercial estates, and the 
increasing diversification of the produce grown by cultivators considerably strengthened 
the agricultural sector of Uganda postwar. 
 While ethnicity played a distinct role in the both the 1993 Burundian civil war and 
the 1980 Ugandan civil war, the aftermath of these conflicts are highly divergent.  The 
CNDD-FDD in Burundi was limited in their appeal due to their explicitly pro-Hutu 
slogans and policies. The logic of insurgency carried over to postwar administration as 
the CNDD-FDD installed their own members as part of village councils throughout 
Burundi to push through land policies without the approval of rural residents. The 
CNDD-FDD ended up replicating predatory state practices of previous Tutsi dominated 
administrations through the use of extension agents who sought to enrich themselves and 
build patronage networks at the expense of peasants and needed agricultural investment.  
This is in sharp contrast to how the NRA sought to expand their limited appeal and how 
they pursued the approval of villagers regarding agricultural reforms in the postwar 
period through the use of LCs. Agricultural productivity postwar in both countries was 
largely shaped by how ethnic conflicts were addressed.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Introduction 
 This dissertation sought to address a gap in the scholarly literature on economic 
recovery after civil wars.  Postwar economic legacies are among the least understood 
elements of intrastate conflict.  The institutional legacies of conflict, despite being critical 
for the overall economic health of the country in question, are also poorly understood 
(Blattman & Miguel 2010).  My research linked postwar recovery in the agricultural 
sector to the postwar political settlement.  Namely, who controls the state and the 
structure of the state in the postwar period can have a significant effect on the 
institutional arrangements critical for productivity in the agricultural sector.  I found the 
institutional arrangements critical to more productive agriculture to be land tenure, the 
ability to manage societal divisions, and participatory mechanisms at the local level.90 I 
found that these aforementioned institutional arrangements had a significant effect for 
economic recovery in the postwar period depending on the nature of the political 
settlement.   
 My contribution hinges on how conflict can bring about institutional changes that 
lead to greater agricultural productivity.  In my case studies, barriers to political 
participation at the local level and social divisions have shaped land tenure policies that 
were ultimately detrimental to agricultural productivity.  Some of these land tenure 
policies included the numerous restrictions placed upon land access, the establishment of 
opaque rules regarding property disputes, and the creation of numerous barriers to credit.  
																																																								
90 I include the ethnic conflicts of Burundi and Uganda as well as the disputes between paramount chiefs 
and villagers in rural communities in Sierra Leone in my definition of social divisions.  Assessing the 
impact of social divisions on economic growth is yet another young field of inquiry that merits further 
examination.   
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Across my cases, civil war led to shifts in the longstanding dominance of the polity in 
question by particular ethnic and social groups (control of the state shifted from Tutsis to 
Hutus in Burundi, the power of paramount chiefs was challenged in Sierra Leone, and the 
pull of ethnic loyalties in Uganda was replaced by allegiance to Yoweri Museveni and his 
newly victorious insurgency).91  The changes in who controlled the state apparatus as a 
result of the conflict were codified in changes to the structure of the state postwar.  In the 
case of Uganda, changes in local government and the way in which preexisting social 
divisions were addressed led to land tenure reforms that fostered greater credit access, the 
establishment of property dispute resolution mechanisms, and a movement toward 
freehold title for marginalized groups, leading to improved outcomes in the agricultural 
sector.  However, this was not the case in either Burundi or Sierra Leone.  In Burundi, 
control of the state shifted but the structure of the state remained largely intact in the 
aftermath of the civil war.  Thus, land tenure policies detrimental to the agricultural 
sector persisted.  In Sierra Leone, neither those in control of the state apparatus or the 
structure of the state shifted in the postwar period.  As a result, there was little 
appreciable change in land tenure policies postwar, with mixed results for agricultural 
productivity in the same time period. 
 My research was unable to answer a few questions that have puzzled researchers 
on the topic of postwar economic recovery.  Scholars have often struggled with 
identifying the institutions that are most critical for overall economic growth.  Some of 
the institutions commonly emphasized by multilateral development agencies such as the 
																																																								
91 My three civil war case studies diverged in terms of the source of violence.  In Burundi, the Hutu and 
Tutsi became increasingly segregated over the course of the conflict and mass violence was aimed at ethnic 
rivals.  In Sierra Leone, the focus of the RUF was primarily the paramount chiefs who were blamed for a 
number of humiliations local peasants endured.  In Uganda, the NRA built a coalition from a number of 
ethnic groups in order to sustain a resistance that could be a credible threat to UNLA forces. 
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World Bank and the IMF for their importance to development are property rights, social 
cohesion among members of a community, and the existence of a professional 
bureaucracy (Acemoglu et al 2001; Knack & Keefer 1997).  This dissertation does not 
identify which are the most important institutions for economic growth.  Instead, I 
focused on agricultural productivity rather than economic recovery in the broader sense.  
This is justifiable given the significant percentage of the population employed as farmers 
and the proportion of the national economy based on agriculture in all three case studies.  
Additionally, this dissertation was unable to definitively elucidate a link between security 
of tenure and agricultural productivity.  Land is one of the most fought over resources in 
LDCs, although this varies greatly depending on factors such as population density and 
the percentage of arable land available.  However, in countries with a high percentage of 
the population working in farming, disputes over land are commonplace and destabilizing 
for economic development.92  There is an expectation then that the security of tenure 
leads to both reduced tensions over land ownership and increased agricultural investment 
(Feder, et al. 1988; Barrows & Roth 1990).   However, my research further supports the 
idea of a link between tenure security and agricultural productivity that is highly 
dependent, first and foremost, on the nature of the postwar political settlement in which 
changes to land arrangements are taking place.  In my case studies, land tenure changes 
would lead to improvements in agricultural productivity only in instances where 
participatory mechanisms at the local level were instituted and longstanding social 
conflicts were addressed.  Likewise, if political participation at the local level was stifled 
																																																								
92 The primacy of land as a motivating factor for conflict is evident across the three case studies in the 
project.  Additionally, voluntary/involuntary movements of people, localized environmental degradation, 
and disputes over the beneficiaries of natural resource wealth have been contributed to violent conflict in 
Burundi, Sierra Leone, and Uganda for several decades (Huggins 2004).   
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and social conflicts were left unaddressed, changes in land tenure meant little to postwar 
agricultural productivity. 
 The chapter proceeds as follows.  First, the results across the three case studies 
will be summarized.  Commonalities among all of the countries will be emphasized in 
this section: patronage networks and the power of institutional persistence are shared 
across Burundi, Sierra Leone, and Uganda in their respective postwar periods.  Second, 
all three of the case studies displayed considerable diversity in terms of the conditions 
under which land reforms and changes to participatory mechanisms at the local level took 
place.  These conditions will be examined in light of still open questions regarding a 
connection between land tenure and agricultural productivity.  Third, some potential 
avenues for future research will be highlighted.  Moving the scope of this study to 
conflict countries beyond the African continent, analyzing a possible link between victory 
conditions and postwar institutional development, highlighting the role of external actors 
in institutional change, and emphasizing additional institutions shaped by warfare all 
should be further explored.  The chapter concludes with the policy implications of my 
research.  Aid programs put forward by multilateral organizations such as the World 
Bank and the IMF have identified a number of targets to improve in post-conflict 
reconstruction, but these initiatives may not be successful without an understanding of 
institutional development.  
 
Summary of Results  
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 Challenging existing patronage networks was a crucial first step in promoting 
postwar recovery in the agricultural sector for Sierra Leone and Uganda.93  In Sierra 
Leone, longstanding patronage ties between paramount chiefs and APC politicians 
perpetuated customary land practices that served as a barrier to rural investment.  The 
APC ruled Sierra Leone from 1967-1991 with the help of paramount chiefs, who served 
to stifle political dissent in exchange for support from party elites.  In the prewar years, 
paramount chiefs stymied moves toward privatization of land in rural communities.  
When the SLPP won the first elections in postwar Sierra Leone, their push to attract 
foreign investment shaped the land market of the country (Vincent 2012).  Leasing 
requirements were relaxed as a result of national legislation passed in the aftermath of 
war, increasing investment in land improvements. Young people, women, and those who 
originated outside of their villages of residence vigorously agitated for their rights to land 
ownership/to open up more land for cultivation in the postwar period.  However, 
paramount chiefs, who continued to serve as gatekeepers to land access in rural Sierra 
Leone, vigorously opposed these measures to recognize the claims of young people and 
women to land or open up new areas for cultivation.  As a result of the continued 
influence of paramount chiefs, despite some small improvements, agricultural outcomes 
in the aftermath of the civil war were disappointing given the increased investment in the 
agricultural sector (Unruh & Turray 2006).  In Uganda, challenging the use of the state as 
a vehicle for ethnic advancement was central to the struggle of Yoweri Museveni and the 
NRA.  As power in Uganda at the federal level shifted from Milton Obote to Idi Amin to 
																																																								
93 Patronage networks were also a common feature among all three case studies.  While all the case studies 
are situated in sub-Saharan Africa, patronage is not somehow unique to the continent (Bach & Gazibo 
2013).   
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the Okello brothers, those of the same ethnic group as the chief executive were elevated 
to positions of power.  This practice promoted a great deal of neglect for Ugandans from 
less wealthy or less influential parts of the country (as well as historically marginalized 
ethnic groups). After the victory of the NRA, older forms of patronage based on ethnicity 
became supplanted with newer forms based on direct loyalty to Museveni.94 Residents of 
rural communities, particularly from minority ethnic groups who had supported the NRA 
during the civil war and lost their holdings as a result, put pressure on the Museveni 
administration regarding their land rights (Hunt 2004).  As a result of this pressure and in 
exchange for continued support of the Museveni administration, national legislation in 
Uganda was passed giving marginalized groups a means to convert certificates of 
customary tenure to freehold title and the creation of tribunals to settle longstanding 
disputes over land.  Moves toward the acquisition of formal titles and the formation of 
means to settle land disputes helped strengthen the postwar agricultural recovery of 
Uganda.   
 Failing to address the ill effects of lingering networks of patronage in Burundi, 
where privatization of land would be discouraged and marginalized ethnic groups had 
few avenues to assert their ownership rights, had negative implications for postwar 
agricultural productivity. The prewar links between the Tutsi-dominated Uprona and 
Frodebu parties and local extension agents jeopardized agricultural yields.  Extension 
agents coerced peasants into growing cash crops that they could then profit from by 
capturing export revenue.  Despondent farmers would plant food crops in secret and 
avoid adding land improvements as a result of the widespread theft of agricultural yields.  
																																																								
94 Local leaders would be directly connected to President Museveni and his allies through their placement 
in government posts in newly created districts (Green 2010).  	
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The actions of extension agents promoted inefficient uses of land that diminished yields 
and overall productivity in the agricultural sector, as profits from cash crops would be 
taken by state bureaucrats and more profitable food crops had less space for cultivation 
(Ngaruko & Nkurunziza 2002).  In the aftermath of the 1993 Burundian civil war, many 
of the rent-seeking mechanisms that once belonged to Tutsis shifted to the Hutus.  
Extension agents under CNDD-FDD leadership treated peasants in the same abusive 
manner as they did during the dominance of the Uprona and Frodebu parties.  
 My research also details ways in which institutional change can occur by 
overcoming institutional inertia.  Some literature on institutional change assumes a 
gradual evolutionary process where something analogous to the law of natural selection is 
applied to institutional arrangements (Lin & Nugent 1995).  The basic outline of this 
argument is that inefficient institutions will eventually decay and give rise to more 
efficient ones (North 1990).  One of the most common reasons for the existence of this 
inertia is the “political settlement,” or the balance of power between various groups in the 
larger population (Khan 1995: 77).  Those groups with a greater share of power will be 
able to effectively destroy opposition movements calling for institutional reform from 
other sectors in society.  The balance of power in local settings then needs to be upset in 
order to break the tremendous pull of institutional inertia (Ndikumana 1998: 41-43).  The 
civil wars in Burundi, Sierra Leone, and Uganda provided the shock needed to upset the 
balance of power in the respective countries. 
 The role of institutional inertia was a significant barrier to institutional change 
across all three case studies before their respective civil wars.  In Burundi, extension 
agents ensured continuity despite a shift in government from the Uprona and Frodebu 
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parties to the CNDD-FDD.  In Sierra Leone, the role of paramount chiefs as custodians of 
land helped to impede moves toward privatization of land.  In prewar Sierra Leone, the 
historical traditions and spiritual significance associated with paramount chiefs 
contributed to their longevity as a rural institution (Fanthorpe & Sesay 2009).  In Uganda, 
ethnic favoritism by post-independence administrations was a long running feature of 
national politics.  In fact, there was a widespread expectation new administrations would 
use the office of the chief executive to appoint ethnic loyalists to positions of power and 
simultaneously settle scores with ethnic rivals (Lindemann 2011).  
 In all three case studies, institutional inertia was challenged in different ways.  In 
Burundi, mass ethnic violence and the victory of the CNDD-FDD toppled longstanding 
Tutsi domination of the national politics.  The reins of Burundian government passed 
from the Tutsis to the Hutus as a result of the considerable violence between the two 
ethnic groups (an oft-repeated occurrence in the history of Burundi).  Institutional inertia 
was challenged in the Burundi case as the coercive apparatus of the state shifted from the 
Uprona/Frodebu parties (who had held on to power since the independence of the country 
from Belgium in 1962) to the CNDD-FDD.  In Sierra Leone, the targeting of paramount 
chiefs by the RUF prompted changes in the age-old institution.  This was due in part to 
the deaths of many chiefs during the events of the civil war, as well as the revival of the 
institution by DFID in order to serve as a vehicle for the disbursement of aid.  A 
combination of the violence of the conflict and outside pressure transformed paramount 
chiefs in Sierra Leone.  In the postwar period, paramount chiefs needed to share authority 
in matters of rural development with reinstated village councils.  In Uganda, the rise of 
the diverse NRA and their ascension to political power helped to bring about a shift in the 
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ethnic politics of the country.  The NRA needed to broaden their appeal given that 
Museveni’s Banyankole ethnic group was far too small to constitute a proper offensive of 
the UNLA government.  Museveni challenged the institutional inertia of longstanding 
dominance of the Ugandan state by influential ethnic groups out of strategic necessity 
(Weinstein 2006). 
 
Discussion of Results 
 How land reforms were initiated in the country cases is critical in our 
understanding of agricultural recovery and investment.  Land tenure reform was a priority 
in both Sierra Leone and Uganda.  Under pressure from DFID, the government of Sierra 
Leone began a move toward privatization of longstanding customary arrangements 
managed by paramount chiefs.  The Museveni government in Uganda sought to change 
land tenure arrangements in order to attract foreign investment.  Changes in land tenure 
were reinforced with pressure from Ugandan citizens living in rural communities through 
voting sessions of LCs.  However, in Burundi, any changes to land tenure were mostly at 
an individual or household level.  Due to the considerable death and displacement 
brought about by the civil war, individuals and households sought to strengthen their 
claims to land left unoccupied by previous owners or to secure themselves from any 
property disputes generated by the conflict.  The rise of informal property markets in the 
postwar period and households using financial assistance from actors such as the 
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) to pursue formal title were two of the primary ways 
conflict shaped land tenure in Burundi (Lin 1995; NRC 2007).  These changes in land 
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tenure were undercut by the aforementioned practices of extension agents and did not 
lead to greater investment in the agricultural sector postwar. 
 Changes in local government structures, critical as a means of addressing social 
divisions that have historically hampered growth in the agricultural sector, meant 
different things across all three case studies.  In Burundi, local government changes 
largely meant a transfer of the coercive power of the state apparatus from Tutsi-
dominated political parties to the victorious CNDD-FDD.  Since the independence of 
Burundi, one of the underlying causes of conflict, in addition to access over scarce land, 
has been control over the state and the corresponding opportunities to profit through a 
number of rent-seeking opportunities (Uvin 1999).  In Sierra Leone, the paramount chiefs 
were restored by DFID, with some limitations to their authority in matters of 
development of rural communities.  In the postwar period, pressure from the SLPP 
government and the return of village councils diminished the power of the paramount 
chiefs somewhat.  In Uganda, there was a rise in participatory decision-making at the 
local level through the formation of LCs (and RCs as their predecessor).  Access to 
decision-making power in Uganda was measured not by ethnic loyalties as in 
administrations past, but in terms of loyalty to Museveni and the NRA. 
  
Directions for Future Research 
 A number of possibilities for future projects have opened up during the course of 
the research.  My study highlighted changes in land tenure in postwar Burundi, Sierra 
Leone, and Uganda.  These land tenure changes had implications for agricultural 
recovery in the three case studies in terms of increased agricultural investment and land 
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access to previously marginalized groups.  However, further research needs to be 
undertaken to understand the applicability of studying land tenure changes in regions of 
the world beyond the African continent.  Furthermore, all of the case studies are low-
income countries.  Do middle-income countries that have experienced civil war also 
exhibit similar changes to land tenure during the course of the conflict?  Also, as middle-
income countries are considerably less reliant on agriculture/less of their populations 
work in the farming sector, would changes in land tenure have an appreciable postwar 
effect?  It may be that examining the plight of agriculture would not be an effective way 
to gauge postwar economic recovery in a middle-income country. 
 My research raises questions about the connection between differences in victory 
conditions and improvements in postwar economic outcomes.  All three cases had 
slightly different conclusions to their respective civil wars: the CNDD-FDD in Burundi 
defeated Tutsi-dominated political parties, the SLPP took power with the help of British 
intervention against the RUF in Sierra Leone, and the NRA won a military victory 
against the Obote government in Uganda.  A number of scholars have noted how 
attempts by rebels to govern the areas in which they control could prompt some changes 
in already existing institutional arrangements (Arjona 2010; Arjona 2014; Kalyvas 2006; 
Mampilly 2011).  If government forces defeat insurgent groups, would any of the 
institutional changes made persist beyond the conflict?  Who wins in a civil war would be 
an intervening variable to take into account in further studies of postwar institutional 
change.  
 The role of outside intervention in spurring institutional changes merits additional 
examination.  There was little support from external actors during the conflicts in 
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Burundi and Uganda.  The most prominent actors in Burundi were peacekeepers from the 
African Union and the United Nations.  However, they were only present after 2003 in 
order to support the peace agreement between President Domitien Ndayizeye of Frodebu 
and Pierre Nkrunziza of the CNDD-FDD.  After the end of hostilities, little foreign 
assistance was available in Burundi, save for 35 million USD from the United Nations 
and additional funds from humanitarian NGOs operating in the country (Huggins 2007).  
In Sierra Leone, the 1991 civil war was marked by extensive outside interference from 
Nigerian-led ECOMOG/ECOWAS, Liberian troops under Charles Taylor, and the British 
armed forces (who sought to rescue UN troops captured by the RUF).  Upon then end of 
the conflict, DFID funded postwar recovery initiatives in the country (Posthumus 1999).   
In Uganda, there was little outside assistance during the fighting itself but considerable 
aid was available from multilateral development agencies such as the World Bank and 
the IMF in the postwar years (Mallaby & Rosenblum 2005).  There was little push from 
outside groups regarding changes in government or tenure security in Burundi, but this 
was certainly not the case in either Sierra Leone or Uganda.95 The relationship between 
outside actors getting involved during the conflict and pushing for changes to institutions 
postwar could certainly be further elaborated.    
 The effects of outside assistance on agricultural outcomes were variable across 
the country cases.  I found that if outside assistance supports the political changes that led 
to growth in the agricultural sector, then the role of such help is positive.  Aid from 
																																																								
95 USAID, the IMF, and the World Bank gave considerable amounts of financial assistance to Uganda in 
the 1990s.  As part of this assistance, these multilateral development agencies viewed the privatization of 
land and structural adjustment programs as keys to the sustained postwar economic recovery.  In Uganda, 
the IMF and the World Bank in particular pushed for reining in spending on the federal civil service, the 




multilateral development agencies was helpful in the postwar agricultural recovery of 
Uganda, although local councils played a critical role in mitigating the impact of some of 
the more controversial recommendations of the World Bank and the IMF for rural 
communities.  However, if assistance from external sources does not support the political 
changes that lead to growth in the agricultural sector, then the role of such help is either 
ineffective or even harmful.  In Burundi, Norwegian NGOs pushed peasant households to 
secure for themselves formal title to their land in order to avoid being displaced and to 
spur investment in agricultural improvements (NRC 2007).  However, as Norwegian 
NGOs were ultimately incapable of dealing with the predatory practices of extension 
agents in the Burundian countryside, efforts to secure formal land title for households 
were not helpful in improving agricultural outcomes.  DFID was instrumental in reviving 
the institution of paramount chiefs in Sierra Leone and attempting to limit their authority 
with reinstated village councils.  However, the continued administrative role of 
paramount chiefs in regards to land has allowed some of the more persistent problems of 
rural communities in Sierra Leone to continue in the postwar period.  Thus, those who 
originate from outside their current residence, young people, and women still struggle for 
access to land.  Additionally, large tracts of territory that could potentially be productive 
remain uncultivated in Sierra Leone.  
 Other institutions that are affected by civil war should be another fruitful avenue 
of research.  My focus on local government and land tenure could potentially be 
expanded to include a number of other institutions that may be linked to postwar 
economic growth.  As previously mentioned, one of the difficulties with this subject is 
the difficulty in assessing the institutions that are responsible for economic growth.  
	
	 151	
Measurement is another challenge: proxy variables will most likely be needed in order to 
gauge links between institutions and economic growth.  For instance, democracy can be 
measured by looking at indicators of civil and political rights (Rodrik 1999).  Civil wars 
and institutional development need to be analyzed further is order to uncover some form 
of general relationship between the two (Beber 2012).  
 
Conclusion 
 My research has highlighted some findings with clear policy implications. As 
assistance to post-conflict countries has grown ever more controversial, an understanding 
of how economies recover or fail to recover after a civil war is more crucial than ever.96 
The World Bank and the IMF have designed development/reconstruction programs and 
loan packages as a means for post-conflict countries to escape the ruin of conflict and 
prevent the recurrence of widespread violence.  In the post 9/11 global moment, 
assistance to countries that have experienced a civil war is increasingly seen as a stopgap 
measure against the spread of global terrorist networks.97  The model of autonomous 
recovery proposed by Jeremy Weinstein provides an alternative view on the role of 
assistance programs to countries that have recently undergone conflict.  Countries can 
recover on their own from the tremendous upheaval unleashed by intrastate conflict, 
																																																								
96 Aid in general has become increasingly contentious in the last few years.  There have been lingering 
questions raised about the effectiveness of aid given the tenuous links between financial assistance and 
economic growth rates and an increased focus on the importance of societal institutions.  Furthermore, the 
effectiveness of aid has been under fire given well-publicized instances of theft and corruption on the part 
of foreign leaders who are recipients of financial assistance (Moyo 2009).   
97 The World Bank has several development programs running in Afghanistan for example.  The World 
Bank loans the country over $150 million a year and manages the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund 
that amounts to nearly $1 billion.  World Bank development programs in Afghanistan are geared not only 




provided institutions are in place to foster participatory mechanisms at the local level and 
properly manage societal divisions (Weinstein 2005).  As John Bellows and Edward 
Miguel assert, “the humanitarian costs of civil wars are horrific but it appears their 
legacies need not be catastrophic (Bellows & Miguel 2006).” Changes in local 
government and land tenure had positive effects for agricultural recovery depending upon 
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